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This thesis investigates if China’s system conforms to János Kornai’s theory of 
reform socialism. To facilitate this study Kornai’s theory of socialism is outlined 
in depth and its basic features are compared with evidence drawn from a broad 
range of multidisciplinary research on contemporary China. I find that the three 
necessary and sufficient features of socialism that Kornai identifies are all 
present. I also reveal other similarities between reform socialism and China’s 
contemporary system.  
 
The idea that China is best understood as a variety of capitalism is considered, 
and I reflect on the dynamics of the state and private sector in modern China. 
After 1978 an important inspiration for China’s economic reforms was the 
Soviet New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced under Lenin in 1921. The Soviet 
economist Evgeny Preobrazensky studied the forces shaping policy during the 
NEP and elaborated a Marxist method to reveal how the contradictions 
between socialist and capitalist tendencies vie for dominance over the 
economy. He views this economic conflict as a type of class struggle, which 
takes the form of ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ (PSA). The planned 
development of the economy accumulates from the private sector, and 
increases the importance of the working class in the economy.  
 
The state sector exercises its dominance by exploiting its semi-monopolistic 
power and undertakes projects of vast scale and ambition. The workforce finds 
it is able to exert considerable pressure on the ruling Party and bureaucracy. 
This indicates that the relationship between the working class and the Party 
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There is a broad global consensus in academia, politics, and economics, 
as well as among the wider public, that China’s system represents an 
enigma. Some scholars have described it as a repressive and barbaric 
form of capitalism (Andreas, 2008; Hurst, 2013; Harvey, 2011). Others, 
such as Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004), have suggested that a ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ is replacing the ‘Washington Consensus’ with a new model 
of capitalism. The late Giovanni Arrighi (2009) suggested that China is 
trailblazing a new model of East Asian development, with a huge appeal 
to the Global South. In a similar vein, the former Chief Economist and 
Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Lin Yifu believes that China’s 
economic miracle is based on a growth formula that other developing 
countries can emulate (Lin et al., 2003; Lin, 2012; Banque mondiale and 
Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). 
 
China’s idiosyncratic status is rooted in the fact that after socialist states 
in Europe and the former Soviet Union collapsed China’s system not only 
survived but also flourished. The year 1989 marked a dramatic turning 
point in world history: social protests erupted, and in most of these 
socialist states a process of internal disintegration of state power began. 
Furthermore, it was in Beijing that this year of street demonstrations, 
rallies and revolutions that shook socialist states began. Students 
initiated this movement. It protested against corruption and inflation, and 
won widespread support amongst the urban masses. On 4 June the 
army forcefully seized back control of Tiananmen Square, the epicentre 
of the unrest, and the movement was defeated. 
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The movement that erupted in East Germany demanded political change. 
This led to the breaching of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Then, 
huge protests broke out across Eastern Europe, which brought down 
socialist governments in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania. In the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Communist 
Party’s leader since 1985, had initiated reforms from above, based on 
‘glasnost’. This term signified openness of discussion, which was 
combined with economic restructuring. However, economic reforms 
stoked up social tension and increased inequality, and this intensified 
popular unrest. In the summer of 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed 
following an aborted coup. The Cold War was over. Socialism lost. 
Capitalism won. Or, so it seemed.  
 
However, nearly 29 years after the dramatic events of 1989 China’s 
Communist Party remains firmly in power. Why did it survive and flourish 
when Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed? This question has 
perplexed and intrigued me since 1989. It was the fall of the Berlin wall 
that led me to engage with questions of the role of markets in a socialist 
system and the complexities of the process of economic transition from 
capitalism to socialism.  
1.1. Research question 
 
This thesis poses the question is China still socialist? This assumes that 
China was once socialist, but what are the defining characteristics of this 
lost world of socialism? If China is no longer socialist, is it a variety of 
capitalism? How well does China system match-up with theories of 
Chinese capitalism? And how influential are China’s socialist remnants? 
Does China’s combination of capitalism and socialism represent a new 
system of political economy, in which markets and planning are but 
neutral methods of economic progress?  
 
To address these questions, I draw on the analysis of socialism worked 
out by the Hungarian economist János Kornai, which provides the pivotal 
reference point around which this thesis revolves. His theory exercises a 
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towering influence in the field of the political economy of 20th century 
socialist systems. His ideas were also central to Chinese policy debates 
on economic reform from 1985 onwards. In the context of this thesis, his 
definition of socialism will be used to evaluate its relevance to China 
today.  
 
I also engage in a historical analysis of the Soviet Union in the 1920s. 
Kornai describes this period as the prototype of all future socialist 
systems. I survey the terrain in which debates on the transition from 
socialism to capitalism took place. This was an environment where the 
state and private economy were both present and influential. Does 
China’s combination of a dominant state sector surrounded by capitalist 
and pre-capitalist economic forms reveal parallels to the circumstances in 
the first decade of the Soviet Union? If so, what are these parallels? To 
address these questions, I analyze China’s economic structure, 
economic debates, and internal dynamics, by comparison with the Soviet 
system during the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 to 1928. My 
questions are concerned with examining the main contradictions and 
driving forces of the New Economic Policy, as well as the main regulators 
of the economy.  
 
The work of the leading Soviet economist Evgeny Preobrazensky is crucial to 
such a historical comparison. His theory of primitive socialist accumulation was 
developed most fully in his study of the New Economic Policy. I ask what 
insight his theory can provide about Chinese economic debates and policies?  
 
Even though both Kornai’s and Preobrahensky’s theories of socialism are 
highly respected by specialists in the field of socialist economics, their 
value for the study of China’s political economy has been neglected in 
English language scholarship on China.  
 
Social relations of power and class are central to the concerns of both 
thinkers and they lie at the heart of the Marxist theory of social change. 
To expand on their study of the political economy of socialism and 
capitalism, I attempt to supplement their insights with an exploration of 
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China’s modern class relations. This concentrates on the role of the 
working class in China’s transformation. To this end, I examine the 
formation of the working class as an objective and a subjective force. To 
assist in this task I employ concepts of class and state power 
championed by the prominent American sociologist Eric Olin Wright 
(1994, 2000a). I reflect on what insight this type of class analysis can 
elicit about the enigmatic features of China’s system.    
1.2. Context 
1.2.1. Personal background 
 
My interest in the fate of socialist states comes from personal 
experiences in 1989. This sustained my on-going fascination with 
socialism, communism and Marxism, and inspired my focus on China. 
My mother is German and my father is Chinese Malaysian. As a 
consequence, when I became interested in Marxism in 1980, East 
Germany and the People’s Republic of China presented fascinating and 
intriguing questions that I still find challenging and exciting today. 
Studying Marxism, inevitably involved dealing with the question of how to 
evaluate the Soviet Union and other states, which claimed the socialist 
and Marxist mantle as the philosophy guiding their principles and state 
system. Discussions around this question seem to me to lie at the heart 
of any serious attempt to propagate, explain and formulate an alternative 
to capitalism that might also have a popular appeal in the advanced 
capitalist countries. 
 
In the summer of 1988 I moved from London to West Berlin in order to 
regularly visit East Berlin. I hoped to gain a better understanding of the 
system, to make contact with like-minded people in East Germany, and 
to participate in what I hoped would become the revolutionary 
transformation of East Germany and of all the Eastern bloc countries 
towards a form of socialist democracy. In the summer of 1989 I enrolled 
to study at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. There I worked with 
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like-minded students and opposition activists to form independent organs 
of student representation and I co-authored a Marxist opposition 
manifesto in October 1989. I witnessed first hand the beginnings of the 
mass social unrest against the Party and state and joined protest 
demonstrations in Berlin and Leipzig throughout October and early 
November. On the morning of November 10th I climbed on top of the 
Berlin wall at the Brandenburg Gate.  
 
At that time, I wrote articles advocating the democratization of power and 
the defense of public property. I hoped and imagined that Stalinist rule 
would give way to a socialist democracy based on workers’ councils, and 
that such a political revolution would retain public ownership and 
planning whilst simultaneously democratizing the state.  
 
Although these ideas seemed to be well received at the start of 
November 1989, after the Berlin Wall was open, German reunification 
soon became the central idea that gripped the minds of the masses and 
became a material force. On demonstrations in Leipzig I witnessed 
protestors sing the communist anthem ‘The Internationale’ with one 
breath, and then chant ‘Germany one fatherland’ with the next. By 
December, a sea of West German flags fluttered in the wind, and the 
German national anthem echoed on the streets.  
 
When the Berlin Wall was opened millions of East Germans engaged in a 
mass comparison of systems. This was judged by the quality and 
availability of consumer goods and services, as well as by individual and 
political freedoms. East German claims to systemic superiority turned to 
dust. Indeed, almost everything produced in East Germany’s socialist 
system was in shorter supply and of inferior quality to those made by 
West German capitalism. Popular moods and ideas changed rapidly, but 
the dominant feature was symbolized by an urgency to acquire West 
German currency to buy the newly accessible goods from the West. The 
slogan ‘if the West Mark doesn’t come to us, we will go to the West Mark’ 
forced the hand of the chancellor Helmut Kohl. Either West Germany 
would provide access to Western currency or millions of East Germans 
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would just move to the West. Kohl grasped this opportunity to call for 
rapid national unification through the assimilation of East Germany by the 
West German Federal Republic.  
 
When Germany reunified I left Berlin for China in October 1990 and I 
worked teaching English in Shanghai for a year and a half. Many of the 
same problems of low quality and the poor availability of goods existed 
there too. There were ration cards for some basic foods and for cooking 
oil. However, private incentive and investment was permitted to operate 
within the framework of the socialist system on a much broader scale 
than had been the case in East Germany. Street markets flourished, and 
private shops and restaurants were commonplace. Kentucky Fried 
Chicken had an outlet in Shanghai, something that would have been 
unthinkable in East Germany, and the difference between the local 
currency and the convertible foreign exchange currency was not very 
large. Shops were well stocked and shopping streets in Beijing and 
Shanghai were bustling market places, very different to the atmosphere 
in Eastern Europe or the USSR.  
 
I became increasingly interested in the question of the balance within a 
socialist economy between planning and markets, and between public 
and private ownership forms. These issues had been ‘resolved’ in East 
Germany by building the Berlin Wall in 1961, but they returned with a 
vengeance to sweep away the East German system like a Tsunami when 
the Wall was breached on 9 November 1989. 
1.2.2. Historical background 
 
János Kornai maintains that his systems theory derives from a tradition 
that seeks to define the basic features of a socio-economic system. This 
intellectual trend can be traced back to Karl Marx. In Capital Marx applies 
this method to study the emergence, ascendance, and predicted demise 
and overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and its replacement by 
socialism. Marx expressed the view that the natural laws of capitalism 
meant that: ‘The country that is more developed industrially only shows, 
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to the less developed, the image of its own future.’ (Marx, 1990, p. 91 
[1867])  
 
In 1881, when Russian revolutionaries tried to work out how to apply 
Marx’s theory to their country, one of their number, Vera Zasulich, 
famously asked Marx’s opinion on the fate of ancient communal property 
forms in the villages, and whether they must submit to capitalist relations. 
Marx replied in the negative.1 However, as Russia remained 
economically backward compared to Western Europe, it was commonly 
accepted amongst Russian Marxists that the character and prospects of 
a future Russian revolution would be circumscribed by the limited 
development of the productive forces. The predicted revolution would 
take a bourgeois or capitalist form, and this would lay the material and 
political foundations for a future socialist revolution.2 However, Leon 
Trotsky suggested that the constellation of class forces in Russian 
society meant that the Russian bourgeoisie was too weak and vacillating 
to take the lead in society, and so, the working class would assume the 
leading role in the forthcoming revolution, which would combine 
bourgeois and socialist tasks (Trotsky, 2007 [1931]). In the 1920s, 
analogous debates to those in Russia occurred among Chinese Marxists 
when discussing the possibilities and character of the Chinese revolution 
(Schwartz, 1954). 
 
Karl Marx employed a concept of Chinese history that lacked the depth of 
his analysis of Russian society. His theory of Chinese society proposed 
that an Asiatic mode of production dominated Chinese society rather 
than feudalism (Wittfogel, 1962a, 1962b). Since then, our understanding 
of Marxist concepts of modes of production and exploitation has 
advanced with more sophisticated research into Chinese and Indian 
history. In particular, Jairus Banaji’s analysis redefined these historical 
systems as a ‘tributary mode of production’.3  
 
Joseph Needham initiated a profound and wide-ranging scientific debate 
about China’s place in world history before the ascendance of Western 
capitalism (Needham and Wang, 1964). His question, known as the 
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Needham Puzzle, asked why modern science failed to originate in China. 
His own conclusion was that China’s social relations had hindered its 
development. His research completely changed our understanding of the 
position of China in world history and it underpins a fascinating field of 
scientific, economic and cultural analysis (Lin, 1995; Brook and Blue, 
1999; Pomeranz, 2001; Needham et al., 2004; Chun, 2013).  
 
When Marxist ideas first gained adherents in China, Li Dazhao, the co-
founder of the Communist Party, immediately grasped the significance of 
historical theory for the revolution. In 1918 he wrote: ‘If one can write the 
history of billions of people, then one can have the authority to move the 
minds of billions of people.’ (Brook and Blue, 1999, p. 131) 
 
Analysis of the basic character of China’s social system has exercised a 
profound influence on the political and economic policies of the Chinese 
Communist Party since it was founded in 1921. Debates about the 
dominant mode of production in China played a pivotal role in the fate of 
the Chinese Communist Party throughout the 1920s. This mattered to the 
Party because its theoretical analysis formed the basis of its tactical and 
strategic orientation. Indeed, up to today, the way that the Party defines 
the social system continues to shape its policies to correspond with its 
official characterization of the epoch. 
 
In the 1920s the party debate on China’s system revolved around the 
question whether China was dominated by feudalism. If it was, the task 
of the Party was to prepare for a bourgeois-democratic revolution. 
However, if capitalism already dominated China, then a socialist 
revolution would be an immediate objective. These Marxist debates 
about China revisited questions raised in the Russian revolution, where 
despite the backward state of the productive forces, the constellation of 
class forces helped the Party to seize state power in 1917. If China were 
similar to Russia, the Chinese Party should have maintained its 
organizational independence from the capitalist Nationalist Party, known 
as the Guomindang (Wang, 1980; Benton, 1996; Trotsky et al., 2006).  
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However, by the end of the period 1921-1927, the view that China was 
dominated by a pre-capitalist social formation won the day. The Chinese 
Communist Party and the Communist International agreed that the 
Communists should subordinate themselves to the Nationalists. Chiang 
Kai-shek, the leader of the Guomindang, made use of this situation to 
strike a crushing blow to their urban revolutionary cadre in Shanghai in 
1927 (Issacs, 2015; Trotsky et al., 2006). This drove China’s 
Communists from the cities, and shifted the Party’s central locus of 
struggle from its urban revolutionary roots to the rural hinterlands. These 
events provided the backdrop for Mao Zedong’s reformulation of the 
tactical and strategic orientation of the Chinese Communist Party, which 
formed the cadre of a revolutionary army in warfare, and of state power 
and administration in the liberated zones that it established between 
1929-1949 (Benton, 1992).  
1.3. Conceptual framework: theories and methodology 
 
This thesis is based on a Marxist theoretical approach, which regards 
social knowledge and political institutions as being intertwined with the 
interests of those who control the dominant economic system, and holds 
that the political superstructure is rooted in its economic base. Marx’s 
study of the economic system of capitalism advanced political economy 
with his theory of surplus value. It also identifies a tendency to 
concentration and monopoly, which intensifies the social nature of 
production and generates the modern working class. Cyclical crises are 
taken to illustrate the temporal nature of capitalism, which points the way 
to an alternative – socialism based on rule of the working class. Class 
struggle is viewed as the means of securing political freedoms and 
preparing for the overthrow of capitalism.4 
 
In Capital (1990 [1867]), Marx studied how the core features and driving forces 
of the capitalist system generate and unleash extraordinarily dynamic 
capacities to produce, exchange, invent, transform, and revolutionize, science, 
technology and all human relations. However, the basic contradictions between 
the workers and the capitalists, and between different capitalists, 
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simultaneously gives rise to dysfunctionality, boom-bust cycles, and class 
conflicts.  
1.3.1. Preobrazhensky’s Marxist framework and method 
 
The Russian economist Evgeny Preobrazhensky plays a central role in 
the application of Marxism that is adopted in this thesis. He developed a 
comprehensive and sophisticated theory about the transition from 
capitalism to socialism in an underdeveloped economy. This drew on the 
concrete experience of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, to explain the 
dynamics and contradictions of socialist development in a backward 
economy.  
 
A close reading of Preobrazhensky’s book The New Economics 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965 [1926]) and of his theory of transition to socialism 
shows how he applied Marxist categories of capitalism and socialism to study 
the internal dynamics of the Soviet economy during the period of the New 
Economic Policy (1921-1928), when the Bolshevik regime selectively used 
market mechanisms to promote economic recovery.  
 
Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s economic reforms, initiated reform policies 
by specific reference to Lenin’s NEP. China’s mix of state ownership and 
control of the commanding heights of the economy, combined with a sizeable 
private economy, corresponds to the combination of economic forms that 
existed during the Soviet NEP (Xu, 2017).  
 
My investigation of Preobrazhensky’s theory looks at how his abstract 
categories, based on pure features of capitalism and socialism, were amended 
and appeared in real life during the NEP. It explores how the contradictory 
interplay between the capitalist law of value and socialist planning principles 
gave rise to the victory of bureaucratic planning under the leadership of Joseph 
Stalin. By examining the historical circumstances in which this system 
emerged, it is possible to identify how the Stalinist method of socialist 
accumulation diverges from Preobrazhensky’s original concepts and policy 
proposals.   
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In the period governed by primitive socialist accumulation, the methods 
employed to extract resources from a capitalist enterprise encompass a wide 
range of possible measures, from mild (a tax on profits), to draconian 
(expropriation without compensation). The decision as to which of these 
measures are most suitable is contingent on concrete circumstances.  
 
Preobrazhensky developed his model of primitive socialist accumulation 
(PSA)5 to work out the regularities of economic activity; to understand 
conflicting social processes, and to develop policies aimed at extending 
the influence of planning.  
 
He wrote:  
‘I devote myself to the modest task of first abstracting from the actual 
economic policy of the State, which is the resultant of the struggle 
between two systems of economy, and the corresponding classes, so 
as to investigate in its pure form the movement towards the optimum 
of primitive socialist accumulation, to discover the operation of the 
conflicting tendencies, as far as possible in their pure state, and then 
to try to understand why the resultant in real life proceeds along one 
particular line and not another.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 62) 
1.3.2. Contrasting Capitalism and Socialism  
 
Preobrazhensky shows that Karl Marx presented capitalism in a pure form and 
as a complete system, contrasting it with its antecedents and its predicted 
communist successor to identify the unique characteristics and conditions in 
which the finished system of capitalism operated; both Marx and Engels 
avoided utopian visions of socialism and made their forecasts based on their 
analysis of capitalism.  
 
Preobrazhensky applies Marx’s theory to develop a method to examine 
the process of economic transition from capitalism to socialism (1965, 
1974). He believed that the categories of political economy would be 
transformed under planned socialist production. The commodity will be 
replaced by the product; value by labour-time; the market by 
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bookkeeping of a planned economy; surplus value by surplus product; 
and social technology - as a science of socially organized production - 
will replace political economy (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 162 [1926]). 
 
This new science would forecast economic necessity and propose how 
labour and production should be organized to satisfy wants and needs. 
The study of future impacts would supplant the estimation of 
consequences; requiring complex regulatory organs of social foresight 
and planned guidance (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 55).  
 
Although Preobrazhensky developed a comprehensive method based on 
Marxist categories to analyse the process of primitive accumulation in 
general, his analysis of the state superstructure did not investigate the 
bureaucratic system of politics and economics that came to reign in these 
socialist states for most of their existence. This system became 
entrenched in the Soviet Union, and it was emulated or replicated in its 
essential features in China and other socialist states.  
 
For his part, Leon Trotsky did examine the rise of the bureaucratic 
system of socialism that was first consolidated under Stalin. But Trotsky 
viewed this regime as a betrayal of the revolution and a temporary 
aberration that would be overthrown with the dawn of new socialist 
revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries (Trotsky, 1999). In any 
case, Trotsky was assassinated in 1940 and many new socialist states, 
including China, were established between 1945 and 1949.  
 
Kornai was able to study the main features of these systems in depth.  
So I draw on his analysis of socialism, which studies the economic 
structure, the system of economic coordination, and the superstructure of 
the state. And I investigate how the state superstructure ensures the 
reproduction of the system as a whole.  
 
However, his conclusions elevate the classical system of Stalinist 
socialism and reform socialism to the only possible types of socialism. 
Indeed, Kornai maintains that because these states were all 
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dictatorships, democracy and socialism are by definition mutually 
incompatible (Kornai, 2016).  
1.3.3. Kornai’s system’s theory 
 
Preobrazhensky’s theory is based on his analysis of the Soviet Union in 
the 1920s, whereas Kornai’s theory is rooted in his analysis of 20th 
Century socialist states. Kornai’s theoretical insights about reform 
socialism provide the structure that frames my investigation of the system 
that operates in China. 
 
Like Preobrazhensky’s method; János Kornai’s systems theory originates 
from the Marxist tradition. It identifies the dominant characteristics of a 
society based on his ‘systems theory’ method. Kornai, like Marx, believes 
that socialism and capitalism operate according to fundamentally 
different laws. So, a comparison between capitalist and socialist systems 
can generate broad insight into the nature of a given society and its 
social and economic relations. This framework is used to elicit the 
patterns, regularities and characteristics of a given social system. 
 
Kornai’s theoretical insights about classical and reform socialism provide 
the structure that frames my overall investigation of contemporary China. 
The analytical tools he uses to study 20th century socialist states provide 
detailed explanations for the specific socialist features of China’s system.  
 
My study of Kornai’s theory focuses on his exposition of basic and 
fundamental features of socialist systems, with particular attention paid to 
his concept of reform socialism. I select the three main features of 
socialism that Kornai uses as definitional determinants of the system and 
explain their importance to his theory. These are: Communist Party rule 
with an ideology that is hostile to private property; the dominance of 
public property in the commanding heights of the economy; and the 
dominance of bureaucratic coordination of the economy. These three 
basic foundation stones of Kornai’s socialism are the benchmarks used 
to test whether China’s system fits his definition of socialism.  
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The first feature: Communist Party power and ideology, are concerned 
with what is seen as the superstructure in Marxist terminology. To study 
China’s state system, I examine articles in the Western and Chinese 
press, government reports, and the speeches of China’s leaders. I also 
selected pertinent material from academic articles, journals and books on 
the Chinese Communist Party, its state organs, internal discipline 
mechanisms, governmental and administrative structures, and 
governance systems, I and evaluated them with a view to identifying the 
dominant trends shaping and determining the behaviour and ideas of the 
Party and state.   
 
It is hoped that by examining China’s system through the prism of the 
theories of Preobrazhensky and Kornai, some new light can be shed on 
the contradictory interplay of powerful social and economic entities, and 
the basic forces governing Chinese society. 
1.4. Chapter Outlines 
 
This PhD asks the question if China is still socialist. To answer this 
question I employ two primary and two secondary approaches, which 
offer different perspectives and frameworks from which to examine the 
Chinese system. The primary approaches are based on the ideas of 
János Kornai and Evgeny Preobrazhensky. Kornai’s theories of socialism 
and capitalism, and his analysis of China, act as the macro-level 
framework structuring the thesis as a whole. Some aspects of his work 
appear in every chapter.  
 
Two chapters focus on an exposition of the theories of the main thinkers 
informing my analysis. Chapter 2 explains Kornai’s theory of reform 
socialism in depth. Chapter 3 examines which of its fundamental features 
are applicable to Chinese reality. Chapter 4 examines a representative 
sample of theories, which locate China’s system as a variant of 
capitalism. Chapter 5 examines the rise and fall of the Soviet New 
Economic policy and Preobrazhensky’s theory of Primitive Socialist 
Accumulation. Chapter 6 uses Marxist methods of class analysis to 
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examine China’s system with special reference to the position of the 
working class. This chapter employs concepts from Erik Olin Wright’s 
theories of class and class conflict to interrogate the nature of Chinese 
society. Chapter 7 concludes that China’s system broadly conforms to 
Kornai’s concept of reform socialism, and that employing 




This chapter examines and explains Kornai’s theory of socialism in 
general, and reform socialism in particular. It begins with an investigation 
of his systems’ theory, which isolates the minimal necessary and 
essential characteristics of socialism in order to distinguish it from 
capitalism. The focus is placed on three primary foundation stones: rule 
by a Communist Party that is hostile to private property; public ownership 
of the dominant sectors of the economy; and bureaucratic coordination of 
economic activity. A system based on the three fundamental features of 
socialism will display a tendency to generate patterns and regularities of 
economic behaviour that merit inclusion as secondary systemic 
phenomena. However, these appearances are not regarded as 
definitional characteristics of socialism i.e. they are not necessary and 
essential to it, and may also occur in capitalist systems. Of these features 
I focus on the tendency to use ‘forced growth’ as an instrument to 
overcome backwardness, and the dynamics, which give rise to this drive 
within socialist economies. I also look at the regularities of cyclical 
growth, the interplay of vertical and horizontal relations of power, the 
budget constraints on enterprises, pressures that give rise to reform and 
revolution, market socialist experiments, the emergence of the private 




To consider the degree to which reform socialism is a viable designation 
for China’s system, I assess the degree to which Kornai’s theory, 
method, categories and observations are applicable in China today. I 
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draw on a wide range of Sinological scholarship to evaluate the nature of 
the CCP’s ideology and its system of state power, particularly since 
1989. This involves sketching an outline of the CCP’s apparatus of 
political, administrative and state power. The CCP’s relationship to the 
commanding heights of the economy is investigated in some depth, and 
differences amongst scholars and economists about how to categorize 
China’s ownership forms are explained. The extent of state ownership of 
the commanding heights is evaluated in the light of these interpretations. 
Kornai’s holistic approach is used to appraise the centrality of the Party’s 
full spectrum of economic and extra-economic instruments that work to 
sustain and reproduce its dominance under socialism. China’s planning 
system was amended in the 1990s. The new planning process is 
assessed in the light of these significant changes. The way it functions is 
gauged by reference to the 12th Five-Year-Plan 2011-2015 and to the 
ambitious New Urbanization Plan; the advance of the state and the anti-
corruption campaign under Xi Jinping also serve to illustrate the direction 




Kornai’s own assessment of China as a variant of capitalism is evaluated 
along with a diverse mix of parallel theories of capitalist China. These 
theories encompass the historical narrative of China’s trajectory towards 
capitalism, institutional comparisons with Germanic and US capitalism, 
as well as assessments of parallels with developmental state theory and 
Japanese and East Asian capitalism. These debates on the 
characteristics of Chinese capitalism return us to the basic problem of 
defining capitalism.  
 
I reflect on two Marxist theories of capitalist restoration in China, which 
display a marked tendency to paint the emergence of widespread market 
activity as being equivalent to the end of planning and the victory of 
capitalism. In addition, China’s achievements in social progress are 
marginalized within a narrative that is consumed by the compilation of 
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negative illustrations of the capitalist degeneration of society, producing a 
rather narrow and skewed assessment of China’s system.  
 
An evaluation of the negative impact of state monopolies illustrates the 
need to consider the positive role that the combined monopolistic 
economic power of vast interconnected entities affords. To contextualize 
this, the role of companies that dominate the commanding heights of the 
modern world economy is evaluated. Similar Chinese companies are 
identified and the sanctions and responses available to the state to 
control them are described.  Kornai’s own theory of capitalism is the 
subject of the final section of this chapter. His core arguments are 
expounded with a view to assessing the extent of China’s 
correspondence to this theory. The chapter concludes with Xu 
Chenggang’s appraisal of whether and how Kornai’s system corresponds 




The Soviet economist Evgeny Preobrazhensky elaborated a Marxist 
theory of economic development by studying the concrete conditions in 
the Soviet Union in the 1920s and by contrasting Karl Marx’s theory of 
socialism with this reality. This approach provides a supplementary 
framework to Kornai’s theory of reform socialism. It can be used to weigh 
up the contradictions and assess the driving forces behind the process of 
state accumulation in a backward socialist economy. Like the second 
chapter of this thesis, this involves a detailed exposition of a complex 
theoretical method. However, I believe that the insights that this intricate 
exposition provides, penetrates into some of the more mysterious 
qualities of China’s socio-economic system.  
The scene is set by reference to the rise and fall of the New Economic 
Policy in the 1920s. The associated victory of Stalin is contextualized 
within the framework of the Soviet Industrialization Debate as the product 
of multiple social impulses pushing towards the ascendance of 
bureaucratic planning. I conclude by selecting and isolating ten core 
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macro-level features of Preobrazhensky’s theory that I suggest can 




The working class is the main subject within the Marxist vision of 
socialism. So it is logical, and probably necessary, to address the role 
and position of the working class in any discussions about whether China 
is still socialist. I approach this task by studying the historical 
development of the working class in the People’s Republic as a class in 
and for itself. To do this, I examine the way that economic policies and 
plans fostered the formation of the working class in the Maoist period and 
during the reform era, and I consider a variety of displays of workers’ 
unrest. 
 
To assist this process I employ categories, terms and concepts that the 
sociologist Erik Olin Wright developed to consider twentieth century class 
relations. This offers a framework that sheds light on class formation in 
pre-reform China, which was mainly circumscribed by stifling restrictions 
on mobility between the town and country and by the dominance of the 
party and state over the lives of the people. 
 
The reform era generated a far more diverse, complex, unequal and 
colourful class structure. It engendered capitalist billionaires; a new and 
relatively affluent social-strata, changes to the social relations in the 
urban state-owned workplaces, and the influx of an immense new 
working and semi-working class constituency formed through mass 
migration.  
 
Social unrest, particularly within the working class is evaluated in relation 
to the CCP, which has as one of its primary objectives, the maintenance 
of social stability and the pacification of outbursts of social antagonism. 
Studies of the key characteristics on display in a variety of social protests 
in China inform this assessment of the CCP’s policies and programme. I 
suggest that there is a close dialectical relationship between social unrest 
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and party policies. This is expressed in the party’s official theories, in 
state actions, and in its legal and ideological orientation. This finds 
reflection in the concealed and overt impact of protest on the party, and 
in the relationship between the upper and lower levels of state power.  
 
Chapter 7  
 
My conclusions are based on evaluating the general macro-level relevance of 
Kornai’s ideas, both where I agree, and where I disagree with his analysis. I 
argue that the internal consistency of his reform socialist theoretical model is 
undermined by his specific analysis of contemporary China. I suggest that 
Kornai’s concept of workers’ self-management merits identification within his 
theory as a systemic specific feature of socialism. I argue that this feature plays 
an important role in shaping China’s system. Furthermore, I suggest that 
Preobrazhensky’s theory of Primitive Socialist Accumulation offers a powerful 
theoretical tool that can be used to supplement and enhance Kornai’s theory of 
reform socialism. However, if correct, this would mean that socialism is not a 
system doomed to inevitable collapse, as Kornai believes. 
                                                
1	The	full	correspondence	can	be	found	at	
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/zasulich/index.htm		
2 Lenin writes in 1905 ‘The degree of economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the 
degree of class consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective 
condition inseparably connected with the objective condition) make the immediate complete 
emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the most ignorant people can ignore the bourgeois 
nature of the democratic revolution which is now taking place; only the most naive optimists can forget 
how little as yet the masses of the workers are informed about the aims of Socialism and about the 
methods of achieving it. And we are all convinced that the emancipation of the workers can be effected 
only by the workers themselves; a socialist revolution is out of the question unless the masses become 
class conscious and organised, trained and educated in open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie.’ 
	https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/tactics/ch02.htm	
3 Here, state power is exercised over the means of production and over surplus labour. Banaji finds that 
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As I began to research socialist economics for this PhD, János Kornai’s 
name appeared time and again in the literature. Kornai, born in 1928, is a 
Hungarian economist who began his intellectual analysis of socialism as 
a committed Marxist. He became disillusioned with the Hungarian system 
of planned economy after the repression of the Hungarian revolution of 
1956 but continued to work as a professor at the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences investigating the socialist system and its flaws. In 1984, he 
eventually took a post at Harvard University.  
 
Academics and economists from a diverse spectrum of intellectual and 
normative backgrounds have respected and praised his work for a 
number of decades. The Hungarian-American sociologist Ivan Szelenyi 
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considers Kornai to be ‘the most influential scholar of the political 
economy of state socialism in the world today’ and calls his magnum 
opus The Socialist System ‘the last textbook one needs on the 
communist economy’. The prominent Sovietologist Alec Nove describes 
it as ‘a masterly presentation of the nature of the functioning of the 
Soviet-type system, and an equally masterly explanation of the failure of 
attempts to reform it’ (Nove, 1993, pp. 1057–1069). The Marxist 
academic Michael Lebowitz sees Kornai’s book as ‘a political economy of 
the vanguard mode of production’ which unravels its systemic laws of 
motion in a similar way that Marx’s Capital did with capitalism (Lebowitz, 
2000). 
 
Within Chinese economic debates, Kornai’s influence has towered above 
that of any other contemporary foreign economist. In the 1980s his 
analysis of the relationship between shortage, investment hunger, and 
soft budget constraints was keenly studied by Chinese economists and 
senior leaders (Gewirtz, 2017). 
 
Looking back to the break-up of the communist system in Eastern 
Europe, the political scientist and Sinologist David Shambaugh argued 
that there was a complete lack of foresight within Western academic and 
policy-making circles about the impending 1989 collapse of Eastern 
European and Soviet socialism. He observes that among recognized 
Western analysts, only one person, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had predicted 
the collapse of the USSR and the socialist system in advance 
(Shambaugh, 2008, p. 12). 
 
When Kornai’s Socialist System was first published in 1992, the drama of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist bloc 
overshadowed his sophisticated and comprehensive investigation into 
the causes of its failure. It was hence largely ignored (Chirot, 1993, p. 
855).  
 
After 1989, China’s system did not collapse. Despite its development into 
a world power, Kornai believes that ‘China is not an “exception” that 
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refutes (his) theory’ of systemic transformation, rather; ‘It can be fitted, 
without difficulty, into the analytical scheme outlined […] Furthermore, a 
still bolder statement can be risked: the analytical scheme provides a 
useful tool for analyzing the Chinese transformation in depth.’ (Kornai, 
2008, p. 150)  
 
This thesis challenges Kornai’s assessment of China by first dissecting, 
and then applying his theory to an analysis of China’s political economy. 
In the first chapter, I present the key aspects of Kornai’s ‘socialist system’ 
with the main focus on ‘reform socialism’. In chapter 3 I compare Kornai’s 
reform socialist model to contemporary China.  
2.2. The system’s paradigm 
 
János Kornai’s study, The Socialist System, The Political Economy of 
Communism (Kornai, 2007 [1992]),  offers a valuable method to 
understand socialism1 by abstracting systemic characteristics and using 
them as tools of analysis. Kornai locates his ‘systems paradigm’ as a 
methodology representing an intellectual tradition begun by Karl Marx, 
who viewed capitalism’s political, economic, social and ideological 
spheres, ‘altogether and analysed interactions between them… looking 
at the sum of its institutions –not one part or the other, but at the system 
as a whole.’ (Kornai, 2008, p. 186) Those thinkers who ‘share the 
common conviction that a comparison of capitalism and socialism is 
worth analysis as research’ are also included in Kornai’s systems 
paradigm tradition (Kornai, 2008, p. 187). 
 
The system’s paradigm seeks to study: 
• The system as a whole and the relations to its parts 
• Societal interactions by combining social scientific disciplines  
• Institutions within which transformative societal processes occur 
and the identification of their system specific or non-systemic genesis  
• Human organisation in the light of historical processes 
• Systemic impacts on individual preferences 
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• Great transformations and big changes, uncovering underlying 
processes of decay and creation that lead to systemic transformations  
• The intrinsic dysfunctional features of a system 
Systemic attributes by comparative analysis (Kornai, 2008, pp. 190–193) 
 
This chapter is a study of the central theses and main features of 
Kornai’s analysis. It is designed to help identify commonalities and 
differences between Kornai’s theory of socialism and ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’, the self-definition used by the Chinese 
Communist Party to characterize its social system.  
 
Kornai acknowledges that Marx only offered a minimalist definition of 
socialism and spent most of his time studying the capitalist system - 
predicting that it would be superseded by socialism. However, for Marx, 
only the advanced capitalist countries could provide the material 
foundation for socialism.  
2.3. Kornai’s theory of causality 
 
Kornai’s socialist system refers exclusively to those countries governed 
by Communist Parties. The system’s ‘genetic code’ automatically 
generates ‘classical socialism’ when the Communist Party holds state 
power. And it shapes the features and fundamental characteristics of the 
system through three main lines of causation.   
 
The first line of causation stems from the rule of a Communist Party 
guided by the ideology of ‘Marxism-Leninism’; the second, from the 
dominance of public ownership within the economy; the third, from the 
preponderance of bureaucratic coordination.  
 
The political system and ideology bring about the dominance of public 
ownership by design, and the combination of these first two lines of 
causation inevitably produces ‘the dominance of the mechanism of 
bureaucratic control’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 363). Once the system of 
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Communist Party rule is established, it finds real roots in society and 
does so with only limited resistance. The system is internally coherent 
and self-sustaining (Kornai, 2007, p. 369). 
 
Figure 1. Kornai’s main lines of causation under socialism 
 
(Kornai, 2007, p. 361)   
 
From three primary lines of causation (blocks 1, 2 & 3 above), 
subordinate features flow naturally and organically. The content of 
subordinate blocks (4+5) can vary significantly. 
 
All countries where the Communist Party led an indigenous revolution 
were characterized by backwardness and poverty. The pre-revolutionary 
order was brutal, and democracy and capitalism were immature. These 
factors helped to shape and define the characteristics of the post-
revolutionary regime. It was envisaged that backwardness would be 
overcome by forced growth, radical redistributive policies would be 
enforced by dictatorial measures; features Kornai describes as common 
to all socialist societies (Kornai, 2007, p. 373). 
 
Kornai’s analysis of socialism draws on Karl Marx's method for 
inspiration. It emphasizes the examination of social relations between 
people - between superiors and subordinates - those who exercise power 
and those who obey them. Kornai studies the complex relations between 
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economics and politics, depicts the social features that shape the values 
adopted, and the choices made by decision makers (Kornai, 2007, p. 12). 
He examines the historical realities of those systems that claimed to be 
socialist and identifies regularities i.e., patterns of recognisable human 
behaviour within a historically specific socio-economic system.  
 
The ‘classical socialist system’ that Kornai dissects, first emerged in the 
Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. It was reinforced by 
measures such as the state requisition of peasant produce after 1928. In 
turn, this provoked widespread sabotage of agricultural production by the 
peasantry. Stalin responded to this with the forced collectivisation of 
agriculture.  
 
In order to identify the main regularities of the socialist system Kornai 
examines these societies before socialist revolutions occurred. His focus 
is on revolutions where indigenous communist forces played the central 
role in taking power.2 These countries shared basic features: 
• They were poor and backward countries with low per capita 
production compared to advanced capitalism 
• The agrarian economy was dominant with weak industrial 
development 
• Modern and technically advanced sectors were very limited 
• Pre-capitalist social relations and property forms still existed  
• There were grotesque levels of income inequality 
• They were dictatorial regimes using political repression  
• Many of these nations were dominated by wealthy or colonizing 
countries 
• They suffered from institutional instability caused by military 
conflicts of some form  
 
In East European countries occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, 
socialist systems were established by 1949, after a brief interregnum in 
which a mixed economy existed alongside a multiparty democracy. The 
Red Army destroyed the pre-1945 system of power. The apparatus of 
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Soviet administrative power exercised ultimate control and helped to 
forge a new state apparatus led by pliant pro-Soviet local communist 
parties (Kornai, 2007, p. 30). East Germany and Czechoslovakia were 
the only developed industrial countries, which underwent the 
transformation to a socialist system. But 'these countries were, so to say, 
compelled by open and concealed Soviet intervention to adopt a system 
whose first historical realisation had developed in a backward society.' 
(Kornai, 2007, p. 26)  
 
Kornai regards the example of the Soviet Union as the 'purest' form of 
transformation into a socialist system. Indeed, it was also a popular, 
mass, urban revolution - more in line with Karl Marx's own concept of a 
revolution led by the working class. The transformation to socialism 
through the revolutionary overthrow of the old order was, as Kornai 
explains, circumscribed by backwardness. Indeed, in his view, it is the 
backwardness of the economy that ‘induces revolution and allows the 
Communist party to seize power’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 28). In order to 
establish the material foundations for socialism, the Soviet revolution 
needed to increase output and the productivity of labour and improve the 
living standards of the mass of workers and farmers.  
 
After the Soviet revolution, as Kornai explains, a revolutionary transitional 
era began. This was a 'heroic' period, characterized by popular 
engagement and participation. It corresponds with the process of radical 
expropriation of the land, property and productive resources of the 
private economy. Where food resources are scarce, rationing and price 
controls are imposed to guarantee access for the poor. And popular 
policies to provide mass education and health provision are introduced. 
In addition, historical injustices produce spontaneous and state-led 
movements to persecute representatives of the old order. The 
consequence was an escalation of violence and lawlessness (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 19–30).   
 
Kornai notes that eventually, the revolutionary cause loses some of its 
lustre. The people begin to concentrate on their own material needs. 
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Production to satisfy material wants inevitably begins to take priority. The 
sense of encirclement by hostile forces creates an urgency to grow the 
economy rapidly. To achieve this objective, a disciplinary hierarchy is 
created. Bureaucratic procedures and methods of rule crystallize and 
generate institutions that are also organized along these lines (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 26–29). Kornai rejects all theories that suggest that the system 
was never really socialist. He focuses instead on how the existing system 
operates by identifying its common features, contradictions and 
regularities. Two main systemic prototypes become consolidated after an 
initial revolutionary transitional period: classical and reform socialism.  
2.4. A summary of Kornai’s three main lines of causation under socialism 
 
The following pages summarize the three main lines of causation that 
operate in both of classical and reform socialism.  
2.4.1. The Communist party rule and ideology 
 
The ruling Communist Party presides over a one party state. Where other 
parties are permitted, they are completely subordinate to the Communist 
Party. The party is a voluntary body, whose branches are headed by a 
party secretary. They function under territorially divided hierarchies. At 
the pinnacle are the Central Committee, its Politburo, and the General 
Secretary. Under ‘democratic centralism’ leading bodies are elected and 
can pass resolutions. Debates are held inside the party and voted on, 
and decisions are binding on lower organisations and individuals. All 
members must act on decisions without dissent. The party apparatus is 
composed of elected officials and unelected appointees, whose power 
emanates from bureaucratic authority. The upper levels of the party 
select and groom future members of the party apparatus. The party 
apparatus makes decisions about membership, promotion, demotion, or 
expulsion. The state and the party are organically intertwined as all 
candidates in elections to government are selected or vetted by the party. 
Government organisations are shadowed by parallel party organisations 
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that monitor operations and ensure that party instructions are 
implemented. Political and administrative functions are unified in the 
‘party-state’ (Kornai, 2007, pp. 36–39). 
 
Mass organisations of the youth, trade unions, women, minorities, artists, 
etc. also exist but they are subordinate to the party leadership and 
adhere to party decisions. The totality of the organisational power of the 
party and functionaries in the state, mass organisations and economy, 
constitutes a collective apparatus or bureaucracy (Kornai, 2007, pp. 39–
40). 
 
The bureaucracy is bound together by four main factors:  
1. Marxist-Leninist ideology and a sense of serving the people and 
mankind.  
2. The collective power to rule over society and the power to rule 
over subordinates. 
3. Prestige and privilege: the former is derived primarily from rank in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy, the latter from access to goods and services 
in limited supply or of superior quality. 
4. Coercion: decisions of the party and state must be implemented 
and defended, and are backed by sanctions, discipline or punishment in 
the event of either failure in practice, or perceived ideological deviation 
(Kornai, 2007, pp. 40–43).  
 
The state is totalitarian in three senses; firstly, it extends to every aspect 
of life and there is no clearly defined private sphere; secondly, it reaches 
the whole society, and, through creating and monitoring comprehensive 
individual files, influences every citizen; and finally, decision-making and 
the legal system are subordinate to the particular and contemporary 
interests of the bureaucracy (Kornai, 2007, p. 48). Sectional, regional, 
industrial, organisational, ethnic, generational and other interest groups, 
inevitably emerge to constitute informal pressure groups - particularly 
when controversial issues are discussed and debated and when extreme 
repression is relaxed (Kornai, 2007, pp. 44–45). 
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Under reform socialism the monopoly of Communist party power 
continues in three key areas.  
1. Party appointments remain ubiquitous in the state, economic 
management, the judiciary, and mass organisations. The public elect 
candidates nominated or approved by the party and bureaucratic 
apparatus.  Limited competitive elections may be permitted, some are 
sham, others, are real conflicts between individuals, ideas and programs. 
Individual political representatives may conflict with official views and 
policies and this sews the seeds of a multiparty system (János Kornai, 
2007, pp. 410–411). 
2. Government continues to be exercised by decree.  There is no 
separation of legislative, executive and judicial power, and thus appeals 
against organs of the state are excluded. The Communists have a solid 
majority and decisions are based on decrees rather than parliamentary 
procedure. In the reform era, demand for the ‘rule of law’ is raised, in 
order to subject all to judicial control, but the law is adjusted to serve the 
bureaucracy and the party (Kornai, 2007, p. 411). 
3. The organs of armed force and repression remain under control of 
the party. It decides appointments, promotion, demotion, budgets and 
material resources. Armed force remains in the hands of the party 
leadership and is not subject to any endorsement procedure within the 
legislature. The classical and reform socialist eras do not differ in this 
respect (Kornai, 2007, p. 411). 
2.4.1.1. Ideology under classical socialism 
 
The classical ideology itself is based on a combination of intellectual 
foundations: from Marx and the tradition of the European labour 
movement; from revolutionary movements in countries that became 
socialist; from the experiences of Communist parties shortly after seizing 
power; or from consolidated systems of power. National variation and the 
selective use of these ideological layers, form the basis from which the 
operative ideology is created. Socialism is held to be inherently superior 
to capitalism because planning is believed to be capable of harnessing 
innovation for the collective good by eliminating anarchic market 
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relations, associated fluctuations in supply and demand, and 
overproduction crises. It should reduce the competitive duplication of 
effort, place human labour at the centre of society, and eradicate 
parasitical class exploitation and attendant luxury consumption. It is also 
supposed to unleash workers’ ingenuity and enthusiasm, reduce 
supervisory costs, and lay the basis for such a high level of productivity 
under communism, that wage labour and the monetary system itself 
disappears (Kornai, 2007, pp. 49–51). 
 
Classical socialism promotes a sense of moral superiority and focuses on 
overcoming individualist and selfish ‘remnants’, and on creating a self-
sacrificing and collectivist psychology that promotes social justice and 
egalitarianism. Ideologically convinced believers in socialism see its 
existence as the pathway to human emancipation, so they view specific 
failings, crises, or limitations in performance in this context. Open 
competition with alternative ideologies is forbidden, although religion is 
sometimes tolerated. Directly oppositional ideologies can only survive in 
underground publications or during short periods of openness. Kornai 
argues that a breakdown in belief in the inherent superiority of socialism 
is a characteristic of departure from the classical system (Kornai, 2007, 
pp. 52–53). 
 
A gulf exists between economic development in advanced capitalism and 
socialism. The superiority of the latter system is supposed to provide the 
base from which to catch up with and overtake capitalism. This requires 
the general mobilisation of enthusiasm and resources to stimulate rapid 
growth and assure future victory. Welfare systems radically reduce 
inequality, unemployment is minimised and the state assumes a wide 
range of obligations in relation to basic needs and services. This ensures 
security in health, education, housing, employment, pensions, holidays 
and access to cultural facilities. Thus a tension emerges between the 
burdens of social provisions and the need for rapid economic 
advancement (Kornai, 2007, pp. 53–54). 
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Party rule is legitimized by its claim to be a vanguard party, incarnating 
the historical interests of the most advanced class, the proletariat, whose 
dictatorship is normally backed by an alliance with the peasantry. 
Opposing forces are represented as class enemies or misguided allies, 
who require education to overcome ‘petty-bourgeois’ prejudices. The 
vanguard party’s ideology boasts of farsighted understanding of historical 
processes and societal needs. Ideological paternalism is combined with 
the ubiquitous provision of all basic needs. This paternalism may 
promote a cult of the individual and serves to justify centralism and 
bureaucracy (Kornai, 2007, pp. 55–57). 
 
The moral imperative is characterized by discipline, loyalty, duty and 
submission to needs and objectives defined by the party and state. This 
can be traced to Communist practices in the pre-revolutionary 
underground struggle, which variously entailed, armed struggle, 
insurrection, and civil or guerrilla war; conflicts in which discipline and 
obedience are necessary and highly valued qualities. In the era of post-
revolutionary transition, establishing the social order and reinvigorating 
economic activity, also required discipline and sacrifice. Those who serve 
the cause are regarded as heroes and revolutionaries, and those who 
don’t, are observed and graded in relation to their utility or hostility toward 
the system. The hostility of anti-communist forces, externally and 
internally, fosters and reinforces a siege mentality (Kornai, 2007, pp. 57–
59). 
 
The maintenance of power is an ideological objective in itself and how 
firmly this power is held is a decisive criterion of success. Power and 
ideology are inextricably interconnected. Ideologically motivated people 
shape the organs of the party and state. The need to legitimize and 
justify the actual system results in adjustments and modifications to the 
ideology. The classical system ‘develops and consolidates only where 
this official ideology of socialism just described enjoys a commanding 
influence’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 61). 
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2.4.1.2. Ideology under reform socialism 
 
Multiple contradictions and pressures inevitably find expression and force 
revisions to the party’s ideology, but party ideologists seek to minimize 
adjustments to safeguard fundamentals and to justify the present line.  
 
However, under reform socialism certain tenets remain untouchable: 
a. The leading role of the party in the state, the ban on factions and 
adherence to democratic centralism inside the party. 
b. The doctrines of Marx and Lenin are untouchable; errors are 
blamed on their misinterpretation. 
c. The superiority of public ownership and its predominance as the 
foundation of socialism. 
 
Where it was previously taboo not to declare allegiance to these 
untouchable principles, now it is self-censorship that prevents the explicit 
questioning of them. Underground literature and groups engage in 
dissent against the core axioms. If this dissidence on the fundamental 
taboos becomes a widespread, vocal and mass phenomenon, it may 
signal a change from reform to revolution. 
 
Ideological flexibility leads to creative pragmatism but weakens the bonds 
between the people in command of society. Certainty of mission and the 
sense of superiority over capitalism are undermined.  Material incentives 
come to replace ideology as key motivators but during economic 
hardship, appeals to moderation may reappear. A retrenchment of the 
state from comprehensive welfare provision, subsidies, and other social 
guarantees, is accompanied by an emphasis on personal responsibility. 
Taboos gradually break down, and a weakening of ideological cohesion 
is reflected in the media and education. The press, radio and television 
become a terrain where the pressures of social opinion find critical 
expression (Kornai, 2007, pp. 414–418). 
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2.4.2. The dominance of public ownership 
 
Classical socialism is characterized by a massive preponderance of 
public ownership as a percentage of national income. The property rights 
of state-owned firms and other publicly and semi-publicly owned entities 
are inalienable. Bureaucratic administrators hold no property rights, and 
their incomes are not determined by the profits of these state companies. 
‘State property belongs to all and to none’. Nevertheless, the 
bureaucracy exercises ‘some of the rights of ownership and all of those 
of control (Kornai, 2007, p. 75). There is no profit motive determining the 
actions of socialist firms in the classical system. Private sector activity is 
almost totally eliminated. It is regarded as a hostile force and it is largely 
confined to informal and illegal ‘black market’ activities. During classical 
socialism state-owned firms occupy the ‘commanding heights’ allowing 
non-state sectors to be dominated. The residual income is difficult to 
identify and is broader than the quantity of taxes and profits. The 
bureaucracy determines all operating conditions, and all income and 
expenditure is part of the central state budget. However, individual 
bureaucrats are limited in their disposal rights by various rules and 
regulations (Kornai, 2007, pp. 71–73). 
2.4.3. The dominance of bureaucratic planning 
 
The bureaucracy exercises control rights over state-owned production 
through a pyramid of power dominated by vertical hierarchal control. 
Overlapping bureaucratic organisations regulate and control individuals 
and organisations. They include, the political police, the youth 
organisation, the trade unions, the women’s organisation, the work unit, 
etc. All organisations are subordinate to the party structures and 
hierarchy, which have their own supervisory and disciplinary apparatus. 
State administration and governance is supervised legally and 
administratively and by mass organisations, and the population is also 
administered where they live. The ubiquitous nature of supervisory 
systems in the classical system, in theory, allows for failures to be 
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spotted and rectified by multiple organisations. Commands downwards to 
subordinates can be issued, and subaltern groups or individuals can 
express disagreement, provided they do not challenge the fundamental 
tenets and principles of the system of power. The system provides no 
means to opt out or ‘exit’, as leaving any institution, moving home, 
changing job, leaving the union, or party, entails bureaucratic 
complications, possible sanctions, or worse (Kornai, 2007, pp. 97–100). 
 
In the classical system planning is comprehensive; it encompasses 
production targets for the main economic sectors; the use of their 
products; a rationing mechanism for distribution, and quota systems for 
inputs. Balance between the sources and uses of production are agreed 
between relevant parties, and equilibrium is sought. Planning 
encompasses labour quotas, wage levels, investment, high priority 
projects, technical development, foreign trade, trade relations, and the 
balance of import-export ratios. It also includes finance of the state 
budget, banking and pricing.  
 
Plans are subdivided between planning bodies, ministries and 
enterprises. They are imposed on lower level organisations, but some 
scope for amendment is negotiated in advance of the final plan. 
Fulfilment reports are required after implementation (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
111–114). 
 
In the classical system the bureaucracy decides on the formation, 
liquidation, break-up or merger of firms and determines appointments, 
promotions, the dismissal of leaders, and the parameters of managerial 
decision-making within the plan. Products and materials are allocated in 
such a way that ‘the bureaucracy takes the place of the market 
mechanism’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 116). Upper levels of the hierarchy 
exercise direct bureaucratic control by constantly intervening in the 
operation of subordinate bureaucratic entities. Despite its rigidity, the 
absence of market impulses, and limits on innovation, ‘the tasks those 
running the system consider of primary importance are particularly likely 
to be accomplished.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 117) 
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Bureaucratic motivation is distinct from proprietary motivation, as no 
residual income benefits are derived from innovative decision-making. 
Supervision and sanctions from above tend towards a conservative 
passivity shaped by bureaucratic dependence. Individual bureaucratic 
motivations may be driven by ideological conviction, professional 
satisfaction, power and prestige, material benefits, the desire for a quiet 
life, and the fear of sanctions from above (Kornai, 2007, p. 119). 
 
A form of vertical bargaining emerges between bureaucratic entities. The 
lower levels seek a simple means of fulfilling their tasks, so they request 
excess labour and supplies. The higher level seeks to extract more 
production, so prescribes tighter plans than are realistic, in expectation of 
the impending bargaining process. This process pertains between each 
superior-subordinate relation of bureaucratic power (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
122–124). 
 
Bureaucrats are not concerned with present and future profits, corporate 
value, market position, or commercial concerns. The top leaders pursue 
a drive for rapid growth. Attempts by lower level bureaucrats to match 
these demands are tempered by conflicting concerns with quality, and by 
bargaining interests, which seek to minimize change. Planning in the 
classical system is inextricably interconnected with politics: as 
managerial, technical, bureaucratic, and political roles, are the combined 
and complementary faces of the bureaucracy when it negotiates about 
resource allocation, tasks, etc. (Kornai, 2007, pp. 124–127). 
 
The interests of those who provide planning information, the quantity of 
information required and the rigidity of the implementation system all 
compromise its quality. Adjustments to the plan inevitably have 
unexpected consequences. Thus a hierarchy of priority plans is devised, 
which result in the relegation of plans of subordinate importance (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 127–130). 
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2.4.3.1. Forced growth: an automatic dynamic of the system 
 
The objective of Communist Party leaders in developing countries is to 
escape from backwardness, and become developed countries. Socialist 
economic management is believed to be in a superior position than 
comparable capitalist countries, as the mobilization of resources and 
manpower is freed from the dominance of imperialist control, and the 
limitations of profit-seeking companies. The speed of growth is 
considered to be the decisive indicator of progress. Kornai’s analysis of 
socialist investment and growth patterns looks at long-term trends and 
the motives of the protagonists shaping the institutional framework and 
dynamics. It examines what determines the rate of growth and the 
motives of the leaders.  
 
Plans are imposed from above to achieve optimal growth. The drive to 
pursue rapid growth is replicated amongst middle and lower level leaders 
who also have “a strong inner expansion drive” and support the same 
ideological objectives. The expansion drive corresponds to their 
bureaucratic motivations and objectives.  When an institution expands, 
the prestige and power of its cadres is enhanced.  In hospitals, schools, 
universities etc., there is always pressure to satisfy unmet demands. This 
also applies to the products and services of state owned enterprises.  In 
capitalist enterprises the potential gains from expansion are tempered by 
the risks of expansion e.g., concerns about competitiveness, market size, 
prices and profits.  Within classical socialism, shortages and a lack of 
competition mean that increased output inevitably finds a buyer. And 
soft-budget constraints mean there is no financial discipline imposed. So, 
without private ownership there is no incentive to curb “investment 
hunger”. Although Keynesianism encourages state investment under 
capitalism, it does so to encourage the “animal spirits” of private owners. 
Under socialism, however, the only limit to investment hunger is the 
bureaucratic fear of sanctions for making ‘wrong decisions’ (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 160–163). 
 
Before investments are made, a top-down distribution of funds is 
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organized through the national plan, which is generally divided between 
basic needs and priorities for development. The plan is not simply a one-
way command; it is the product of a bargaining process. Lower-level 
entities demand more than higher-level entities wish to offer and 
investment priorities outnumber the resources to match them. 
Negotiations between superiors and subordinates stretch the plans 
towards over ambitious targets. This may involve deliberately 
underestimating costs to get in on the plan. Profits do not determine if a 
project is deemed viable. Investment is concentrated on priority projects. 
The planning process involves the identification of shortages and the 
means to overcome them, and the elaboration of new spheres of 
production. Excess demand for investment goods and services stretches 
available resources, and higher-level organizations are forced to 
intervene to determine allocation priorities. Those projects lacking 
resources must delay completion, which increases costs. Nevertheless 
the projects continue, as they represent bureaucratic lobbies. This 
system is inflexible and unresponsive to unplanned circumstances and 
opportunities (Kornai, 2007, pp. 163–165).  
 
A fetish for large-scale investment projects, which consume vast 
resources and assume a gigantesque scale, compliments the focus on 
rapid growth. In addition the concentration of power over investment 
decisions is the responsibility of a small number of people. Under 
capitalism, investment and spending decisions are decentralized and 
individualized, whereas in classical socialism an extremely centralized 
structure of decision-making, shapes investment and spending through 
the restriction of consumption. The proportionate relationship between 
the growth of investment and consumption is shaped indirectly; to the 
degree that leaders sense popular discontent and adjust policies to 
contain this. Concern for the welfare of the masses is expressed in 
multiple documents from the leadership but the focus is defined by 
political expediency. Nevertheless, throughout long historical periods 
consumption may rise, although, from 1949-1978 consumption stagnated 
in China. A thirst for investment in resources is engrained in the micro 
and macro level motivations of the bureaucracy at all levels of power. 
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Their motivations coincide with each other. Therefore, the central 
leadership’s drive for growth expresses the will of the entire bureaucracy. 
 
A mutual interrelationship exists between the power structure, ideology 
and property relations, and the character of investment and growth. The 
maximization of growth over 10 or 20 years is prioritized over present 
consumption. Sacrifice for the future is a central demand but public 
tolerance is limited e.g. if it entails inadequate food rations. The 
postponement of consumption involves a growing under-utilization of 
resources, buildings, stores, consumer goods factories etc. and such 
neglected investments may have long-term detrimental impacts on 
society, for example on the environment and in health care (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 165–170). 
 
The production of fixed capital investment goods assumes the leading 
role. This generates a cycle of reproduction, which produces even more 
fixed capital investment.  ‘There is sense, therefore, in speaking of an 
internal spiral (or propeller), because the spiral motion advances, 
resulting in evermore investment, evermore fixed capital, and ultimately, 
ever more aggregate output.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 171)  
 
This driving force pulls other sectors around it like a magnet and so 
decision-makers tend to structure planning procedures and priorities in 
ways that replicate the original design. The subordinate priorities adopt a 
similar pattern of investment. Domestic production is elevated over 
imports, in line with autarkic development planning. The Marxist 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour is interpreted as 
one between tangible material products and ‘intangible’ services. The 
lack of democratic control leaves decisions in the hands of bureaucrats 
rather than consumers. Such bureaucratic priorities are insensitive to the 
vicissitudes and complexity of consumer demand. Therefore, the 
postponement or neglect of service provision is commonplace.  
 
The production of the means of production takes priority over consumer 
goods production. Heavy industry is seen as the most rapid path to 
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mechanization and technical advance. Top priority projects are assisted 
by a highly centralized system that concentrates resources on primary 
objectives. These sectors grow extremely rapidly while consumer goods 
production, housing, communal services, trade, agriculture and 
transportation all tend to lag behind (Kornai, 2007, p. 173). 
 
The importance of the arms industry intertwines it with the internal spiral 
driving the economic system. At the micro level these driving forces and 
priorities focus on new installations that represent spectacular advance, 
progress, and modernity. This is simultaneously designed to stimulate 
workers enthusiasm and to boost production. However, the neglect of 
older factories, housing stock, universities etc., is the other side of the 
coin. 
 
Gigantic mega-projects are like bureaucratic fiefdoms, which take centre 
stage in national planning. They are justified on the basis of economies 
of scale but this simultaneously ignores the notion of an optimal scale, 
which should be defined by technology, skills, market structure, 
administrative competence etc. These factors may augur against single 
giant entities from the standpoint of rationality, responsiveness to 
demand, and quality control. However, fewer subordinate entities are 
easier for upper-level bureaucrats to control.  
 
So, for example, where the steel industry is given top priority, agricultural 
machinery made of steel may also become a priority sector. However, 
the multiplicity of components, infrastructure, repair services, storage 
facilities, etc. lags behind, and this causes a dislocation in the 
proportionate relations of such economic ‘ecosystems’. This leads to 
breakdowns in the production process and shortages. Planning by such 
methods inevitably produces an information deficit in the regulation of 
complex interrelationships and dependencies - a role that prices play in a 
capitalist economy.  
 
A priority investment project promoted by the leadership, when first 
authorized, will generate an indecent haste, rush, and forced growth. The 
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achievement of priority plans by definition involves the neglect of other, 
perhaps equally important projects. Neglect also takes the form of 
environmental impacts such as the degradation of soil, air pollution, 
water pollution, etc. Little is done to ameliorate the negative 
consequences of this investment priority structure. It is perfectly true that 
capitalism is also destructive to the environment, as profit seeking has no 
inherent bias to environmental protection. However, bureaucratically 
driven forced growth, combined with a lack of democratic means of 
expression, excludes supervisory mechanisms that might act to check 
excess and neglect. 
 
Forced growth has as its objective the maximization of aggregate output 
and improvements in corresponding statistics. These objectives are 
limited to the medium-term of 10 to 20 years. Consequently, these 
priorities organize the structure of the economy, which becomes 
fixed in a disharmonious state (Kornai, 2007, pp. 174–180). 
 
 An examination of extensive and intensive methods of growth allows us 
to differentiate between capitalist and socialist methods. The factor 
output relationships can be divided into two groups. The first concerns 
the impact of growth of the capital or labour expended on production, 
which causes a proportionate growth in output. The second concern is 
raising productivity through the effective exploitation of capital or labour. 
Kornai explains that the term ‘extensive growth’ has the same meaning 
as ‘factor growth’ used in capitalist economics; and the term ‘intensive 
growth’ refers to ‘factor productivity growth’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 181). 
 
The use of extensive methods of growth stems from the original state of 
backwardness and the poor exploitation of resources. The potential to 
increase the labour force is revealed by unemployment, 
underemployment, and the low level of female employment. The number 
employed grows rapidly as capital and labour is brought into play. A high 
investment ratio is combined with rapid employment growth. The lack of 
fixed capital means that lengthening the working day or increasing the 
number of shifts worked on the same plant can maximize its exploitation. 
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And a lack of worker representation limits resistance to this. However, as 
the reserves of labour are used up this strengthens the hand of the 
labourer. Farmland is also extended to the maximum degree possible 
and natural resources are treated in a similar fashion. The economy 
resembles an economy mobilized for war. 
 
Intensive methods are combined with forced growth.  In theory, socialism 
is supposed to unleash latent energy and enthusiasm on the part of the 
workers.  However, after an initial boost, as time passes a more apathetic 
mood sets in, which is exacerbated by everyday problems such as the 
lack of consumer goods. Technical advances introduce new technologies 
and science to backward areas, although this often takes the form of 
replicating and imitating production that already exists in capitalist 
countries. The concentration of investment and rapid growth requires 
skilled labour, but the development of these skills lags behind. 
Bottlenecks and stoppages cause disruption to production. The quality of 
goods is hindered by the lack of resources and the urge for speedy 
production. The capitalist desire, to innovate production technique to gain 
a first entrant advantage, is completely lacking. Instead there is a bias 
towards achieving growth rates and targets based on the quantity of 
production. The use of services at their optimal level is confused with 
over intensive use: such as packing people into trains or buses, the 
inadequate provision of housing, and overcrowding in educational 
institutions.  
 
The application of intensive methods known as total factor productivity 
plays a minor role in socialist economic systems and plays a far larger 
role in capitalist economies (Kornai, 2007, p. 186). 
2.4.3.2. Socialist economic cycles 
 
The economic cycles under socialism are distinct to those under 
capitalism. The economy fluctuates with the planning calendar. During 
annual plans, the pace of work increases as the plan period comes to an 
end; and, as the new planning year begins, work slows down. However, 
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a new Five-Year Plan produces a less pronounced fluctuation, and it 
usually signals the start of many new investment projects. 
 
 Some countries experienced more dramatic shifts from rapid growth to 
decline than others. The central system-specific cycles resemble stop-go 
phases. These are characterized by sudden changes, slowdowns and 
stagnation; which is followed by slow and then rapid expansion, and 
again slowdown and stagnation.  
 
Expansion and contraction are characteristic features of capitalist cycles 
but are caused by different factors. Capitalist cycles often take the 
appearance of crises of demand - overproduction -in which profitable 
investment opportunities are lacking. However, investment decisions that 
lead to a slowdown are spread horizontally through the independent and 
decentralized decisions of company owners. In socialist economies the 
brakes are applied by central control, and instructions to enforce this are 
carried out by command from above.  
 
Neither the falling rate of profit, nor inadequate demand, is the causal 
factor of economic crises. Rather, braking mechanisms are applied 
because the resources to drive accelerated growth are lacking.  
 
‘The entire cycle takes place amid conditions of rush, expansion drive, 
investment hunger, investment tension, and chronic shortage. These 
mark the conduct of decision-makers at all levels in the bureaucracy. 
They would like to invest as much and as fast as possible; meanwhile 
they meet constraints at the peak of the cycle that rule out further 
acceleration. One might put it like this: the top leaders receive signals 
notifying them of the obstacles to further acceleration.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 
191) 
 
The signals that provoke a slowdown may be debt or import dependency; 
investment tensions that cause ever more common interruptions in the 
process of production and distribution; or discontent amongst the masses 
at restrictions on consumption caused by expanded investment. These 
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factors may occur individually or simultaneously. And with such a system, 
whose mechanisms of administration are on a particular path, this 
inevitably means that responsiveness operates with a time lag. Therefore 
slowdowns and periods of acceleration are themselves punctuated by 
several phases. Adjustments through the period of slowdown permit the 
bureaucracy to reassemble its forces and readopt its default mode of 
operation - forced growth. In addition, changes in political leadership can 
provoke dramatic shifts in policy. It is certainly true that socialist planning 
failed to produce smoother growth - free of fluctuations - as envisaged by 
those who originally sought to overthrow capitalism (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
190–193). 
 
Distortions of data are commonplace as socialist countries used different 
accounting methods; and the productive sphere was valued more highly 
than the service sector. In addition, because prices were not fully 
responsive to supply and demand they do not reflect quality and 
emphasize quantity. The main features of growth within a classical 
system of socialism differ to those under capitalism and to those in the 
developing capitalist countries. The key feature of growth under socialism 
is the acceleration of tempo forced from above by the bureaucracy. This 
leads the economy ‘to run faster than its legs can carry it’ (Kornai, 2007, 
p. 197). Typical forms include: high investment and low consumption; 
priorities determining investment; accelerated exploitation of extensive 
development; and quantity over quality.  
 
However, none of these features constitute a strategy intentionally 
pursued by the leadership: ‘no one adopts a conscious policy of 
neglecting quality, overstretching utilization of the service sphere, 
damaging the natural environment, in some periods reducing 
consumption, and so on. Yet the combination of the main features forms 
an organic whole: the planned and spontaneous priorities, conscious and 
instinctive methods, and desired and undesired consequences go 
together. After all, these features were not chosen according to a 
particular planner’s own preferences. This type of growth and the 
accompanying behaviour and mutual relations of those taking part are 
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formed largely by their social situation, which circumscribes the scope for 
decision-making. A combination of prevalent power structure, ideology, 
property relations, and coordination mechanisms, together with the 
systems initial state characterized by poverty and backwardness, sets 
the process of growth on the system specific path described’ (Kornai, 
2007, p. 198).  
 
Despite Kornai’s normative rejection of socialism he recognizes that 
‘classical socialism certainly took many countries from a state of severe 
backwardness at least to a medium level of development.’ (Kornai, 2007, 
p. 202) 
2.5. Kornai’s definition of reform and revolution  
 
Kornai argues that the classical socialist system constitutes a coherent 
entity. Its breakdown and demise is driven by impulses that come internal 
contradictions and dysfunctions. Economic slowdown exposes shortage 
and waste and the technical lag compared to advanced capitalism. 
Forced growth leads to neglect in spheres such as health, housing, 
transport and telecommunications, and military budgets restrict 
consumption. Public disaffection with consumer goods, the natural and 
built environment and low living standards, grows. Bureaucratic power 
and propaganda clashes with a desire for greater freedom of expression 
and action, particularly amongst the intelligentsia. Unity amongst the elite 
dissipates as self-doubt replaces self-confidence. The international 
experience of reforms and revolts in other socialist states, impact all such 
states. This was evident in 1989 where, regardless of repression or 
control over propaganda, even isolated states experienced common 
upheavals (Kornai, 2007, pp. 383–386). 
 
Kornai provides his own contextualized definition of ‘revolution’ and 
‘reform’, in which, any change that fails to radically amend the three core 
lines of systemic causation (party rule, public ownership and bureaucratic 
coordination) cannot be considered as reform. Changes restricted to 
subordinate spheres are defined as ‘superficial phenomena in economic 
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activity’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 388), and are not classified as reform. Reform 
must impact one of the three main lines of causation and affect the 
functioning of this sphere fundamentally and permanently, and yet not so 
fundamentally as to change the system away from the socialist ‘species’.  
 
 ‘Revolution’ as defined by Kornai means ending the undivided rule of the 
Communist Party as the precondition for a qualitative change of system. 
He rejects the view that revolution is defined by rapidity, origin ‘from 
below’, or violence. The term revolution is defined as a qualitative leap 
from one family of systems to another, not by whether it is considered to 
be an advance or a retreat. ‘A consistently radical change in the deepest 
fundamental attributes of some society - that and only that is what in this 
book qualifies as a revolution.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 390) 
 
When long-term ailments find expression, the trigger events are diverse. 
It might be the death of a leader (Mao Zedong, Stalin), change from 
above (Tito), or initiatives from within the elite. Pressure from below may 
take the form of rumbling discontent or open revolt. The aim of Kornai’s 
analysis is to provide ‘abstraction distilled from the multiplicity of historical 
realizations’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 394).  
2.5.1. The perfection of control  
 
Advocates of ‘perfection’ are supporters of the system, who seek to 
refine and perfect it. To eliminate problems within the bureaucracy they 
amend the instruments of power and control. Firms are merged for 
economy of scale, although comparative capitalist enterprises are 
generally smaller. For, under socialism, systems are designed for ease of 
control and monitoring. Thus monopolies without overlapping boundaries 
are efficient from the standpoint of bureaucratic simplicity.  
 
Mathematical and computer models are employed to promote rational 
planning and control. But, as planning functions through ‘vertical 
bargaining and horizontal reconciliation’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 404), the 
concealment of information is in the interest of many officials. So, they 
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are hostile to computerized models that might expose this. However, 
Kornai maintains that the complexity of the calculations required to 
regulate a national economy are too intricate and uncertain to be 
calculable (Kornai, 2007, p. 405).  
 
Plan indicators may be adjusted by decentralisation; amending their 
quantity and quality; focusing on net production or profits; and decoupling 
performance assessments that relate to past results (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
405–406). Indeed, even elevating the profit motive to the chief indicator 
is, in Kornai’s eyes, antithetical to capitalism if real decentralisation, free 
entry and free competition is missing (Kornai, 2007, p. 406). 
 
 After such experiments a new cycle of recentralisation re-emerges to 
restrict non-compliance, and to tighten up on dodges and tricks. More 
regulation, control, administrative layers and disciplinary measures are 
imposed. In this way, the ‘perfection’ tendency may serve to strengthen 
conservative tendencies. However, where political loosening 
accompanies these changes, it may help to ‘break down the self-
congratulatory official ideology’. A constituency, encompassing sections 
of the leading circles, comes to believe in more profound and radical 
change (Kornai, 2007, p. 407). 
2.5.2. Market socialism 
 
The principal concept behind market socialist ideas is for the market to 
fulfil the role of the basic coordination mechanism of the economy, or at 
least be equal in importance to bureaucratic planning, and for this to 
function in an economy dominated by public ownership. Various 
tendencies exist within this stream with differing ideas concerning how 
much power the market should have within the economy (Kornai, 2007, 
p. 474).  
 
This constitutes one of the main trends away from the classical system. 
Kornai argues, that the idea of market coordination is alien to Marxist 
traditional theory, which sees the market as an anarchical system of 
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coordination. Marx proposed that market relations, reacting to supply and 
demand, would be replaced by conscious planning. Kornai believes that 
adopting market socialist ideas entails abandoning the axiomatic 
principles of Marxism (Kornai, 2007, p. 475).  
 
For reform socialists, combining a ‘plan-cum-market’ appeared to offer 
the prospect of correcting market failure in the social sphere, and 
minimising the need for intervention by central planners in everyday 
economic operations.  The system retains key features of the classical 
system and combines these, with independent firms, contractual 
relations, price signal tools, and other market based measures. Market 
socialist ideas emerged organically. Many thinkers in different countries 
independently developed similar ideas to one another. These theories 
play a central role in the new ideological line developed under reform 
socialism, in which the market is allotted a respected role in economic 
activity (Kornai, 2007, pp. 477–479). 
 
Various ‘socialist-market’ methods were used over time. They involve a 
degree of ‘deregulation’ i.e. they remove economic entities from direct 
bureaucratic command (Kornai, 2007, p. 480). 
 
There are differing criteria for assessing such deregulation.  
a. The degree: to which it impacts on central command.  
b. The scope: local, national, experimental, gradual, competitive, 
universal.   
c. The sequencing: sudden abolition of commands or gradual evolution.  
 
The package of deregulatory measures differed substantially from 
country to country and experiment to experiment (Kornai, 2007, p. 481). 
2.5.3 Self-management  
 
Kornai identifies self-management as a political and ideological tendency 
that advocates economic democracy, workers’ councils or soviets, as 
replacements for bureaucratic coordination. He describes this as a 
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socialist tendency. It can originate as a top-down national initiative - as it 
did in Yugoslavia from 1950 till the 1990s. But the ‘idea of self-
management recurs repeatedly in the debates on reform in other socialist 
countries as well’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 462).  
 
This trend finds support in the ideas of Marx and Engels and envisages 
that workers’ self-governance will replace bureaucratic coordination. 
Kornai says:  
‘One leitmotif is strong condemnation of the role of the state and 
rejection of all kinds of ‘etatism’. The ideal situation is a society with no 
state at all. What is needed is economic democracy and workers’ self-
organization.’  
 ‘Some elements of the ideas proclaimed by the intellectual current of 
self-management are realized in practice, at least in part. For instance, 
the historical formations like the Paris Commune in 1871, the soviets 
in the early days of the 1917 Russian Revolution or the short-lived 
workers’ councils in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 bear some 
resemblance to the intellectual model of self-management.’ (Kornai, 
2007, p. 462 [1992]) 
 
The concept of self-management that Kornai employs encompasses a 
wide range of phenomena. These include the revolutionary episodes just 
cited and a variety of trends that enhance the expression of workers’ 
demands: from official trade unions becoming more militant; to the 
Yugoslav experience; where state and economic power was supposed to 
be an expression of workers’ self-management. Yugoslavia is the most 
enduring example of this trend, where it was the guiding philosophy of 
the party and state for nearly 40 years (Kornai, 2007, pp. 461–473). 
 
It is a trend produced by the political and ideological loosening of 
bureaucratic authority or even its disintegration. It is often promoted by 
Marxist believers but may also be supported by opponents of the system 
as a tactical measure to undermine the power of the party. Self-
management may result in a loss of managerial authority, and a 
strengthening of the trade unions and workers’ bargaining power. The 
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official state unions may start to display a greater degree of 
independence vis-à-vis management. In turn, managers will often adopt 
populist measures and represent workers’ interests in negotiations with 
superiors (Kornai, 2007, p. 462 [1992]). 
2.6. Hard and soft budget constraints 
 
Kornai developed the concept of soft and hard budget constraints in 
1980. These correspond to socialist and capitalist financing systems. Soft 
budget constraints pertain, when state firms under socialism consistently 
bargain with their superiors to increase their allotted funds without due 
regard for economic viability, profitability, etc. Soft-budgets can assume 
the form of bargaining for soft subsidies, soft tax bills, soft credit, and soft 
administrative pricing. Overall the soft-budget constraint expresses the 
collective experience of state owned entities in a socialist economy. Even 
if they make a loss, they are provided with funds and subsidies that 
ensure the enterprise remains in operation regardless of market 
conditions. A paternalistic relationship emerges between lower and upper 
level bureaucrats. The hard budget constraint assumes that profit 
maximization is the objective of the firm. If it is unable to make a profit, it 
is allowed to go bankrupt. Capitalist economic systems generally operate 
within hard budget constraints (Kornai, 2007, pp. 140–144). 
2.6.1 Vertical dependence 
 
Some key features of the semi-deregulation of state owned firms are 
cited here. There is dual-dependence upon vertical ties to state 
authorities and on horizontal ties to the market of buyers and sellers. The 
system specific features of these vertical dependencies are catalogued 
as follows: 
 
1. Entry into the market to produce and sell goods is determined by 
bureaucratic decision and permission.  
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2. Exit from productive investment is also determined by bureaucratic 
decision, or halted by bureaucratically allocated resources producing a 
culture of soft-budget constraints for state companies. 
3. Mergers and splits are permitted, but final rejection or permission 
is a bureaucratic right. 
4. Appointment of leaders is decided or heavily influenced by 
bureaucratic powers.   
5. Exports, imports and foreign exchange are less tightly controlled, 
but pressure is brought to bear to fulfil certain obligations or de-prioritise 
others. Technology or product development choices may be determined 
by superior organisations.  
6. Prices are generally still subject to some control. 
7. Wages are subject to pressures at the minimal and maximal 
scales, undermining free bargaining.  
8. Taxes and subsidies are subject to considerable scope for tailor 
made solutions and the bending of rules.  
9. Bureaucratic interests vertically control credit and loans; banks 
provide soft-budgets to save and sustain projects that are deemed 
important.  
10. Investments are partially deregulated to firm level decision-
makers, who can spend retained profits. In large projects, the state 
intervenes more frequently.  
 
Free enterprise does not apply in the state sector and rivalry between 
firms is restricted. The survival or demise of state owned firms and 
managerial promotion or demotion within them, is determined 
bureaucratically. However, formal regulatory frameworks fail to account 
for a myriad of intangible means by which the leadership bend firms to 
their will. There is a far greater scope for evasion and personal decision-
making, more fluidity in power relations and more bargaining between 
superiors and subordinates. Direct bureaucratic control of the classical 
system gives way to indirect bureaucratic control in the socialist-market 
(Kornai, 2007, pp. 482–489). 
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2.6.2. Budget constraints and the responsiveness of firms 
 
Market-socialists hoped that reduced engagement in direct planning 
would free resources up to concentrate on short-term macro economic 
policy and long-term economic strategy. However, micro-regulation 
continues and old planning routines become useless. Kornai believes 
that socialist-market planning is not a strategy but rather ‘a series of 
improvisations’(Kornai, 2007, p. 489).  
 
The profit motive is supposed to incentivize the behaviour of firms. 
Investments are partially financed by retained profits in the hope that 
prices and costs will begin to shape managerial action. Budgetary laxity 
means that the correlation between profits, prices and actions, remains 
limited. Soft budgets take the form of subsidies, tax benefits, credits and 
administrative pricing. The maintenance and expansion of unprofitable 
firms, by rescues and bankruptcy avoidance, is financed by the state.  
 
Vertical bargaining produces customized solutions. Rules are subject to 
incessant adjustment, subsidies and deductions are complex and unique, 
and relate to the specific spheres of interest of bureaucratic powers. High 
profit companies are squeezed to subsidize other sectors in a form of 
egalitarian profit distribution. Profits are conjured-up by bureaucratic 
action rather than being produced by market relations and incentives.  
 
The Communist Party and the bureaucracy are not profit driven owners 
of firms, so, ideological conflicts occur between the paternalistic 
promotion of solidarity and workers’ welfare, and demands to implement 
hard budget choices, particularly when this provokes workers’ unrest.  
 
Under capitalism, property ownership generates innate profit seeking 
motivations and behaviour. The market is governed by this universal 
discipline. Kornai believes that public ownership negates this, and cannot 
lead to the application of financial discipline, because ownership relations 
do not divide the bureaucracy. The state is the owner and manager rolled 
into one. This can only be changed by private ownership, or if state 
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enterprises are few in number and surrounded by capitalist enterprises 
(Kornai, 2007, pp. 493–495). 
 
Entrepreneurial dynamism requires free entry into productive activity and 
access to credit for private individuals or companies. Market socialist 
coordination and control mechanisms involve micro-level decision-
making on company activities by managers and their vertically superior 
bureaucratic organisations. ‘The more bureaucratic control remains 
dominant, the less the budget constraint can be hardened’ (Kornai, 2007, 
p. 495). 
 
The root of this problem is seen in the power structure, property relations 
and coordination mechanisms. In an economy in which budgets are 
‘sufficiently weak to dampen substantially all demand and supply 
reactions, the market is incapable of fulfilling its role’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 
496). 
 
These factors produce firms which react with dulled market responses to 
price signals, producing less effective and slower reactions than their 
private free-market cousins. Price signals from companies that are kept 
alive artificially, in turn produce more artificial prices.   
 
The expectation of market-socialists was that firms would behave price-
sensitively and financial control would replace physical input and output 
instructions. Investments would respond to interest rates and product 
substitution would be stimulated by prices. However, the firms were 
overwhelmingly unresponsive to these control mechanisms. Despite the 
more active role for money, public sector economics under market-
socialism remains only semi-monetized (Kornai, 2007, p. 497). 
2.7. The affinity between public ownership and bureaucratic coordination 
 
Reformers hoped that market mechanisms would occupy the vacuum 
created by the control or dissolution of the instruction system, but 
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amended bureaucratic coordination filled the gap. Indirect vertical control 
predominates and is combined with subordinate horizontal relations.   
 
The resistance by upper and lower level bureaucrats to implementing 
policy changes is often blamed for the situation. Kornai maintains that the 
bureaucracy is a ‘hierarchically structured social group’ rooted in every 
cell of society, so the natural survival instincts of this group pursue its 
continuance. They cling to their authority, identify with their respective 
organisational and social functions, and seek to complete them. They try 
to reinforce their rule and to perfect it. Firm managers want little 
interference from their superiors, but nevertheless seek out their 
superiors, and connections inside the bureaucracy, whenever difficulties 
are encountered. Their ‘capital’ is composed of these interrelations and 
these connections are their natural environment. 
 
The attempt to match central control with independent firms is 
contradicted by vertical subordination. Bureaucratic self-reproduction is 
organically engrained in the system. ‘There is no need for a central 
command; on the contrary, bureaucratic coordination rises again even if 
some stern central resolution lays down that it must be curtailed.’ (Kornai, 
2007, p. 499) 
2.7.1 Horizontal relations of firms in public ownership 
 
There is a substantial growth of horizontal relations in the reform era, but 
these relations are not governed by prices, profits or rivalry. Rather, they 
are the result of bureaucratic command. This market is a contrived affair, 
in which formulas and incentives are thought up and imposed, rather 
than naturally evolved. There is no affinity between the market and public 
ownership. Contracts are broken with impunity, companies refuse to pay, 
or pay late, leading to debt queuing by firms and general liquidity crises, 
and state rescue as a last resort is taken for granted. Company to 
company credit and debt is permitted, but so is delay, or the non-
payment of debt. 
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Three forms of capital allocation for public firms emerge, central state 
budgetary funding, investment loans from state banks and investments 
from company savings. One method proposed, is to permit cross 
ownership is through joint - stock companies, which issue shares. Banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and other state entities, hospitals, 
local governments and villages etc. are permitted to own and trade 
shares; these shares would be traded on state stock markets. Kornai 
believed that without private ownership, state entities owning these 
shares would continue to behave within soft-budget constraints (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 500–504). 
2.7.2. Proportions of the two kinds of dependency 
 
Vertical dependencies predominate over horizontal ones, despite the 
growth of the latter.  Coordination and control methods are altered but 
not fundamentally changed. There is a critical point at which bureaucratic 
intervention destroys market vitality, so the balance between them is not 
an arbitrary question. 
 
The demeanour of managers assumes the appearance of their capitalist 
counterparts. They are not owners, but are granted rights of control over 
public firms, so their interests are not bound to the profit and net worth of 
the companies. Their positions are vertically dependent, ‘one eye on the 
market and the other on their superiors, the important thing, in fact, is for 
the eye cast upward to see clearly: their present bonus or penalty and 
their future promotion depends on their superiors. The proprietor, if any, 
is the sum total of the bureaucracy. But this is ‘intangible.’ What was 
established about the classical system remains true: public property 
belongs to all and to none.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 505) An independent 
managerial class opposed to the bureaucracy and independent of the 
workforce fails to emerge. Managerial behaviour is governed by multiple 
roles: as intermediate managers dependent on their superiors, yet 
wielding local power; as recipients of residual income; as technocrats of 
production and development; and as representatives of employees’ 
interests (Kornai, 2007, p. 505). 
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2.8. The rise of the private sector 
 
The classical system defined the private sector as a vestige of capitalism. 
Leading reform Communists such as the CPSU general secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev, declared universal public ownership as his objective as late 
as 1988, and CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang reiterated his faith in 
public ownership and its inviolability in 1989 (Kornai, 2007, p. 445). 
 
Small-scale producers can develop into large-scale capitalists and 
unearned income and exploitation is an anathema to Communist 
ideology. Thus high-income earners become the object of envy and 
hatred. Wide layers of society, imbued with the ruling ideology, share this 
outlook and approve of measures taken against ‘parasites’. The reform 
socialist ideology is an inconsistent combination, internally torn between 
the need for pragmatic solutions and antipathy towards the agents and 
methods of these solutions (Kornai, 2007, pp. 446–447). 
 
Kornai regards the formation of the private sector as the most profound 
change in the economic sphere under reform socialism. Private sector 
growth mushrooms naturally and spontaneously as soon as there is a 
decrease in hostility towards it. It is driven by material incentives, a desire 
for autonomy, the satisfaction of self-mastery and a thirst for 
independence. And a part of the bureaucracy assists the private sector in 
order to alleviate shortages and to divert attention from political 
shortcomings (Kornai, 2007, pp. 432–435). Private owners establish new 
enterprises parallel to state sectors, or acquire ownership of state or 
collective assets through privatisation. The first method tends to 
characterize the reform era, but privatisation can also take place outside 
the productive sphere, for example in housing stock (Kornai, 2007, p. 
444). 
 
In Kornai’s opinion there is an organic affinity between private ownership 
and the coordination of economic activity through the market. Private 
enterprises relate on a horizontal basis. They do not wield administrative 
power over one another.  Individuals own property and voluntarily 
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engage in autonomously determined interconnections in conditions of 
decentralized coordination. Prices are the natural domain of the 
proprietor, as costs and sales are the means and measures of material 
gain. Unhindered entry into the market, competitive rivalry, and 
consequent failures, are all part of normal market conditions.  
 
‘All economic relations arising among private enterprises or between 
them and the general public are coordinated basically by the market 
mechanism. A natural advance of the market mechanism is inseparable 
from the expansion of the private sector.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 448) 
 
Contact between the two sectors is fraught with conflicts. Private 
entrepreneurs dislike the privileged access of state enterprises to power 
and credit. State managers envy the autonomy of the private sector, and 
the fact that higher wages may ‘steal’ talented workers away from public 
firms. Workers in the private sector envy the security of public sector 
workers. Access to key materials may come only from public enterprises, 
so private companies often need to bribe officials to sell to them, and 
access to public sector contracts is restricted by the state. Fair 
competition does not exist, thus both sectors have legitimate grievances 
against the other (Kornai, 2007, pp. 505–507). 
 
Hard budget constraints dominate the private economy; a failure to 
generate sufficient income and profits lead to survival crises for private 
enterprises. However, in reform socialism, bureaucratic coordination still 
dominates and impacts on the operation of private firms in a myriad of 
ways. This significantly differs from the interventionist state in capitalist 
countries (Kornai, 2007, pp. 448–449). 
2.8.1. The private sector and the bureaucracy 
 
The bureaucracy has a variety of interest groups within it. They relate to 
the private sector differently. The bureaucracy governs the public sector 
from within its administrative authority and experience. But in the 
exercise of power over the private sector bureaucrats operate outside of 
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their natural domain. This undermines the power of the bureaucracy. 
Although private sector economic activity develops spontaneously, so 
does bureaucratic opposition to it (Kornai, 2007, pp. 450–451). 
 
The bureaucracy determines and defines the enforcement of the legal 
framework governing private operations, but the private sector seeks 
protection and guarantees for its property. The parameters of legal 
activity are amended, permitting previously forbidden activities, but this 
simultaneously extends bureaucratic authority over them. Other 
previously illegal spheres may now be tolerated, and semi-legal activities 
proliferate. New forms of dependence on bureaucratic leniency develop, 
as legal measures to enforce contracts are weak or non-existent. The 
state is protected against private sector interests by existing power, 
ideology and law. Tax rules are arbitrarily applied and the burdens 
imposed eat into profitability. The tolerance of grey markets fosters a 
moral climate of lawlessness in tax relations. 
 
Limited access to bank credit, materials and state orders, discriminates 
against the private sector, which has no voice in political life. This 
ambivalent environment and insecurity, promotes short-term money 
making as the norm for private sector activity. Conditions of shortage 
permit private firms to disregard quality, and the bribery needed to 
engage in their business activities, promotes a cheating culture. This in 
turn increases public hostility to private entrepreneurs (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
451–455). 
 
Family based economic coordination increases in the reform era and 
creates a zone of privacy and independence from the state. Privatisation 
of housing promotes family ownership, engendering autonomy and 
positive identification with private property. The state also begins to 
retreat from welfare responsibilities (Kornai, 2007, p. 458). ‘Traditional’ 
family roles provide a retreat from the bureaucratic invasiveness of the 
past. This benefits state finances, whilst those dependent on subsidies, 
or unable to tap into the new sources of financial accumulation, become 
more impoverished. Women lose the independence provided by work 
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and may be burdened with a wide range of welfare responsibilities 
previously shouldered by the state (Kornai, 2007, pp. 458–459). 
 
Kornai predicted that after the demise of socialism, the advance of the 
private sector would be all the more rapid where the private sector had 
already matured. Capitalism can be ‘abolished by state command’ in a 
relatively short time span, but the development of the private sector 
cannot be ‘performed by state command’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 460).  
2.8.2 Interaction between the mechanisms; assessment of the changes 
 
In the reform era, managerial flexibility is increased, the quality and 
quantity of products improve, new product innovation and production is 
accelerated, and buyers’ interests are considered more frequently. The 
rigidity of the economic atmosphere changes, and barrack like controls 
and fear, associated with the classical system, diminish.  
 
The failings of bureaucratic and market mechanisms reinforce each 
other, producing a no-man’s land scenario where neither operates 
effectively. The old bureaucratic discipline is undermined and central 
power is no longer able to enforce policies, simultaneously, market 
discipline, governed by competitive rivalry is also absent.  
 
Markets require a minimal trust level to develop ‘good will’ and avoid 
constant litigation. Instead of this, bribery, nepotism and ‘cheap 
commercialism’ predominate, and there is widespread petty theft of state 
property -as it is not endowed with ‘value in the public’s eyes.’ (Kornai, 
2007, p. 509) 
 
In the 1980s, the Chinese a ‘dual-system’ economy encouraged the sale 
of subsidized goods at higher market prices. Managers often pocketed 
the difference. Those with bureaucratic connections spawned entire 
industries based on ‘back-door’ access to these state subsidized goods. 
The general public viewed the new rich with profound dislike, 
unconcerned whether the wealth was a product of entrepreneurial 
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endeavour or theft. Hatred of corruption erupted in 1989, in a widespread 
social movement alienated by the results of the reform process (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 509–510).  
 
According to Kornai, the imaginable model of a rational, objective and 
neutral bureaucracy, behaving according to market impulses, was 
contradicted by the actual structure, surviving ideology and property 
relations, within which the attempts to create market socialism were 
made. He thinks that the main benefits of market-socialist experiments 
are that they shake belief in the command economy, promote 
spontaneous forms of economic activity, and improve the public 
perception of private enterprise and the market (Kornai, 2007, p. 511).  
2.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is a presentation of the central concepts and definitions of 
Kornai’s socialist system, particularly reform socialism. Kornai’s systems’ 
theory examines the rise and fall of two specific types of socialism. The basic 
features of these socialist systems were shaped by the backward state of the 
pre-revolutionary society. The objective to catch-up with the advanced capitalist 
countries is shaped by ruling ideology and by social pressures to raise living 
standards.  
 
The political system acquires the form of a dictatorship, which is all- 
encompassing and brooks no organized opposition. The reform socialist 
system maintains control over political power, armed force, and the 
appointment of leaders in bureaucratic agencies. However, the system 
becomes unstable because its internal coherence disintegrates, as the 
tolerance of dissent and private economic interests at the margins, 
undermines the internal consistency of the ideology and mission of the 
Party and bureaucracy. The emergence of private economic actors plays 




The loosening of command and control systems inside the bureaucracy 
undermines its unity and increases the scope for bureaucratic jostling 
and bargaining as well as for pressure from the workforce that finds 
expression in populist tendencies amongst managers and officials in 
relation to their base constituency. The system of bureaucratic planning 
continues to coordinate the economy under reform socialism but now 
private firms operate alongside state enterprises. Investment hunger and 
forced growth are default policies of the bureaucracy.  A drive for rapid 
development encourages an untamed obsession with growth and this 
also leads to the pursuit of medium to long-term megaprojects. This 
produces patterns of growth that swallow-up investments and resources 
and generates unique cycles of expansion and slowdown. These are 
connected to the tempo of planning cycles and the limited resources 
available to realize bureaucratic investment plans.  
 
The inconsistency of the system finds expression in clashes between 
different interest groups and policies. This undermines ideological 
authority and produces internal contradictions within the ruling party and 
society. The tolerance of markets undermines planning and increases the 
influence of private incentives and private businesses. The weakening of 
central authority undermines planning but fails to nurture adequately 
functioning market entities, or mechanisms that might otherwise provide 
the basis for an alternative system. The system becomes unable to 
satisfy societal demands, the demands of private business, and the 
demands of various bureaucratic interests. Eventually this gives rise to a 
revolutionary crisis that brings down the system as a whole.  
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Kornai’s approach to socialism is based on his study of the systems that 
ruled over a third of humanity in the twentieth century. This chapter 
addresses the main question of this thesis: ‘Is China still socialist?’ This 
is evaluated by examining the degree to which China’s system 
corresponds with Kornai’s definition of socialism. I assess contemporary 
Chinese political economy using the tools developed in The Socialist 
System (Kornai, 2007). However, Kornai’s writings on China since 2008 
define China as capitalist (Kornai, 2008, 2014, 2016). This assessment is 
considered in greater depth in chapter 4.  
 
I select Kornai’s three main definitional criteria for socialism and examine 
the related evidence on China. They are: Communist Party control of 
political power and Marxist ideology; the dominance of public ownership 
of the commanding heights of the economy; and the dominance of 
bureaucratic coordination of the economy. 
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To undertake this task I evaluate an extensive body of research, which 
provides evidence from a diverse range of multi-disciplinary sources. 
This draws on cutting edge research by leading scholars of Chinese 
economic history, comparative political systems, political science, public 
administration and management, sociology, political economy, 
demography, economic geography, and urbanization studies. In addition, 
I cite from documents and speeches from the Chinese government, 
government economic statistics and census data, as well as quality 
journalism from the Chinese and Western media.  
3.2. Kornai’s connection to the Chinese debate on reform  
 
In 1985 leading Chinese economists and policy-makers attended a 
unique conference held on a boat travelling the Yangze river. This was 
called the Bashan Boat Conference. It brought together eminent Chinese 
reform minded economists and a wide spectrum of foreign economists to 
engage in an intensive deliberation on economic reform in 1985. One of 
China’s most prominent economists Xue Muqiao introduced the 
conference as being about economic planning and macroeconomic 
management. China’s price system, the relationship between plan and 
market, the rate of growth, and the nature of reform were all on the table 
for discussion. János Kornai’s presentation was the most influential and 
challenging for the Chinese audience.  
 
Kornai impressed his audience by focusing on the experience of state 
owned firms in Hungary. He examined their vertical dependence on 
bureaucratic superiors and their horizontal relations to consumers. His 
presentation and assessment of these questions struck the Chinese 
audience because it was intimately connected to their own discussions 
and concerns. The Keynesian economist James Tobin warned that 
China’s economy was overheating and recommended contracting 
monetary policy and a slower rate of growth. However, some of the core 
language used by Tobin lacked an intellectual or linguistic affinity to the 
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history and structure of Chinese economic discourse (Gewirtz, 2017, pp. 
136–145). 
 
By contrast the Chinese audience easily grasped Kornai’s presentation. 
When he discussed the economic problems of reform socialism, he dealt 
with problems that his audience were familiar with from first hand 
experience. His presentation dealt with administrative and market 
coordination. In his view, administrative policies could take the form of 
direct or indirect regulation, whereas market coordination policies could 
be based on free markets, or markets governed by macroeconomic 
control. The last type, markets governed by macroeconomic control was 
what Kornai wanted his audience to concentrate on. This offered a 
means to tighten the budget constraints of enterprises, and to 
simultaneously protect important firms that might find themselves in 
serious difficulty. The more price sensitive the response of enterprises 
the better. Kornai’s suggestion had the advantage for Chinese 
economists that it could easily fit within the official ‘planned commodity 
economy’ designation that was adopted by the Party in 1984 (Gewirtz, 
2017, pp. 146–149).  
3.3. Kornai’s rejection of China as a socialist system  
 
Today, Kornai categorizes China’s system as Leninist in only one sense: 
that the Communist Party retains its exclusive political monopoly and 
continues to repress opposition. However, he maintains that the party 
has changed its ideology and adopted a positive view of capitalists, 
private property and the market.  
 
The ‘ownership structure has undergone fundamental changes, in which 
the state-owned sector has given up its leading role. The role of 
bureaucratic coordination and central management has been drastically 
reduced and largely replaced by the market. China is not a classical 
socialist system, and is closer to a typical capitalist system.’ (Kornai, 
2008, pp. 58–59) 
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Thus Kornai argues that the Communist Party underwent a 
metamorphosis over decades, in which, the ideology of socialism was 
abandoned, and public ownership and bureaucratic control, also 
underwent a fundamental transformation (Kornai, 2008, pp. 147–150). 
He maintains that public ownership has radically declined and private 
ownership now predominates. ‘The first characteristic of capitalism –a 
dominant role for the private sector –either applies or is near to applying.’ 
(Kornai, 2008, p. 148) The statistics cited by Kornai reveal that 60% of 
the value added to the national economy, derived from the private sector 
in 2005 (Kornai, 2008, p. 149). As we shall see, the statistics on this 
question are sharply contested, and this makes assessing the relative 
weight of different ownership forms problematic. Furthermore, I will show 
that his methodology developed in The Socialist System better 
contextualizes the hierarchy of ownership and power in contemporary 
China, and elicits a more precise picture of the relative weight and 
influence of the private and public sectors.   
 
The dominance of market price transactions is cited as evidence that the 
‘second characteristic of the capitalist system – predominance of market 
coordination –clearly applies’ (Kornai, 2008, p. 148). Although Kornai 
placed significant emphasis on planned prices in socialist systems 
dominated by bureaucratic coordination, he did not previously elevate 
generic bureaucratic prices to the definitional determinant of the 
dominant mode of coordination.1 Kornai suggests that market socialist 
experiments in the reform era attempt to adjust prices by market 
methods, whilst maintaining bureaucratic coordination and control over 
factor prices (Kornai, 2007, p. 525). His contention was that bureaucratic 
coordination within a market socialist environment distorts true price 
signals, as it operates through soft budget constraints and maintains the 
close relationship between the party, bureaucracy, public banks, publicly 
owned companies and other state entities (Kornai, 2007, pp. 512–527).  
 
Kornai believes that the CCP has abandoned its outright hostility to 
private property; and Party cadres and business interests have 
intermingled within an authoritarian system. Although, the formal political 
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structures of the socialist system remain, its ideological content has been 
jettisoned and replaced with a purely rhetorical allegiance to socialist and 
communist ideas (Kornai, 2008).  
3.4. The organization and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party 
 
The Chinese word for the Communist Party is gongchandang; literally 
translated this means the “public assets party”. Indisputably, the CCP 
exercises a monopoly on political power and dominates the government 
and state apparatus. Its 86 million members (2013) are organized in 4.3 
million grassroots party organs.2 Some 85% of party members work for a 
state entity or for the party.3 Members must abide by the constitution and 
policies of the party, and should participate in their party branches, cells 
or units. Party cells operate in all official and semi-official state entities 
and nearly all legally registered civil society organisations. The party also 
extends its reach into the private sector. In 2012 over 300,000 party 
committees existed in 210,000 large private entities.4  
 
David Shambaugh’s book The Chinese Communist Party: Atrophy and 
Adaption (Shambaugh, 2008) is a study of China as a ‘Leninist party 
state’. It uses comparative methods to study assessments of why 
Leninist states collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and it 
considers why the CCP survived.  
 
 Shambaugh examines both Western and Chinese assessments of the 
causes and consequences of the systemic collapse. The Chinese 
Communist Party leadership was initially stunned, and blamed Western 
plots to promote "peaceful evolution". However, by 1990 they considered 
a more complex mixture of reasons. The Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), the Central Party School, and Marxism and Socialism 
Institutes, began a research and analysis process that continued until 
2004.  
 
Shambaugh observes that the leadership’s view of Soviet reforms was 
one of skepticism between 1986-7; support from 1987-9, suspicion 
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between 1989-91, shock in 1991-2. Then, they engaged in a systemic 
study between 1993-2004, and drew their conclusions in 2004-5 
(Shambaugh, 2008, p. 55). 
 
Chinese research involved a broad historical overview of the ossified 
character of the Soviet Party. Some argued that this became entrenched 
under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader from 1964-1982, and believed 
that had the reform policies carried out under Nikita Khrushchev in the 
period 1953-1964 continued, the crisis and collapse in 1989 could have 
been avoided. Chinese Party scholars studied the way that a wide 
spectrum of oppositional civil society forces emerged to overthrow 
Leninist states.  
 
Reforms to the CCP’s methods of governance were designed to prepare 
for all of the eventualities that triggered the collapse of other socialist 
systems, and to ensure its longevity and the reproduction of its power.  
The assessments that informed the analysis spanned a wide variety of 
governmental and economic systems around the world. The objective 
was to assimilate beneficial elements from any and all relevant systems.  
Official conclusions were published at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th 
Party congress in 2004. Shambaugh considered this meeting to be the 
most important since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s 
reforms. 
 
Shambaugh’s book provides a strong counter-weight to Kornai’s concept 
of a fundamental and irreparable ideological degeneration within the 
Party. He shows that Party intellectuals and advisors undertook a broad, 
sweeping and sophisticated analysis of the reasons behind the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. This undertaking was 
notable for its depth, its holistic character, and its attempt to contextualize 
the collapse in broad historical terms.  
 
Of particular interest was the Chinese assessment of the former Soviet 
leader Michael Gorbachev. In Western scholarship, he was almost 
universally credited with bringing down the system. However, this was 
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not the dominant Chinese theory. Indeed, many Chinese studies 
concluded that Gorbachev’s main ‘error’ was to carry out political and 
economic reform simultaneously. Indeed, most Party scholars claimed 
that the collapse of their sister parties was rooted in long-term 
dysfunctional and systemic problems (Shambaugh, 2008, p. 70). 
 
The Party leadership decided to carry through reforms to the Party’s 
methods of governance. They wanted to prepare for all of the 
eventualities that triggered the collapse of other socialist systems, and 
tried to reconfigure the Party’s ‘governing capacity’. China’s 2800 Party 
schools, that train party cadres about a broad range of governance 
systems and tasks, are singled out by Shambaugh as they sought to 
sustain Party rule by broadening feedback systems to allow Party and 
state agencies to head off any discontent that might escalate into a 
systemic crisis.  The conclusions drawn by the CCP’s researchers were 
quite complex, but they consistently focused on key issues which it was 
felt, unless learnt from, would lead to similar events in China and the loss 
of power by the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
 They blamed the Soviet Communist Party’s demise on four main 
causes:  
1. Economic deterioration  
2. Too much distance between the ruling parties and the masses, and a 
lack of local party building  
3. The failure of the trade unions to act as a bridge between the working 
class and the party, and  
4. Western activities to promote peaceful evolution (Shambaugh, 2008, 
p. 50). 
 
Following this period of studying what happened to the USSR and 
Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist Party undertook a full scale 
"rectification campaign”, which lasted for 18 months and ended in July 
2006. During this time all 73 million members of the Chinese Communist 
Party had to 1. Undertake three months of study of classical Marxist 
texts, some of Mao's writings and some speeches by present day leaders 
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(during this period no party members were allowed to leave China) 
2. Spend three months writing self-criticism and three months circulating 
this to colleagues 3. Then spend three months being criticized by 
colleagues and then rewrite their self-criticism (Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 
129–130). 
 
Shambaugh’s study contradicts Kornai’s view that China’s leaders 
employ socialist and Marxist phraseology in a merely ritualistic fashion, 
and not out of conviction. He writes that although a ‘strong case can be 
made that Marxist-Leninist ideology and its various Chinese permutations 
are irrelevant in today’s China – or are an impediment to any real CCP 
reform. The logic of this argument is that, like socialism or communism 
as political-economic systems, Marxist-Leninist ideology has little 
analytical or policy relevance in the twenty-first century world. Indeed 
Marxism-Leninism is considered a hindrance to modernization and 
incapable of explaining contemporary phenomena like globalization. The 
CCP, however, does not and cannot agree with this judgment – for the 
very reason that it is a communist party.’ 
(Shambaugh, 2008, p. 104) 
 
This certainly appears to correspond with the views of President Xi 
Jinping. For example, at a group study session of the Politburo held on 
29 September 2017, he stated:  
 
‘Marxism is the foundation for advancing the cause of the CCP and the 
people, and the source of their strength to make progress. Should we 
deviate from or abandon Marxism, our Party will lose its soul and 
orientation. We must follow the guidance of Marxism, a faith unshakable 
at all times and in all circumstances.’ 
(Xi, 2017, pp. 68–69) 
3.5. CCP organization and state power 
 
The CCP is certainly organized in a way that corresponds fully with 
Kornai’s original description of communist parties. Debate and discussion 
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inside the party is followed by uncritical compliance to implement party 
policies and directives. However, where decisions leave scope for 
interpretation, local committees can, and do, amend, adjust and resist 
party policies. However, in cases of intransigence, work teams are 
dispatched to enforce directives (Lawrence and Martin, 2013, p. 6).  
 
Xi Jinping is General Secretary of the Party and Chairman of the Party’s 
Central Military Commission. The Politburo and its Standing Committee 
constitute the leadership of the party and are elected by the Central 
Committee (CC).5 The current CC has 205 full and 171 alternate 
members. In 2007 the CC informally voted on 200 candidates before 
identifying the final 25.6  
 
The party commands 2.5 million members of the People's Liberation 
Army, 1.5 million members of the People's Armed Police, and 800,000 
members of various internal security services. Approximately 60% of 
soldiers and police officers are party members (Bruce J. Dickson, 2014, 
p. 52). Recently, Xi Jinping reiterated that, ‘the Party commands the 
gun’.7 
 
The Party's own bureaucracy is dominated by four agencies: 
• The Central Discipline Inspection Commission: the party's anti-corruption 
agency. 
• The Organization Department: which recruits, trains, and assigns 
personnel to a vast range of party, state, and public organizations. 
• The Propaganda Department: which deals with ideological and media 
work. 
• The Central Commission of Politics and Law: which controls internal 









Figure 2. Chart outlining the structure of the CCP and its internal bureaucracy 
 
After the 1970s state administration was devolved to state agencies. 
However, Party committees mirror state organisations at all levels, and 
make all major decisions.  ‘Cadres’ in China’s are public officials in 
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responsible or managerial positions in the party or government. Cadre 
appointments are made by the Central Organisation Department of the 
Communist Party through its nomenklatura system - a list of leadership 
positions and suitable candidates. State organisations and work units are 
hierarchically ranked according to military principles. The promotion, 
rotation and transfer of officials occur across and between political, 
economic and state institutions. This generates loyalty to the party and 
state rather than to one’s particular employment, shareholders, or private 
interests (Lin, 2011, p. 76).  
 
Positions at the upper levels of the hierarchy are all political 
appointments. The central party and state, vertically controls local 
governments through the power to set objectives and targets, and can 
remove those displaying disloyalty or too much independence (Lin, 
2011). 
3.6. The Central Organization Department 
 
The executives of the top SOEs and banks are appointed by, and 
beholden to, the Central Organisation Department of the CCP. This 
means that the goals of the state override shareholder value and the 
pursuit of profit maximisation (Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, 2011, 
p. 3). The Central Organisation Department (COD) recruits, appoints, 
evaluates, promotes and removes, party and governmental officials at 
central, regional and provincial levels. The COD keeps detailed files on 
all employees of the party, government, state enterprises, the judiciary, 
the mass media, and state entities and institutions. This facilitates 
universal control over personnel of the state. In addition the personnel 
files of urban workers employed by the state are stored under party 
control and are secret and intrusive. This mechanism is typical in the 
socialist system. Employment transfer depends on the transfer of your 
personal file. This acts as a critical mechanism of control. Similar 
organisational supervision and control also extends to large private 
sector entities where party committees exist. However, in private and 
foreign owned entities the personnel files are less critical, and the party 
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may operate under the auspices of a trade union in these companies 
(Lin, 2011, pp. 72–73). 
 
Government employees do not have to be party members, even at a 
ministerial level, but party members perform nearly all-sensitive roles. In 
1997 China had 40.19 million cadres, of whom, 15.27 million were CCP 
members, and 24.91 million were not (Heilmann and Kirchberger, 2000, 
p. 2). It would seem logical for the size and influence of the bureaucratic 
state to decline when the market mechanism replaces planning as the 
central coordinating force, but the reform era witnessed a major 
expansion in the number of officials on the government payroll, from 20 
million in 1990 to 46 million in 2004. This rose to 47.78 million in 2005, 
divided between 891,000 units (Ang, 2012, p. 692). 
 
Non-party cadres have been a traditional recruitment field for the party. 
At the top level of the bureaucracy: ranked above the level of a 
county/division chief, there are approximately 500,000 cadres. Over 95% 
of them are party members. For these cadres, the obedience of party and 
non-party cadres is a prerequisite for the reproduction of their power. 
However, ordinary party members do not constitute part of the elite, 
although they commonly work in supervisory roles or as group leaders. 
Walder believes that these relationships constitute the only real social 
base of the regime (Andrew G. Walder, 2004, pp. 196–197).  
 
Party members are permitted to express their opinions inside party 
structures and, in the process of developing policies, party leaders 
engage in wide ranging policy debates in which experts and the public 
are invited to make contributions or comments. The party is able to use 
its control over the mass media to shape public opinion to serve its 
objectives. As officials serve limited terms and their roles are rotated they 
need to be sensitive to popular opinion. However, as external supervision 
and control is lacking, the danger of rent seeking behavior and insider 
jostling for control of resources and revenues is ubiquitous. So it is hard 
to tell whether those seizing control of revenue streams are in command, 
or whether central objectives and planning edicts are the driving force 
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behind China’s modern economy. Naughton concludes that dominant 
insider interests should be understood in a broad sense as ‘those of a 
larger group of Communist Party officials, politicians and technocrats, 
and even the urban population - at least those with urban residence 
permits -as a whole.’ (Naughton, 2017, pp. 20–21)  
 
The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's highest organ of state 
power. It exercises legislative and constitutional power, elects 
government leaders and ministers, supervises planning, and makes 
decisions on war and peace.8 Within the NPC system there is some 
scope for limited expression of opposition. Anyone with the support of 10 
other voters can stand in direct elections to lower level People's 
Congresses. In practice, this provokes sanctions, repression, and 
harassment. Nevertheless, independent candidates stood for election 
and won seats in Beijing, Changsha, Chongqing and Chengdu as far 
back as 1980 (Yuan, 2011, p. 391), and estimates for the number of 
independent candidates in 2006 ran as high as 10,000 (Yuan, 2011, p. 
393). These candidates are commonly grassroots heroes; lawyers, 
victims of power-abuse, idealistic social activists, or political dissidents 
(Yuan, 2011, pp. 395–396). 
 
Premier Li Kejiang presides over the State Council. All major institutions 
and working organs of the state are subordinate to it.9 Ministries and 
Commissions are bureaucratic entities, which formulate relevant 
regulations and help to draft laws. They can affect, amend and adjust 
policies, and interpret their implementation (Lawrence and Martin, 2013, 
pp. 28–31).10 
 
A large number of organisations participate in policy formulation, 
debating proposals and generating ideas. They include the Central Party 
School, Leading Small Groups, numerous think tanks, research 
organisations and institutes, as well as academia, the mass media and 
China's Internet users, known as netizens. 
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3.7. Ownership and control of the ‘commanding heights’ 
 
Kornai says that the majority of China’s GDP comes from the private 
sector. This shows that the ‘first characteristic of capitalism –a dominant 
role for the private sector – either applies or is near to applying’ (Kornai, 
2008, pp. 148–149).   
 
The state owned enterprise is the core of the political economy of 
socialism. According to Kornai, it is ‘the first and most important property 
form’ of the socialist system. It occupies what Lenin called the 
‘commanding heights’: 
‘the positions that allow the other, non-state sectors of the economy to be 
dominated: mining, energy production and manufacturing, transport, 
domestic wholesale trading, foreign trading, banking and insurance. On 
the other hand, agriculture, retail trading, and other services to the 
general public, do not qualify as ‘commanding heights,’ and although 
state firms appear in them, other property forms occur alongside and 
may even predominate.’(Kornai, 2007, p. 71) 
 
It is certainly true that Lenin regarded ownership and control of the 
commanding heights of the economy as an essential prerequisite for 
socialism.11 And Kornai accepts Lenin’s concept of the commanding 
heights as his definitional determinant of the dominant form of ownership 
over the means of production. Indeed, although the objective of Marx and 
Engels was to abolish private property in production, and this was a 
‘cornerstone of the ideology’ (Kornai, 2007, pp. 444–445). A subtlety in 
their tactical approach was evident as far back as 1847, when Engels 
wrote in ‘The Principles of Communism’:  
‘Will it be possible for private property to be abolished at one stroke? 
No, no more than existing forces of production can at one stroke be 
multiplied to the extent necessary for the creation of a communal society. 
In all probability, the proletarian revolution will transform existing society 
gradually and will be able to abolish private property only when the 
means of production are available in sufficient quantity’.12    
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Under Kornai’s socialist political economy the Communist Party controls 
the state, the leading publicly owned financial institutions, and a broad 
range of state enterprises. This permits the mobilisation of resources to 
implement plans. From this perspective, the power derived from 
ownership and control of the commanding heights in China’s system is 
certainly highly concentrated and amplified.  
 
Let us examine the extent of public ownership in contemporary China:   
 
The state sector is divided into three parts.  
• State owned enterprises (SOEs) run by the State-owned Assets 
and Supervision Administration Commission (SASAC) under the State 
Council.  
• SOEs run by local SASACs under lower government tiers.  
• SOEs controlled by other SOE owners and enterprises that are 
owned and controlled through SOE subsidiaries.  
 
The national SASAC was formed in 1999. It now supervises 121 Central 
State Owned Enterprises (CSOEs). It has its origin in the mid-1990s 
when Asset Management Companies (AMCs) were formed by China’s 
four state owned commercial banks in order to off-load bad loans. AMCs 
were supposed to make SOEs act in a more market responsive fashion. 
 
In 2006, the Chinese government published a list of ‘strategic’ industries 
that it deems vital to national or economic security and that will remain 
permanently in state hands. They are defence, power generation and 
distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation 
and shipping. In 2007, this list was extended to include shipbuilding, 
metalwork and construction, and fifty non-financial enterprises are 
deemed to be ‘strategic’. They act as the commanding heights of the 
state sector. Provincial governments use the same terms of reference as 




The state will also retain significant or absolute control over those sectors 
defined as ‘pillar’ and ‘basic’. These are machinery, automotive, IT, 
construction, steel, base metals, chemicals, land surveying, and R&D. 
Other sectors in which significant ownership stakes and control are to be 
maintained include, trading, investment, medicine, construction materials, 
agriculture, and geological exploration (Mattlin, 2007). In addition the 
government is increasing its share ownership in those sectors it defined 
as ‘key’ and ‘pivotal’, but these categories are fuzzy and are subject to 
political and bureaucratic pressure.  
 
Although foreign mergers and acquisitions are allowed to encroach on 
state ownership, and the purchase of existing enterprises holds an 
attractive appeal for foreign investors, blocks on foreign investment 
outside the least prioritized sectors are commonplace. Even where local 
bureaucracies favour such outside investment, central bodies, 
particularly the Ministry of Commerce (MofCom), flexibly interpret their 
definition of the importance of those companies in order to block mergers 
and acquisitions. The criteria used by MofCom to review potential 
monopoly dangers are set at a relatively low benchmark. They are 
defined in terms of assets, revenue and market share, or by the number 
of enterprises in which investors hold stakes; resulting in greater 
restrictions on foreign investment and increasing selectivity over project 
approvals (Mattlin, 2007). 
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Figure 3. Chart showing the assets of China’s 150 largest firms in 2010 
 
The above chart shows the assets of China’s largest 150 companies in 
2010 (as measured by revenue). The combined assets of these 150 
companies made up 84% of the largest 500 companies. The assets of 
the largest 117 state owned companies within the top 150 firms were 
equal to 41.2% of China’s total corporate assets. Yet, according to the 
Economic Census in 200813 there were 4.95 million registered 
corporations in China14 with total assets of 207,800 billion yuan (including 
domestic, Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan invested (HKMTI), and foreign 
invested).  
Key to chart:  
• CSOEs: refers to central state owned enterprises  
• State: refers to state enterprises owned by local government or state 
institutions 
• Unclear: refers to firms where I was unable to ascertain the predominant 
ownership status  
• Private: are firms that are predominantly privately owned.  
The data is from 2010 and was published by China.org.cn15 and the All 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce.16  
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A 2015 survey by the OECD on the role of State Owned Enterprises 
presents ‘the most comprehensive and internationally comparable 
dataset currently available on the size, sectorial distribution and 
corporate forms of national SOE sectors in 40 countries’ (“The Size and 
Sectoral Distribution of State-Owned Enterprises | OECD, p. 7). These 
SOEs are defined by the fact that they offer goods and services in 
markets that could otherwise be carried out by profit seeking private 
enterprises (“The Size and Sectoral Distribution of State-Owned 
Enterprises | OECD, p. 11).  
 
The dataset of 40 countries includes: China, India, Brazil, the UK, the 
USA, France and Germany. China stands out like a sore thumb in terms 
of the size and weight of its SOEs compared to all the other countries 
combined.  
• There is a combined total of 2,467 of such SOEs in all 39 countries other 
than China. They are valued at over US $2.9 trillion, and employ 9.2 
million people in total. 
• According to the OECD’s categorization method, China has 51,341 
central government owned SOEs.17 Their value is US $29.2 trillion, and 
they employ over 20 million people. India’s SOEs by contrast employ 3.3 
million people and their total value is just US $338.5 billion, this comes in 
a distant second behind China.   
The vast scale and combined resources of Chinese SOEs, means they 
can undertake global takeovers to acquire technology and knowhow; 
secure scarce resources from other countries; and undertake state 
financed and supported megaprojects such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative that aims to link together the road, rail and maritime 
infrastructure of 60 countries. It has been estimated that investment in 




3.7.1. The invisible hand of the state 
 
In the late 1980s, some advocates of market socialism in Hungary, 
Poland and China proposed the creation of stock markets where the 
shares of public enterprises could be bought from the state by various 
public entities. This was intended to foster greater fluidity and flexibility of 
response to market impulses. Kornai predicted that such firms would not 
change their behaviour as ‘there cannot be a real market in capital 
without capitalist private owners’ (Kornai, 2007, pp. 503–504).  
 
When stock markets were formed in Shanghai (1990) and Shenzhen 
(1991) there was a rapid decline in the state shareholding of listed 
companies. However, the fall in state ownership directly corresponded to 
a rapid rise in institutional ownership by the state. This means that state-
owned entities buy shares in these companies, although this often also 
implies that a portion of company shares may end up in the hands of 
managers or officials. However, this transfer of shares did not change the 
quantity of state ownership at all (J. Wang et al., 2011).  
 
In the early 1990s the transformation of enterprises into corporate share 
based structures opened the possibility to trade shares and raise capital. 
A general audit was conducted which identified the assets and 
subtracted the liabilities of enterprises. This determined the net asset 
value of these enterprises, which was denominated in shares. Control 
over these SOE's assets fell to parent companies and the heads of 
supervisory agencies. Shares were divided between tradable A-shares 
and non-tradable state shares. Non- tradable shares were designed to 
stop wholesale privatisation whereas A-shares would be floated. In the 
1990s the main concern was the potential to use A-shares to raise 
money, and to contain the danger that speculative fluctuations could 
undermine stability. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CRSC) took central control over the exchanges, the market press, 
listings, and administrative controls. Attempts to sell a percentage of non-
tradable shares, to raise revenue for state spending, hit the value of A-
shares, as greater supplies would be issued without increased demand. 
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In the early 2000s the state intervened to prop-up the market and 
proposed measures to draw in foreign capital (Carl E.Walter in Oi and 
Walter, 2011, pp. 210–234). 
 
Privatisation has never been a state policy, but widespread insider 
privatisations of small SOEs reduced the total number of SOEs from 
250,000 in 1995, to 127,000 in 2005 (Mattlin, 2007, p. 25). However, 
according to Wang it is ‘naïve to view the state as simply having divested 
itself from ownership of the state sector. Virtually all of the figures that 
scholars and the popular press have picked as evidence of the declining 
role of the state, relates to the decline in state shares but ignores the rise 
of institutional shares.’ (J. Wang et al., 2011, p. 9) In 2004, the state was 
the largest shareholder in 70% of listed non-financial firms, which are 
commonly defined as private companies (Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole 
Kyle, 2011, p. 10). 
 
The transformation of SOEs into share-holding firms took several forms, 
shareholding cooperatives, jointly owned enterprises, limited liability 
corporations and limited shareholding corporations. These firms held 
over 50% of capital assets and generated 35% of national sales. They 
replaced SOEs as the dominant public sector employers in the interior of 
the country. These hybrid forms were supposed to operate under hard 
budget constraints (Lin and Hu, 2011, pp. 725–728). 
 
The introduction of stock markets in China appeared to represent a 
qualitative symbolic transformation toward capitalism. However, in July 
2015, a crisis in the stock market revealed the inner contradictions 
between market pressures and state control and exposed peculiar 
features of China's markets. Formally, all the institutions, organisations, 
administrative and legislative forms that are required to replicate Western 
stock markets exist. However, Walter notes that despite such 
appearances: ‘all aspects of the capital markets remain owned by some 
agency of the state’ (Carl E.Walter in Oi and Walter, 2011, p. 238). As a 
consequence, when share prices began to collapse in July 2015, state 
banks were told to lend US $209bn to the wholly state-owned China's 
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Securities Finance Corp in order to buy stocks. Market volatility was 
thereby contained by massive state intervention.19 Thus, the valuation 
and fate of these listed companies is determined on the basis of soft 
budget constraints. 
 
Shareholding companies that mask their state ownership through stock 
market listings, help to generate a general underestimation of the extent 
of public ownership. In addition, it is also commonplace to ignore the role 
of the state in joint ventures with foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). 
These foreign investors include cases where state enterprises acquired 
FIE status by registering outside the mainland in order to gain access to 
FIE concessions. Indeed, even nominally private companies may conceal 
significant state share ownership in China.20 However, the widespread 
underestimation of the influence of state ownership in the economy is not 
simply a question of misidentifying concealed public ownership relations, 
but also of understanding the ‘dynamics of control’ exercised by organs 





Figure 4. Chart illustrating the system of control over the commanding heights of the 
economy 
 
The above chart shows the overall networked chain of command over 
urban state owned and state controlled enterprises. The organisation 
department of the Communist Party appoints the heads of the SASAC 
and the top 50 centrally managed SOEs. Most leadership positions in 
SOEs and banks are also party appointments. The SASACs appoints the 
managers and supervises SOEs at a national and local level (Andrew 
Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, 2011, pp. 72–76). SOEs also exercise control 
over Limited Liability Companies and Shareholding Companies through 
dominant share ownership. State banks provide credit to SOEs at a 
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national and local level, as well as to Limited Liability Corporations, 
Shareholding Companies and Urban Cooperatives.  
 
In his ground breaking book Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics 
Yasheng Huang (Huang, 2008) argues that the key to identify state 
ownership is control rights. Who can appoint the managers, dispose of 
the assets and determine the strategic direction of the firm? This 
information is hard to decipher from the datasets used to assess the 
extent of state ownership of Chinese industrial enterprises. Huang 
illustrated the problem by examining a widely cited study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
about the extent of private ownership in China’s industrial firms 
(Dougherty and Herd, 2005). Huang pinpoints the categorisation of legal 
person shareholding firms as problematic.  
 
If you accept that they are private, then the foreign and indigenous 
private firms share of China’s industrial profits was 28.9% in 1998, and 
71.2% in 2005. However, if legal person shareholding firms are not 
counted as private, then foreign and indigenous private firms share of 
China’s industrial profits declines to 17.6% in 1998, and 39.8% in 2005 
(Huang, 2008, pp. 14–16)  
 
As regards the percentage of GDP produced by each sector, similar 
problems exist when trying to identify what is a private or state owned 
firm. A comprehensive survey by Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle 
(2011) agrees with Huang (2008), claiming that the state sector is far 
more influential than the previous consensus believed. Although I agree 
with their view, the emphasis here is placed on the multi-spectrum 
character of party control that operates in systems that Kornai defines as 
socialist. So, although the statistical evidence is important, the hierarchy 
and mechanisms of control under socialism inevitably multiply the 
specific weight of state ownership within the economy and society.   
 
Kyle notes that: ‘The observable SOE sector under reasonable 
assumptions accounts for nearly 40 percent of China’s economy. Given 
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additional information on the prevalence of SOE ownership in China’s 
capital markets, anecdotal and observed data on the prevalence of SOE 
ownership among LLCs and other ownership categories, and the SOE 
role in round‐tripped FDI, it is reasonable to conclude that by 2009 nearly 
half of China’s economic output could be attributable to either SOEs, 
SHEs, and other types of enterprises controlled by the SOEs indirectly. If 
the output of urban collective enterprises and the government‐run 
proportion of TVEs are considered, the broadly defined state sector likely 
surpasses 50 percent.’ (Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, 2011, p. 25)  
 
SOEs account for 28% of formal urban employment identified by the NBS 
for 2010; this means that informal employment of migrant workers is 
excluded (the incorporation of unregistered migrant workers is a primary 
concern of government policy today, this subject is dealt with extensively 
in the chapter of this thesis about the working class in China). The data 
also excludes SHEs as well as other mixed enterprises where SOEs are 
controlling shareholders which, if included, would significantly increase 
the role of the state in employment.21  
 
Thus, according to the NBS figures on total urban employment for 2015, 
the categories that Huang defined as state owned or controlled sectors 
employed 149 million urban workers. That is over 40% of the urban 
workforce: This is broken down as follows: 
State owned units 62 million 17 percent, 
Collectives 4.8 million 1%  
Coops 920,000 0.2%  
Limited Liability companies 63.8 million 17%  
Share Holding Companies 17 million 4%. 22 
3.7.2. Investment and the commanding heights 
 
Kornai identified investment hunger and forced growth as system specific 
attributes of socialist political economy. They are driven by the perceived 
need to rapidly overcome economic backwardness and catch up with the 
advanced capitalist countries. All levels of the bureaucratic apparatus 
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promote rapid expansion to increase their sphere of power. Whereas the 
rapid development of capitalist firms is restrained by personal risk, under 
socialism, this constraint does not exist. Socialist investment hunger is 
only constrained by fear of sanctions for making mistakes and restrictions 
on resource allocation (Kornai, 2007, pp. 160–163). 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) was responsible for the collection and 
allocation of all financial surpluses prior to 1979. The People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) was its sole bank. SOEs’ budgets were part of the state 
budget and the PBC was the accountant and cashier of SOEs. SOE 
reforms led to the restoration of four state-owned commercial banks. 
Reform permitted bank lending related to increasing deposits, and the 
stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen became sources of direct 
finance for listed companies and banks. Now state enterprises use profit 
retention, stock markets, banks and financial intermediaries (e.g. state 
owned insurance companies, investment companies and leasing 
companies) as sources of finance for state enterprises. The government 
restricts financial markets through controls over entry into the banking 
sector, restrictions on stock exchange listing, and by interest rates (Lin, 
2012, pp. 185–186). 
 
Fixed investment may be the most appropriate means for determining the 
influence of the state sector because it reveals the forces determining the 
direction and orientation of the economy (Huang, 2008, pp. 20–22).This 
view is reinforced by data on the share of state investment in a variety of 
sectors. 
 
Given the fact that SOEs are ‘not completely market based, liberalising 
the financial market would have greatly increased their capital costs’ (Lin, 
2012, p. 208). The Chinese financial system is treated as an instrument 
of state policy. Stock exchange listing is too costly for small and medium 
sized private sector companies,23 and SOEs receive 80% of bank loans. 
Therefore the development of the private sector is ‘crippled due to the 
lack of a normal financing channel’ (Lin, 2012, p. 209).   
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‘In the majority of industries, the SOE/SHE (State Holding Enterprise) 
share exceeds 50 percent, as does the median share.’ (Andrew 
Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, 2011, p. 15). ‘SOEs and SHEs account for the 
majority of investments in most major sectors of the Chinese economy.’ 




Figure 5. Chart showing investments in fixed assets by ownership status 
 
The above chart records the percentage of total investments in fixed 
assets in China in 2015 by ownership registration. The data comes from 
the National Statistical Yearbook 2016.24  
 
The segments on the right of the chart are composed overwhelmingly of 
state owned or controlled entities. As limited liability companies, 
shareholding companies, collective and cooperative firms are all 
dominated by public sector ownership or control.  
 
However, shareholding companies and limited liability companies are 
often categorized as capitalist enterprises. Many do indeed have 
significant private equity stakes, but many, if not most of these nominally 
private entities, are either majority owned by state entities, or have very 
significant state or state institutional ownership stakes. Such mixed 
ownership companies expanded rapidly from 2001, and by 2008, they 
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held ‘half of the country’s total capital assets and generated over 35% of 
the national total sales income’ (Lin and Hu, 2011, p. 728). However, 
even though they are formally more independent than SOEs they are still 
made to serve party-state planning objectives.  
 
The specific nature of China’s hierarchy of authority - deriving from the 
combination of Communist Party rule of the state and public ownership of 
the commanding heights of the economy - concentrates and multiplies 
the power and control over all the non-state sectors of the economy and 
wider society. This power multiplier stems from the totality of instruments 
at the disposal of the party. The leadership of the banks, judiciary, 
education, police, secret police, army, mass media, government officials, 
trade unions, youth organisations, national minorities and religious 
groups etc. are all vetted and selected by the Communist Party. Thus, 
deemphasising the issue of whether the majority of GDP derives from the 
state or the non-state sector or whether the majority of workers work for 
the state sector - as the definitional determinant of the system –is entirely 
consistent with the method used by Kornai to define power relations in 
his socialist system.  
 
Kornai questioned the viability of attempts to rationally combine 
bureaucratic and market coordination, as one of the system specific 
features of reform socialism is that horizontal coordination remains 
subordinate to indirect vertical dependence. Although ‘manager’s dress, 
vocabulary, and demeanour begin to resemble those of his or her 
Western counterpart’, these managers lack the identification with the 
profit motive characteristic of capitalist owners. Their positions are 
dependent on evaluation by their superiors in the bureaucratic 
administrative hierarchy (Kornai, 2007, pp. 504–505).  
 
In corporations predominantly owned by central or local government or 
by state entities, the leading executives are appointed by party and 
government agencies. They are actually civil servants, whose roles rotate 
between public industry and government positions. Managerial 
ownership stakes remain insignificant and managerial remuneration is 
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modest. ‘Almost all of China’s largest and most powerful corporations are 
still in this category.’ (Walder, 2011b, p. 31)  
 
The Financial Times reports on the impact of new rules to control the 
earnings of senior SOE managers: ‘Wang Yilin, chairman of China’s 
largest energy group CNPC, has been earning just $107,000 a year — 
equal to what ExxonMobil boss Rex Tillerson, Donald Trump’s nominee 
for secretary of state, earns in less than a day and a half.’ 25 
3.7.3. Relations to the private sector 
 
Kornai’s description of the development of the private sector in reform 
socialism involves the spontaneous emergence of private enterprises 
when the hostile environment of classical socialism is reduced or 
eliminated. Part of the bureaucracy supports the private sector because it 
improves supplies and eases shortages and can reduce social tensions 
(Kornai, 2007, pp. 431–435). 
 
However, another part of the bureaucracy relates to the private sector in 
an obstructive fashion and sometimes the attitude of bureaucrats 
changes from supportive to obstructive. The bureaucracy governs the 
public sector from within, and the private sector from without. Private 
sector autonomy is difficult for the bureaucracy to stomach. Such 
resistance to private enterprise is a spontaneous and natural reaction of 
the bureaucracy in defence of its power and ideology (Kornai, 2007, p. 
450).  
 
The bureaucracy fails to adequately guarantee the security of private 
property and controls access to all manner of permits and licenses. 
Restrictions can be placed on the size of firms and the sectors that are 
open to the private sector. The legal infrastructure is not designed to 
serve the enforcement of private contracts and leaves few avenues of 
redress against the state itself. Taxation can be arbitrary, and 
bureaucratic control over access to credit, materials, and state 
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procurement orders, acts as a severe constraint on private sector 
development (Kornai, 2007, pp. 451–454).  
 
In academic and policy debates on the speed of systemic transformation 
during the 1990s, Kornai maintained that the transition should be organic, 
in the sense of not being excessively disruptive (Kornai 2008:79), and he 
argued that the design and implementation of comprehensive reform, 
requires experimentation and institutional transformation, whilst 
maintaining a broad constituency of support. Thus, ideally, such changes 
would impose a minimal negative impact on living standards (Kornai 
2008: 80, 160-1). 
 
Kornai argues that an organic and gradual economic transformation from 
socialism to capitalism has been completed in China. The process was 
characterized by an evolutionary development towards private sector 
domination, stemming from the dynamic nature of entrepreneurial drives, 
which, encircled and outperformed the state sector. The main spheres of 
economic activity of private sector enterprises described by Kornai in 
1992, were small scale, although some medium and large private 
enterprises also existed at that time.  
 
In the ideological sphere the growth of private enterprise provokes a 
crisis under reform socialism, in which pragmatism clashes with 
socialistic and anti-capitalist tendencies, provoking deep-seated 
reactions from broad sections of the population and within the ruling party 
(Kornai, 2007, pp. 444–447).  
 
In China private ownership restrictions were first relaxed in 1982. At the 
15th Party Congress in 1997, the private sector was declared to be an 
‘important component of China’s socialist market’. The proposals were 
the subject of negotiation and sharp conflict, which reached a peak in 
2005, when Gong Xiantian, a professor at Beijing University, publicly 
criticized the law in an open letter. This gathered support from thousands 
of prominent figures, including scholars, retired officials, and military 
generals - all opposed to a watering down of socialist property law. A 
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furious public debate caused the legislative process to be temporarily 
suspended and further amendments were incorporated to deflect leftist 
concerns (Lee, 2010, pp. 37–40). In 2004, a constitutional amendment 
recognized private property, and in October 2007, the Real Property 
Rights Law was finally passed. The long and complex process behind the 
passing of the 2007 law, probably reveals that the CCP, the government, 
the state, and wide layers of the general public, retain an ambivalent and 
conflicting relationship to the fundamental underpinnings of capitalist 
property relations (Lee, 2010). 
 
The pressures to introduce legal protection for private property came 
from various sources. Foreign investors and states sought guarantees for 
the security of their investments. Domestic private enterprises developed 
into a significant part of the national economy, and their owners could be 
more readily co-opted in a legal environment that was friendly to private 
property. The Marxist ideological framework, within which the state 
operates, required some form of adjustment that would strike a balance 
between stability and legitimacy (Lee, 2010, pp. 29–31). 
 
The private sector in China developed in an environment that was often 
hostile towards it, and access to critical inputs remains restricted by the 
in-built bias towards SOEs, and by the exclusion of the private sector 
from access to resources allocated by plan. Indeed, private sector firms 
often live in fear of expropriation. However, discrimination against the 
private sector by local government is more pronounced in those areas 
where SOEs predominate in the local economy. An IMF study found that 
private enterprises were 90% self-financed, and a Chinese Academy of 
Social Studies survey in 2003, found that fees extracted by local 
government, consumed 70% of private enterprise profits, and this did not 
take account of the cost of approvals, permits and associated ‘red-tape’ 
(Kung, 2011).  
 
Huang provided strong empirical evidence to contradict the gradualist 
and evolutionary interpretation of the development of Chinese capitalism. 
He located China’s dynamic entrepreneurialism within the largely private 
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rural Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), formed by peasants in 
the 1980s. Thus, TVEs - originally the foundation for rural capitalism in 
the 1980s - were forced back under government control by the 
repression of rural finance to private sector TVEs. This entailed a return 
to promoting cooperative firms with private revenue rights, which 
functioned under effective government control (Huang, 2008).  
 
However, he shows that private and state funding of private enterprises 
was repressed and a general policy bias towards urban state-owned and 
controlled sectors prevailed. In the 1990s rural capitalism was repressed 
and village level democratic control was transferred to higher levels of 
power, i.e., to expanding, unelected, bureaucratic organizations at the 
township level. In the 1990s, private companies were starved of finance, 
and larger-scale collectivist TVEs, under the dominance and control of 
local government, were backed with finance, and by policy initiatives that 
produced paper viability (Huang, 2008, pp. 133–174). Such entities 
operate under soft-budget constraints. 
3.7.4. CCP ideology and the commanding heights 
 
The standard view of capitalist progress in China is that the CCP 
leadership encouraged market incentives but were overwhelmed by the 
capitalist genie they unleashed. And, thereafter, they mainly reacted to 
market driven imperatives, rather than consciously steering events.  
However, Sarah Eaton studied the CCP's official discussions and shows 
that they pursued policies that were designed to guarantee the primacy 
of state enterprises from the late 1980s onwards. She discovers a 
consistency and continuity in the ideological justifications used to defend 
the policies pursued. She examines how the emergence of state-owned 
empires was structured around enterprises in those sectors designated 
as the commanding heights. Although a vocal pro-market lobby exists, 
which decries the monopolistic power of SOEs, policy-makers defend 
their monopolistic power. Indeed the CCP leadership see state monopoly 
as a means to defend state enterprises against more powerful 
international players (Eaton, 2014, p. 14).  
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The vertical hierarchal structure of SOEs from Mao's day was replaced 
by large-scale horizontal relations, which integrate and unify enterprises 
within interlinked sectors. The increased scale improved the focus of 
capital intensity. So, in the 1990s the state encouraged the formation of 
large state enterprise groups with monopolistic power. Consequently, 
Chinese economic theory and practice diverged from the neoliberal trend 
led by Britain and the United States. When China joined the World Trade 
Organisation and signed up to its free market rules; state enterprises 
leading the 'national team’ were considered to be the last line of national 
economic defence, as well as the mechanism for reaching outwards 
through international joint ventures, alliances, and corporate acquisitions.  
 
Internal documents informing senior Chinese official debate reasoned 
that the most successful capitalist enterprises and nations flourished due 
to the extinction of free competition and the victory of monopoly 
capitalism. Interest in Japanese developmental policies identified large-
scale socialized production groups as the core of Japan's success 
(Eaton, 2014, p. 10). Despite the policy of encouraging markets, planning 
was reformulated to rely on large enterprise groups in the commanding 
heights. State companies used public listing as a means of raising capital 
- without ceding control or ownership. And they sought to improve 
efficiency and enforce the government's regulatory role over the 
economy.  
 
In the 80s and 90s, the senior level internal party debates on SOE 
monopoly power, were a contested ideological terrain. This remains true 
today. Eaton notes that a Marxist analysis of the concentration of capital 
and the tendency towards monopoly was used to justify the inevitable 
concentration of capital in a commodity economy. Competition - between 
and within large enterprise groups - can be said to constrain and 
ameliorate monopolistic distortions. However, bureaucratic decisions and 
interests - rather than profits - often lay behind enterprise marriages. 
Some reports to officials advocated the eradication of this ‘rigged’ market 
that unifies the power of large monopoly enterprises and government. In 
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particular China's 'New Right' economists like Zhang Weiying continue to 
denounce this (Eaton, 2014, pp. 16–18). Eaton finds historical continuity 
evident in the 'advance of the state' thesis that has been central to 
Chinese government and intellectual debate since 2008. However, 
neoliberal thinkers and pro-market publications maintain that interests 
bound to the state sector are holding back political and socio-economic 
transformation.  
 
Sarah Eaton’s assessment was confirmed by President Xi Jinping’s, 
2016 speech to a National Conference on Party Development in SOEs, 
where he said that the objective of Party activity in SOEs is to ‘make 
them the most reliable force of the Party and country and a major force in 
implementing the decisions and plans of the CCP Central Committee […] 
We should implement policies that preserve and increase the value of 
state assets, and make consistent efforts to help SOEs become bigger, 
stronger and better.’ 
 
‘SOEs serve as a material and political foundation of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.’ (Xi, 2017, p. 192)  
 
And he insisted that Party organizations must continue to decide on the 
appointment of SOEs leaders, and even though the Party appoints 
business leaders to manage state assets this trust must be subject to 
strict and all encompassing supervision from the party and the workforce 
(Xi, 2017, pp. 193–194). 
3.8. Planning in contemporary China 
 
Since 1953, China’s planning system operates through five-year plans. 
Originally, the plan directed state owned companies in production 
decisions, and government ministries were responsible for each sector of 
the economy. After 1978, when non-state competition was permitted, 
planning was subsumed under the ambit of ‘reform’ and ‘development’ 
leading to the creation of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) in 2006. The Central Committee of the Communist 
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Party drafts Five Year Plans (FYP), which are amended and adjusted 
under the control of the NDRC before approval by the National People’s 
Congress (Chow, 2011, pp. 1–2). 
 
The various bureaucratic entities that were combined to form the NDRC 
are steeped in a culture, habit and outlook that allot the primary role to 
planning and a supplementary role to markets. The NDRC is composed 
of an amalgam of bureaucratic administrative organs directly inherited 
from the history of central planning. They set the targets, and the State 
Council, through its ministries and offices, is tasked with implementing 
them (Chow, 2011, pp. 5–6).  
 
The direct control of the economic resources of state-owned enterprises 
is the primary means by which the plan is realised. In addition, monetary 
and financial policies encourage non-state entities to help achieve 
planning targets using interest rates, subsidies, tax breaks, government 
procurement, and contracting policies. Party secretaries at all levels of 
society are directed to ensure the Plan is realized, and government 
agencies at all levels must implement the Plan under the direction of 
Party organs (Chow, 2011, p. 7). 
 
Kornai identified a distinct tendency within socialism that seeks to 
amend, adjust and perfect mechanisms of bureaucratic coordination, 
whilst leaving one party rule and the dominance of public property intact. 
This involves reshaping organisational control by function or location, or 
by means of centralisation and decentralisation. Public firms are 
reorganized into ever-larger units and computer models are devised to 
improve control systems (Kornai, 2007, pp. 396–408). Kornai believes 
that the complexity of millions of transactions in a national economy 
make calculations to effectively regulate and plan impossible. And he 
argues that only the free market can carry out these functions, which it 
does automatically. This is a contention that one might question in 
today’s networked economy, and that has previously been challenged on 
non-technological grounds26 (Lange et al., 1938). Indeed, some Chinese 
scholars are questioning how the advent of big data affects the capacity 
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to plan an economy effectively in ways that can supplant the markets 
(Wang and Li, 2017).  However, here we are not seeking to establish the 
validity or error of his claim, but to identify the degree to which Kornai’s 
description of reform socialism fits contemporary China. 
 
According to Kornai, those seeking to perfect the system, seek a 
reduction in the quantity of planning indicators, and place greater 
emphasis on a smaller number of objectives. They concentrate on quality 
not quantity, separate targets from past performance, and concentrate on 
net production. However, the self-interest of decentralized bureaucratic 
entities comes into conflict with the central bureaucracy. To eliminate this 
‘imperfection’ the central bureaucratic apparatus reasserts its authority 
and control. It tightens discipline and centralizes coordination and 
command. The identification of corporate ‘profits’ as the primary target 
indicator produces the superficial impression of a radical shift towards 
capitalism. However, Kornai believes that without decentralisation, free 
entry and free competition, profits cannot be used as the defining 
characteristic of capitalism (Kornai, 2007, p. 406). 
 
Research by Heilmann and Melton (2013) on the revitalisation of state 
planning reopened a closed debate in western scholarship. It challenged 
the consensus represented by Naughton (1996), who argued that the 
market had conquered China in 1993, after being given the green light by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1992. According to this theory, planning had faded into 
insignificance, and any enduring influence is the shadow of a once 
ubiquitous system. Naughton responded to Heilmann and Melton’s 
challenge by accepting that the ‘planning process is deeply integrated 
with other aspects of the Chinese political system, especially the policy-
making and implementation process, and the cadre evaluation system’ 
(Naughton, 2013, p. 642).  
 
His dispute with their theory on the revival of planning centres on the 
definition of planning. A default reversion to resource allocation based 
planning in which the ‘market economy coexists with numerous 
distortions, underdeveloped institutions, and actors who have incentives 
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to invest in projects with zero returns’ is decried by Naughton (2013, p. 
647) as in his view planning ‘necessarily involves influencing behaviours 
to become consistent with a politically generated set of objectives’ 
(Naughton, 2013, p. 648).  
 
He says that after 1993 resource allocation planning gave way to 
systems transformation and institution building to help marketization. 
However, although the state budgetary situation improved from the late 
1990s onwards, rather than carry through promises made at the Third 
Plenum in 2003 - to complete the change to a market economy - Premier 
Wen Jiabao spent increasing government revenue on vast and ambitious 
government investments. Naughton complains that this process 
escalated with the onset of the 2008 world economic crisis, \the shift 
towards more planning after 2003 has not been accompanied by 
adequate further movement towards a well-functioning market economy’ 
(Naughton, 2013, p. 650). Instead, Naughton believes, marketization was 
put on ice. 
 
The sabotage of the reform agenda agreed at the Third Plenum in 2013 
was the consequence of a coalition of the four of the most powerful state 
bureaucracies that was formed around 2009. According to Shambaugh 
(2016) the Party propaganda apparatus, the Ministries of State and 
Public Security, the state owned enterprises, and the People’s Liberation 
Army and the People’s Armed Police undermined political reforms which 
they feared would spin out of control and ramped up the security 
apparatus instead. The post 2008 world economic crisis reinforced a 
sense of moral and economic superiority amongst the Chinese 
leadership. The ascendance of Xi Jinping and his anti-corruption 
campaign has been accompanied by a more and more illiberal 
atmosphere and by the reintroduction of many forgotten symbolic 
policies, rituals and forms of language. For example, Xi’s appeals to the 
popular masses through promoting simple living puts pressure on cadres 
to experience the lives of the people, and the anti-corruption campaign 
has spread fear amongst those engaged in corrupt practices. This has 
been promoted by the massively popular TV show called In the Name of 
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the People, which delves into multiple forms of corruption, presents the 
subtle nuances of the consequences of graft within wider society, and 
shows how trustworthy and honest Party member and cadres intervene 
to resolve outbreaks of social unrest. And a young and determined anti-
corruption team is pursues corrupt cadres with determination and zeal.  
 
For Naughton, present-day planning retains basic market hostile 
mechanisms and instruments. He cites the way the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) intervenes in macro-
economic policy, in a way that produces excess liquidity and asset 
bubbles. It is unclear why Naughton considers excess liquidity and asset 
bubbles in China to be illustrations of hostility to markets; after all, asset 
bubble and liquidity problems are common features in mature market 
economies. What is unusual is the way China contains the negative 
impact of market crises.   
 
Heilmann and Melton's (2013) comprehensive study of China's planning 
system covers the period 1993-2012. They explain that the plan has  
‘provided room for market forces’ and simultaneously enhanced the ‘state 
bureaucracy's ability to influence the economy’ and maintain party 
control. Planning remains ‘central to almost all domains of public policy 
making and the political institutions that have fostered China's high 
speed growth and economic stability’ (Heilmann and Melton, 2013, p. 
581). 
 
Under Wen Jiabao, planning, fiscal, and monetary policy would become 
the three mechanisms of macro-economic control. Planning would 
concentrate on strategic issues and policies, and allow flexibility to the 
institutions responsible for implementation. In the Tenth Five Year Plan 
(2001-5) proportionality and the balancing of supply and demand became 
central objectives. Imperative targets were abolished and resource 
allocation was to be market dominated. Planning would focus on 
qualitative targets, and coordinate the urbanisation process and the 
development of the interior and west of China. It would also target 
scientific, technical, environmental, and human resource issues. In order 
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to overcome various imbalances in development; social welfare, 
administrative competence and public services, became the focus of the 
11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010). The plan was now composed of 
binding targets, anticipatory, and indicative targets. Binding targets are 
set for government bodies and refer to various promises particularly in 
public service provision. This established ‘a direct link between China's 
top policy priorities and the party's control over the leaders of major 
institutions and state-owned enterprises, the plan-cadre nexus’ 
(Heilmann and Melton, 2013, p. 586).  
 
This plan-cadre nexus welds the action of cadres through its discipline 
and reward structure to the priorities set in state planning objectives. So 
the incentives to meet planning targets are integrated with the career 
structures of the party. The Central Committee draws up initial guidelines 
which are converted into thousands of sub-plans to be implemented by 
government entities at all levels of administration. In addition to the 
overall Five Year Plans there are three core sub-plans, comprehensive, 
macro-regional, and special plans. The initial approval of plans begins an 
unceasing process of coordination and evaluation that draws together the 
operations of bureaucratic agencies (Heilmann and Melton, 2013, pp. 
586–590).  
 
Kornai noted that boom-bust economic cycles under socialism are 
aligned with the calendar pulsation of the planning system, with speed-
ups clustered at the end of annual plans. The Chinese planning system 
since 1978 has certainly experienced a far smoother growth pattern than 
classical socialist systems based on ubiquitous public property and 
planning. However, Heilmann and Melton point to a similar and related 
phenomenon in the Chinese planning cycle: ‘the regular five year 
planning periods are not synchronized with the turnover in party and 
state leadership. Incoming leaders remain bound to the previous plan for 
three full years and thus cannot openly discard the policy goals set down 
by their predecessors […] The “CCP rhythm,” not the rhythm of State 
Council turnovers, thus governs plan making.’ (Heilmann and Melton, 
2013, p. 608)  
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3.8.1. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
 
In the 12th Five Year Plan, the SASAC identified key sectors for 
supportive government intervention including strategic and emerging 
industries. This entailed the assimilation of imported know-how and its 
transformation into emulation and innovation. This policy was 
consolidated through state sector investment regardless of whether took 
place at the expense of private sector competitors. Competitive capacity 
in global terms was facilitated by preferential state support through such 
methods as credit policy, tax preference, and state procurement policies 
(Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, 2011, p. 2). 
 
Hu says that the 12th Five Year Plan involved several stages, which 
included evaluation, research, suggestions, conceptualisation, 
consultation, review, brainstorming, deliberation and approval. He says 
that this approach draws on democratic centralist methods where the 
contrasting views of interested parties are aired and debated and the 
decisions reached are implemented. Hu notes an increasing 
correspondence between local and national objectives and indicators, 
and he claims ‘the performance of governance is far higher not only than 
in the period of the planned economy, but also higher than in the mature 
market economy of Western countries [...and] is an important source of 
the miracle of the Chinese economy’ (Hu, 2013, p. 637). 
 
Industrial policy contained in the 12th FYP supported ‘Strategic Emerging 
Industries’, biotechnology, new energy, high-end equipment 
manufacturing, energy conservation and environmental protection, clean-
energy vehicles, new materials, and next generation IT. The 12th FYP 
envisaged expanding these industries from between 2-4% of GDP in 
2010, to 8% by 2015, and 15% by 2020. Naughton said that if this is 
realized ‘they will be large industries driving the whole development 
process’ (Naughton, 2011, p. 325).  
 
The 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) affected nearly every aspect of 
society: agriculture, industrial upgrading, service sector expansion, 
	 108	
regional and urban development, energy and environment, education, 
science and technology, people’s livelihood and welfare, the 
management of society, promoting socialist culture, perfecting reform, 
advancing the open door policy, promoting democracy and socialism, 
establishing a harmonious society and strengthening defence. The FYP 
document outlines guiding concepts and directions and the means of 
executing them (Chow, 2011, pp. 2–3). 
 
The objectives of the 12th FYP are defined through numerical targets. 
These included the following categories: total GDP and per capita GDP; 
the increase in the service sector as a percentage of output and 
employment; expenditure on research as a percentage of GDP; the rate 
of urbanisation; total population; reducing energy usage and carbon 
emissions; the quantity of cultivated land; years of schooling; the extent 
of urban employment and unemployment, insurance and disposable 
income; rural health coverage and net income. The objectives are 
designed to rally support behind the realisation of these targets (Chow, 






Figure 6. Chart of China’s Five Year Plan process 
 
Its targets for social policy were overwhelmingly state driven policies 
aimed at expanding public sector control over housing, healthcare and 
education. Compulsory ‘binding targets’ to be attained by 2015 in these 
sectors included: 
1. An increase of urban residents enrolled in the basic pension 
scheme from 257million to 357 million 
2. Building 36 million apartments for low cost rental to low-income 
groups. 
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3. Basic urban and rural medical insurance enrollment is to increase 
by 60 million. The percentage of state payment is to exceed 70 
percentBinding targets for environmental protection included: 
1. A 16 percent reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP  
2. A 17 percent reduction in CO2 emissions per percentage of GDP 
27 
 
According to the report by the National Reform and Development 
Commission delivered to the Twelfth National People’s Congress on 5 
March 2016 nearly all of the 12th FYP targets were met. Of the 59 main 
targets contained in the FYP, the results for 5 targets fell below 
expectation: natural gas production, the total import and export volume, 
spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP, total fixed asset investment 
and total retail sales of consumer goods. All the other 54 FYP targets 
were met. This includes all GDP targets, 6 out of 7 targets for the output 
of industrial and agricultural products. All 4 out of 5 external trade and 
investment targets were met. The inflation target was met, as were the 
targets for government revenue, expenditure, deficit and the money 
supply. All the social, population, urbanization, health and clean water 
targets were met, as were those concerned with education and the 
environment.28  
 
China now stands uniquely alone amongst developing countries in 
Naughton’s opinion because it carried through a significant shift away 
from the market and towards state interventionism following the world 
financial crisis of 2008-9 (Naughton, 2011, p. 328). 
The experience during the 12th FYP closely resembles Kornai’s 
description of attempts to perfect a system of planning under reform 
socialism (Kornai, 2007 see chapter 13). The CCP claims it is pursuing 
‘scientific development’ and seeks to promote a government led 
‘informationization’ strategy. Hu Angang identifies a shift from planning 
economic growth and structural changes to planning non-economic 
issues concerned with education, science, technology, environment, 
resources and people's livelihoods. He describes this as a shift from 
economic planning to public affairs governance. In his view, markets and 
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planning constitute invisible and visible hands, the planning system is 
visible to market players and so is considered helpful. This process of 
planning is described by Hu as ‘democratized, scientized and 
institutionalized’ (Hu, 2013, p. 633).  
3.8.2. The new urbanization plan 
 
During the reform era, registered urban residents experienced 
spectacular improvements to their housing conditions. Meanwhile 
migrant workers tended to live either inside their workplace or in squalid 
'urban villages' on the outskirts of cities. However, the Party’s planned 
urbanisation drive encompasses the staggered, but extremely rapid, 
integration of peasant-workers into the urban system. The provision of 
housing, social and welfare services to migrant workers and their families 
is central to this. It is designed to consolidate a vast new constituency of 
social support for the party. Zhang Xueqin, the vice director of a bureau 
for public housing under the Ministry of Housing and Urban-rural 
Development claimed that nearly 100 million people benefitted by 2011. 
With public housing offered to 26.5 million households in 2011 and 4.5 
million households financially supported. Although it is said that housing 
for workers of state enterprises and other types of companies made up 
half of the low cost housing built that year. 29 In the period 2011-13 work 
began on building 24.9 million subsidized housing units, of which, 15.8 
million were completed (Oecd, 2015, p. 126). The NDRC 2016 report 
claims that 28.6 million units of urban government- subsidized housing 
had been ‘basically completed’ and 40.13 million had been started. In 
addition 19.94 million dilapidated rural homes had been renovated.30 
 
It is incontestable that China's per capita urban housing space (for urban 
residents) has risen dramatically year on year. In the 1970s average per 
capita urban living space was just 3.6 m2 (Lui cited in Yang and Chen, 
2014, p. 2). This rose to 13.7 m2 in 1990 (Yang and Chen, 2014, p. 22) 
and 30m2 in 2009 (Yang and Chen, 2014, p. 24). Improving the housing 
provision for newly designated urban residents is a powerful tool to win 
support for the CCP.  
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Land in urban China is owned by the state, and rural land is collectively 
owned.31 Land usage rights may be leased for profit in designated urban 
areas, but the same practice is illegal for rural leases from village 
collectives. The control of land is a major source of contemporary capital 
accumulation, both by state entities and by private individuals and 
companies. Urbanisation has led to battles between contending users 
and claimants to land usage rights. Forced evictions and conflicts about 
land seizures are common sources of urban and rural unrest. Local state 
planners, landlords, financiers, builders, and an ever-expanding urban 
state apparatus drive the process of urbanisation. Local leaders seeking 
land rents as revenue sell real estate projects in which rising property 
prices are used as indicators of success (Hsing, 2010, pp. 6–10). 
 
The conflicting claimants to the control rights over land usage are 
territorially divided; this generates three primary levels of intra-state land 
disputes. 1. Between municipal governments and state entities such as 
SOEs, universities, the military etc. in the major cities. 2. Between urban 
and rural governments at the fringe of the expanding cities. 3. Between 
township and village governments at the rural fringe (Hsing, 2010; 
Huang, 2008, p. 15). Huang believes that land grabbing may 
fundamentally undermine the faith of rural entrepreneurs in the security 
of property rights. On the one side, land grabbing is certainly a lucrative 
means for bureaucrats to transfer public resources to private hands 
through corrupt property deals. On the other, it also involves state 
bureaucracies extending the wealth, power and reach of the urban state. 
To a significant degree this conflict determines who owns China. 
 
China's urbanization plan seeks to shift economic geography to develop 
the interior by means of massive investment in infrastructure. Regional 
plans are granted significant experimental autonomy but are often 
centrally coordinated. Regional governments make implicit contracts with 
the central government to meet development objectives. The use of 
experimentation and competition in policy implementation is a common 
feature of China's reform era. National special plans concentrate on 
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large-scale investments in infrastructure and the use of key resources, as 
well as the provision of core public goods and services. These plans are 
developed during the Five Year Plan period and include industry specific 
plans. The drawing up of plans involves multi-level and multi-agency 
consultation and the elaboration of targets and financing on an on-going 
basis (Heilmann and Melton, 2013).  
 
China’s urbanisation plans were tested in Chongqing in advance of the 
national roll out. A massive expansion in the public sector provision of 
housing, which emulated the Chongqing example was adopted as a 
national model in 2010 and then integrated into the 12th Five Year Plan 
in 2011. China’s New Urbanization Plan 2014-2020 seeks to integrate 
300 million people into urban life. According to the plan, 100 million 
migrants who already live in urban areas are to be granted urban 
residence by 2020. This allows them to gain access to the full range of 
welfare and social rights. A further 100 million who live in run-down urban 
areas are to have their accommodation renovated or rebuilt, and 100 
million rural residents are to move to the cities in central and western 
regions of the country. This plan, launched in 2014, and to be realized by 
2020, comes in for criticism from Hu and Chen (2015) because it is 
‘heavily affected by the planned economy and it is essentially plan-led 
urbanisation’ (Hu and Chen, 2015, p. 39). The projected cost of this New 
Urbanization Plan is estimated to be RMB 42 trillion (US $6.8 trillion) 
according to China’s Ministry of Finance.32 It should be noted that this 
Plan was not part of the 12th Five Year Plan, yet top-level endorsement 
ensures that truly colossal resources are being mobilized to realize it.   
 
Philip Huang (2011) suggests that the economic and political policies 
pursued in the Chongqing municipality under the leadership of its ousted 
former mayor Bo Xilai were a unique experiment. It combined market 
capitalism and planned socialism in a reconfigured way, which Huang 
claims, invalidates Kornai's theory, that an economy responsive to 
market signals requires that private firms be the mainstay.  
 
	 114	
Chongqing's government accumulated resources in public hands to 
finance social policy objectives and infrastructure projects. Its 
urbanization programme was a trailblazing experiment in the structured 
process of reforming the hukou and formalizing the status of migrant 
workers. The government courted large multinationals including Foxconn, 
BASF, Ford and Hewlett Packard to invest in Chongqing. This involved 
expediting delivery to seaports and creating an ambitious logistical 
infrastructure, which included building a new inter-continental freight 
railroad to Europe. The government provided resources such as land at a 
discount and the infrastructure to encourage investment in priority 
sectors by key enterprises called 'dragon-heads'. Eight state-owned 
asset management companies were charged with realising large-scale 
development in urbanization, transport, energy, water and real estate. 
Financing was raised on land assets, and the realisation of these projects 
further increased the land value. The use of land appreciation for public 
benefit is central to the Chongqing model. It was secured by 
infrastructural investment to facilitate urbanization and complemented by 
foreign investment and relatively low wages.  
 
Chongqing's land exchanges offered peasants big incentives to trade 
unused land for about 100,000 yuan in cash when their residency status 
was urbanized, and they also offered significant subsidies and loans to 
open businesses in the city (Huang, 2011, pp. 596–598). In 2009 the 
Chongqing government spent over 68 billion yuan, more than half of its 
spending on improving 'peoples' livelihoods' (Huang, 2011, p. 589). 
Central to this social investment is the process of formalisation of migrant 
peasant-workers within the urban environment, the municipality recently 
built public sector rental housing for 2-3 million migrant workers and 
extended urban residency status to them. Chongqing aimed to provide 
low cost rental housing for 30% of the urban population, when many 
cities aimed at less than 5%. Chongqing aims to extend urban status to 
10 million migrant workers by 2020 (Huang, 2011, pp. 591–595).  
 
Alongside Bo Xilai's socio-economic programme in Chongqing, he 
initiated a campaign against crime, which focused on tackling organized 
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crime and its connection to money and power. The campaign became 
renowned for taking on corrupt senior local police and judicial figures, 
and for its depth, speed and severity. It solicited 40,000 reports and 
accusations from the public, 80% of which were signed, indicating 
confidence that they would not be persecuted for these submissions 
(Huang, 2011, pp. 602–604). Such popular engagement was reinforced 
by measures that forced officials to experience the living conditions in 
villages and peasant households. This is reminiscent of Maoist anti-
bureaucratic campaigns and was accompanied by the promotion of leftist 
propaganda and nostalgia.  
 
In 2012 Bo Xilai was removed from office, and in 2013 he was jailed for 
abuse of power, bribery and corruption. However, when Xi Jinping 
became the General Secretary of the CCP, he promoted similar socio-
economic policies, which had already been integrated into the 12th Five 
Year Plan, and he initiated a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign 
reminiscent of Bo Xilai's campaigns in Chongqing.  
 
President Xi Jinping said: ‘the essence of urbanization is to bring more 
people to settle in urban areas. We should encourage those rural 
households which are capable of maintaining a stable job and life in 
urban areas to relocate there. In this way, we can achieve a steady 
increase in the labour supply, reduce the pressure of rising labour costs, 
and expand consumption in real estate and other fields. This is also the 
fundamental solution to narrow the urban-rural gap, promote urban and 
rural integration and agricultural modernization.’ (Xi, 2017, p. 265)  
3.9. State advances the private sector retreats 
 
If the dominant macro-economic regulator is accumulation to realize the 
state plan, then the ability to mobilize the necessary resources is central 
to its success or failure. And the identification of those sectors of the 
economy that constitute the commanding heights will change according 
to priorities set out in planning objectives. In the period since 2004, and 
more especially since the world economic crisis of 2008, the phrase 
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guojin mintui 国进民退 meaning 'the state advances the private sector 
retreats' became a popular complaint from private business circles and 
amongst advocates of free markets. This process of strengthening state 
enterprises involves activities that channel the operations of competing 
private sector companies, or squeeze them out of business. 
 
Many of the methods used constitute de-facto nationalisation. The coal 
mining industry in Shanxi is an example: private mines in the province 
have been highly profitable but have poor safety records. A number of 
mine disasters focused national attention on lax safety supervision and 
on the corruption of officials who turn a blind eye. In 2008 a mining 
accident killed 270 people and the governor of Shanxi province resigned. 
He was replaced by Wang Jun who ordered the wholesale consolidation 
of the province's mining industry. Only those mines with an annual output 
above 300,000 tonnes were permitted to continue operating and smaller 
mines would either fall under the control of state giants or be closed 
down.33 
 
When China’s $588 billion economic stimulus was launched in 2008 to 
counter the impact of the world economic crisis. State enterprises rapidly 
expanded the range and scale of their operations and intensified their 
vertical integration. Local governments established 8000 state 
investment companies in 2009 to manage these cash injections. State 
enterprises were able to access these funds to acquire assets and 
realize projects that their own profits and bank balance could not justify, 
for example, Zhejiang Geely Holdings acquired Volvo with money from 
such local government funds.34   
 
Another example is the airline industry, three state carriers, China 
Airlines, China Southern and China Eastern, dominate the passenger 
airlines industry. The government permitted private airlines to operate in 
2004, and eight private airlines had entered the market by 2006, but they 
were soon squeezed out by various methods: state airlines refused to 
allow private companies to use the reservation system; they charged 
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private carriers higher rates for jet fuel; and they engaged in a price war. 
In 2010, only one private airline, Spring Airlines remained.35  
 
The process of state entry into the dairy industry was initially provoked by 
a food safety scandal about melamine-contaminated milk products. The 
state owned Yili Group established dairy cooperatives in which farmers 
are given shares to standardize the feeding, housing and milking of 
cows. This also offers efficiency and costs savings, and similar 
cooperatives are being promoted by large-scale investments. China's 
four biggest dairy companies are now all controlled by dominant state 
shareholding.36  
 
China's largest private steel company was Rizhao Iron and Steel, in the 
early 2000s it had successfully encroached on state dominated markets. 
But the state-owned Shandong Iron and Steel Group bought 67% of its 
shares in 2009 in order to consolidate the industry and expand total 
production.37 A recent article in the Financial Times identified what it sees 
as counter-trend to the process of state advance, ‘one Chinese province 
embraced privatisation to cast off its burden, setting a precedent for 
dealing with thousands of “zombie enterprises”’38 The state owned 
Dongbei Special Steel in Liaoning province allowed Shen Wenrong, a 
private steel tycoon with personal wealth of US $3.7bn, to buy a 43% (a 
controlling stake) in the enterprise at a cost of RMB 4.5bn. Those who 
favour widespread privatization of SOEs cheered this decision. However, 
perhaps this actually represents the nationalization of Shen Wenrong’s 
money and time? As the article explains an unnamed executive in Shen’s 
company said, ‘that the decision had “both commercial and political 
motives”’. 
 
China’s anticorruption campaign and President Xi’s campaign to 
strengthen the Party’s support and revive socialist idealism, ‘can be 
interpreted as an acknowledgement that internal interest groups-rather 
than public interest-have been driving specific economic outcomes.’ 
(Naughton, 2017, p. 21)  
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China certainly the means and intention to shape the nation’s economic 
outcomes by plan. And ‘even those who judge that the Chinese system 
today is not socialist might consider that the socialist ideal is still 
influential, and the system may continue to evolve in the direction of 
stronger “socialist” and redistributive institutions’ (Naughton, 2017, p. 22). 
3.10. Xi Jinping in power 
 
After Xi Jinping became General Secretary and president in 2012, 
investment, through state owned industries, continued to dominate 
China’s economy. Capital controls and low interest rates help to 
reproduce this model. Consequently, overcapacity and surplus 
production is ubiquitous and income inequality has reached extraordinary 
proportions.  
 
In November 2013 the Third Plenum of the CCP’s central committee 
announced a series of sweeping reforms, which included the pledge to 
upgrade the role of the market from ‘basic’ to ‘decisive’. The market was 
supposed to determine prices in all instances where it could. Simplified 
regulations for foreign capital investment would be introduced and 
publicly owned enterprises would become mixed ownership entities, and 
even natural monopolies would lose their privileged access to resources. 
Executives would be paid market rates and asset management would 
give way to capital management. Banking reforms would facilitate access 
to loans by private companies, and interest rates were to be liberalized 
(Brødsgaard and Rutten, 2017, pp. 154–156).  
 
However state owned enterprises were consolidated into larger 
monopoly organizations, acting as national champions in the world 
market in 2014, this was followed in 2016, by mergers in shipping, the 
power industry, and the steel industry. In October 2015 the central 
committee promoted ‘supply-side reform’ to eradicate excess capacity, 
excess costs for companies, excess housing stocks, and financial risks. It 
was designed to cut taxes and labour costs, reduce the real estate 
inventories of state entities and cut SOE debts.  
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As Brødsgaard and Rutten explain excess capacity in steel, coal, 
cement, chemicals, and other sectors is truly enormous. For example, in 
2014 China’s excess steel capacity was equal to the combined ‘output of 
Japan, India, the USA and Russia.’ (2017, p. 158) China’s cement 
production makes up 57% of world production, between 2011 and 2013, 
China used more cement than the USA had throughout the 20th century 
(2017, p. 159). The downturn in global demand after 2008, exacerbated 
China’s overcapacity problems, and accusations of Chinese dumping 
grew louder around the world. 
 
Supply-side reform has been a top-down initiative, and encouraged 
provincial leaders to enforce this. ‘However, in doing so they are 
confronted with powerful vested interests that feel hurt by production 
cuts.’ (Brødsgaard and Rutten, 2017, p. 161) The pressure from angry 
workers in state enterprises commonly results in government intervention 
to meet their demands. So, despite announcements of large-scale layoffs 
in loss-making enterprises, to avoid social discontent political pressure 
has generally resulted in the reallocation of labour within these enterprise 
groups. This avoids creating unemployment.  
 
China’s 13th Five Year Plan 2016-2020 envisages growth rates of about 
6.5% and a restructured economy; based on innovation, services, and 
increased consumption. Rising living standards should end poverty, and 
quality-of-life and environment should improve, and refining governance 
and public services provision takes high priority. However, colossal state 
investment programmes are set to continue. Indeed they have assumed 
a gigantesque scale. For example, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, 
involves the creation of land and maritime infrastructure linking Asia, 
Africa and Europe by road and rail (the Belt) and shipping lanes (the 
Road). If realized, this trade infrastructure will link up 60 countries, and 
more than half of the world’s population. In theory, this could 
simultaneously provide an important outlet for the excess capacity of 




3.10.1 The anti-corruption campaign 
President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign targets ‘flies’ and ‘tigers’ 
the aim is to produce a climate whereby officials fear party disciplinary 
measures or court action more than they believe they can escape 
detection for corrupt practices (Xi, 2014, pp. 436–441). Xi invokes Maoist 
precepts concerning the relationship between the CCP and the people by 
reference to mass-line education, meaning that the party must maintain 
close ties with the people, and engage in criticism and self-criticism. He 
specifies four evils: formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and 
extravagance; warning that the consequences of inaction against them 
would result in the downfall of CCP rule (Xi, 2014, pp. 401–405). 
 
Anti-corruption campaigns escalated significantly after Xi was elected. 
There were 140,000 officials punished for disciplinary offences in 2011, 
160,000 in 2012, and 180,000 in 2013 (Yuen, 2014, p. 42). Most of them 
were lower level officials punished by the party's Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which has powers of search, interception of 
communications, detention, interrogation, and seizure, backed by the 
police and courts, and it can forward charges to state prosecutors. Party 
disciplinary crimes include categories, which do not exist in the criminal 
code. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign escalated between 2013 and 2017 
when a further 1.34 million officials were punished.39   
 
Various manoeuvres were introduced to overcome the resistance of 
protective networks. Fu (2014) notes that a corresponding crackdown on 
attempts to organize independent campaigns against corruption excludes 
popular participation in the anti-corruption effort, except for those that are 
conducted online. This phenomenon is known as ‘human flesh’ 
searching. If, for example, an official wearing an expensive watch is 
photographed and posted online, people try to identify and expose them 
on the Internet. Often the authorities are compelled to take action, 
although defamation suits and the fear of being accused of illegal 
activism, tempers such online activity. However, the anti-corruption 
campaign has re-centralized and re-concentrated power in the hands of 
the party and its leader.  
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    3.11. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have contrasted Kornai’s general method for classifying 
socialism with his specific statements on China. Kornai’s analysis of 
reform socialism describes its inner workings and dynamics. He 
elaborates the idiosyncrasies, contradictions and incoherence that 
penetrate the system as reforms take root. Notwithstanding this, he 
recognized that some countries were able to sustain reform socialist 
combinations for decades before facing revolutionary change.  
 
Kornai’s reluctance to compare contemporary China to his own reform 
socialist theory is perplexing. Surely, such a method could help to identify 
which ‘remnants’ of China’s reform socialist past continue to display 
vitality; and which are withering vines and empty shells, that will 
inevitably fade away as new capitalists sprouts bloom?  
 
I believe that Kornai’s writings on contemporary China have drawn 
premature conclusions about the extent of its systemic transformation 
towards capitalism. Indeed, there is a growing body of research on 
Chinese political economy that also questions the degree that China has 
‘transitioned’. When this research is dovetailed into Kornai’s original 
model of reform socialism, it produces a very close match to this ‘genetic 
code’. I find that all three of the basic criteria that Kornai uses to define 
reform socialism apply to China. China’s system of political economy 
remains dominated by the party, the bureaucracy and public ownership. 
This conclusion reinforces the strength of Kornai’s original theory but also 
poses new questions about the nature, longevity and potential of Chinese 
socialism and indeed of socialism in general.  
 
There are also some key differences between Kornai’s original concept 
of reform socialism and China today. There is a far greater role for the 
market and private ownership than in any previous socialist experiments. 
China has experienced a prolonged and exceptionally rapid rate of 
economic growth. This enabled the Communist Party to ameliorate many 
of the conflicts that undermined other socialist systems. 
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  4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the literature that describes China’s 
transformation as one from socialism to capitalism.1 To introduce this, I 
select a representative sample of the dominant historical narrative in the 
field.2 
 
I evaluate studies that apply "Varieties of Capitalism” (VOC) theories to 
China. The original VOC theory is based on a binary ideal-type model 
that compares and contrasts Anglo-American capitalism to Germanic 
capitalism. However, in this chapter the concept of capitalist varieties 
encompasses a broad range of theories that locate China as a type of 
capitalism.  
I review several influential contemporary frameworks, which analyse 
China in an East Asian, social, cultural and historical context.  
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This is an approach adopted by many Sinologists and political 
economists. Studies of the emergence and character of the modern 
Japanese capitalist state generated the influential "developmental state" 
theory. By employing this framework, China has been compared with 
Japan and other East Asian capitalist states. A further conceptual outline, 
which defines China’s system as Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC), 
is also considered. This theory offers insight into the ideological 
predicaments confronting China's leadership, and revives questions 
about the basic definitions of capitalism and its dynamics. After this, I 
evaluate two Marxist theories of capitalist restoration in China and 
assess their arguments.  
 
I question the theory that state monopoly power over the Chinese 
economy plays a negative role. And I consider the structure of leading 
multinational companies, which appear to have acquired a dominant 
position within the commanding heights of the world economy. Then I 
examine the growing influence of China's Internet giants.  
 
Insightful as these theories are, they do not adequately identify, isolate or 
evaluate, the basic features of capitalism. This is crucial in deciding 
whether China is capitalist. Therefore, I return to Kornai’s theory of 
capitalism and I draw on Xu Chenggang’s detailed assessment of 
Kornai’s theory of capitalism and its application to China.   
4.2. China’s billionaires 
 
The scale and speed of capitalist accumulation in China is truly 
astounding. In February 2016 the Financial Times reported that China is 
home to 470-dollar billionaires, compared to 535 in the United States. In 
Greater China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are 568 
billionaires and their total net worth is estimated to be $1.4tn. A grand 
total of 630 billionaires of Greater Chinese origin account for 29% of the 
world's 2188 billionaires, and these figures ignore concealed wealth.3  
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In China, the staggering accumulation of personal wealth by the few is a 
recent phenomenon. Indeed, the official ideology of the CCP remains 
formally committed to socialism and communism. The CCP's and China's 
national constitution - and all of the country's state organs - are 
ostensibly aligned with these objectives. The introduction of capitalist 
relations was supposed to be a detour undertaken to accumulate 
sufficient knowhow and advanced means of production, to create the 
material basis for socialism; which requires a well-off society based on a 
high per capita level of production.4 But China's formal, legal, and 
ideological structure stands in stark contrast with the reality of its super-
rich elite and their intimate connections to sections of the party 
leadership.  
 
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that 
22,000 Chinese and Hong Kong accounts are held in tax havens. They 
focus on the 'Red Nobility' - relatives of politburo members - who stashed 
away huge sums overseas. Their business interests span every section 
of the Chinese economy and include state and private enterprises. The 
use of tax havens followed changes to laws governing the economy in 
the 1990s, which were designed to serve the interests of SOEs. As 
foreign enterprises did not trust these laws, they channelled their China 
related financial operations through offshore tax havens. And they also 
encouraged wealthy Chinese clients and partners - often engaged in illicit 
activities - to do the same. Thereafter, each major political and economic 
crisis (the Hong Kong handover in 1997, the Asian crisis in 1998 etc.) 
exacerbated the perceived risks to the rich, and accelerated the flow of 
money into tax havens.5 
 
This enrichment process, and its connection to leading CCP cadres, 
appears to confirm the consensus in Western scholarship that China is 
capitalist. Indeed, so widespread is this view that the overwhelming 
majority of scholars of China's political economy make little attempt to 
define capitalism. Instead, China's transition is described by historical 
narratives, in which the growth of markets is equated to the rise of 
capitalism.   
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The influence and role of China’s SOEs is hotly contested and the 
monopoly power of state-owned and state controlled enterprise groups is 
widely condemned inside and outside China. Critics maintain that the 
structure and influence of SOE monopolies is enormously costly and 
damaging to the overall welfare of society and to capitalism. A closely 
linked problem is that China seeks to nurture large state-enterprises so 
that they can outstrip Western multinational competitor firms.  
4.3. The historical narrative of capitalist development in China 
 
The hegemonic discourse on China's development is dominated by the 
school of New Institutional Economics.6 One of its most prominent 
exponents is the Nobel Prize winner Ronald H. Coase whose ideas are 
highly influential in debates inside China. In the book How China became 
Capitalist Coase, and his colleague Wang, (Coase and Wang, 2012), 
present a narrative of China's capitalist evolution that, with this or that 
minor shift in emphasis, can be considered as a typical overview of this 
process. They see capitalist ascendancy as the unintended consequence 
of state policy measures.  
 
The authors employ a method of systemic categorisation, according to 
which: ‘The most fundamental difference between capitalism and 
socialism is the operation of a market pricing mechanism in the former 
and its replacement by state planning in the latter.’ (Coase and Wang, 
2012, p. 168) They define China as capitalist based on the overwhelming 
influence of markets for goods and services (Coase and Wang, 2012, p. 
197). And progress toward capitalism is defined by the degree of state 
withdrawal from the economy.  
 
For Coase and Wang this process of transition in China succeeded 
because capitalist incentives motivated wide layers of society and these 
social forces overcame counter-pressures emanating from the socialist 
objectives and traditions of the CCP leadership. They identify four 
'revolutions' that created Chinese capitalism: the spontaneous spread of 
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peasant incentives; the success of Township Village Enterprises (TVEs) 
in acting like private capitalist firms; which helped to generate a capitalist 
class; and finally, the creation of 'special economic zones'.  
 
For Coase and Wang it was the emergence of a national market, 
spurred-on by regional competitive pressures that accelerated 
industrialisation. This was based on the improved dissemination of 
knowledge. As a consequence, all levels of government administration 
‘threw themselves into an open competition for investment and for good 
ideas for developing the local economy.’ 7 These 'good ideas' came, so 
these authors say, from the earnest search for mechanisms and 
measures that might assist modernisation. So here the driving force of 
capitalism is presented as competition, markets, good ideas and dreams 
of modernisation. However, these “good ideas” came mainly from 
government agents, and investments were by driven state-led visions 
and dreams of modernization. This contradicts the idea that profits and 
return on investment are the motive force of capitalism. We shall return to 
these themes later in this chapter when we examine the theory of 
Centrally Managed Capitalism.   
 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 delegations were dispatched far 
and wide to assimilate relevant experiences and draw lessons for China. 
For example, officials studied Yugoslavian and East European 
experiments, which permitted extensive markets to operate alongside, or 
within, the state economy. In 1978 a report by a top-level delegation to 
Japan concluded that a massive increase in commodity production was 
required before an egalitarian socialist system - based on needs - could 
be established. When Deng Xiaoping visited Japan he studied their 
management and technology; and in Singapore he learnt about how FDI 
had assisted its modernisation process. The so-called open-door policy 
promoted FDI, trade and exports. Coase and Wang believe that the 
primary benefit was the assimilation and dissemination of scientific and 
technical knowledge, which easily trumped the benefits of exploiting 




Coase and Wang pose the question: ‘what exactly is capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics? In other words what kind of capitalism has 
China ended up with after its extraordinary transformation?’ (Coase and 
Wang, 2012, p. 188) They reject the idea that the central defining feature 
of Chinese capitalism is the CCP's monopoly control of power and its 
aggressive economic interventionism. Rather, they focus on the lag 
between national productive power and endogenous innovation capacity 
- which they believe is reinforced by intellectual rigidity. They criticize the 
ideological restrictions, supported by the CCP’s monopoly power, that 
limit the free dissemination of ideas (Coase and Wang, 2012, p. 192). In 
addition, China's system of compulsory Marxist education is slated for 
generating intellectual narrow-mindedness, which is reinforced by 
Chinese Marxism's claim to universal truth.   
 
‘The dearth of innovation and remaining state monopolies gravely 
reduces the range of investment opportunities that Chinese 
entrepreneurs find profitable.’ (Coase and Wang, 2012, p. 193) As a 
consequence Chinese capitalists tend to manufacture for others rather 
than developing their own products. According to Coase and Wang major 
problems remain. Large bureaucracies depend on local knowledge, so 
their power to act is constrained by their lack of it. But better-informed 
local capitalist actors may not have the power to act.  
4.4. China and "Varieties of Capitalism" 
 
The theory of Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) originates from Hall and 
Soskice (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It differentiates between two basic 
forms of capitalism: liberal market economies (LMEs), like the USA, and 
co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), like Germany. The LME model 
is less interventionist and elevates private interests to the dominant 
motive of socio-economic and political organisation. The CME model 
operates with greater state intervention and higher social welfare 
provision. It focuses on long-term societal objectives within capitalism 
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rather than short-term profits. These pure ideal-type forms are regarded 
as the most efficient and effective ones.  
 
VOC offered a means to study and influence China's institutional 
development as it adopted market reforms. This task was undertaken by 
Ahrens' and Jünemann's (2010) in their comparative survey of China's 
institutional dynamics, which examines China's transition from central 
planning to a capitalist market economy from the VOC perspective. They 
note that in China, incremental and pragmatic changes occurred 
alongside strong economic growth, and this negated the big-bang 
method of revolutionary destruction that was applied to much of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
 
By combining transition theory with a theory of how institutional forms 
compliment each other, Ahrens and Jünemann consider how China's 
comparative advantages can be enhanced. VOC theory posits universal 
entrepreneurial drives expressed through pressure on institutional forms 
and actions. However, decision-makers choose between LME or CME 
models but as corresponding social relations morph into comparative 
institutional advantages, changing VOC type becomes difficult. As 
China's system stems from a Maoist institutional background its transition 
towards either VOC type is bound to be far more complex and fraught 
with difficulty than changing from a US to a Germanic model. Indeed, 
although Ahrens and Jünemann embark on their investigation with the 
aim of identifying where China's institutions fit on the LME-CME 
spectrum they soon find that ‘socialist’ legacies remain ubiquitous.  
 
When Ahrens and Jünemann compare China's financial system and its 
stock market to LME or CME systems, they discover that state controlled 
‘remnants’ - state owned banks and financial institutions - dominate over 
non-state finance. And they blame the gradualist method of systemic 
transition that sustains loss-making enterprises. Nevertheless, Ahrens 
and Jünemann explain that less restrictive state control and greater 
access to inputs and markets have enabled the private sector to flourish. 
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But China's stock markets are hampered by price distortions, a lack of 
investor protection, and weak law enforcement.  
 
An intense bargaining process between local and national bureaucracies 
decides which firms can be listed. Political criteria determine most bank 
lending decisions; information disclosure is not standardized; and 
accounting is opaque. High trading volumes reveal the speculative nature 
of China’s stock market. Although shareholders can put pressure on the 
board of directors and influence management actions; party and state 
control predominates, and ‘the concept of socialist “public” ownership is 
still prevalent in the minds of both government officials and managers’ 
(Ahrens and Jünemann, 2010, p. 15). Party controlled state entities 
dominate decision-making in shareholding companies; and supervisory 
bodies are normally composed of 50% shareholders and 50% employee 
representatives. This results in a strong party presence. Supervisory 
boards control operations; the supervision of managers and directors, 
and policy changes, and they convene general meetings (Ahrens and 
Jünemann, 2010, pp. 16–17). 
 
China's business relations are said to operate through mutual obligations 
known as guanxi. Guanxi relations are nepotistic social networks that 
facilitate deals between individuals, firms and government agencies, 
through informal ties that help to organize and structure economic 
relations. However, in SOEs and associated enterprises, it is the party 
that defines these relations (Ahrens and Jünemann, 2010, pp. 21–23). 
Intra-firm relations are dominated by a collectivist managerial style that 
Ahrens and Jünemann attribute to Confucian values of family and social 
order. Leaders define the general outlines of company objectives and 
tasks, but considerable freedom is granted to employees to bring them 
into being. In large SOEs, formal, hierarchical, and bureaucratic authority 
is the norm (Ahrens and Jünemann, 2010, pp. 25–27). So, when Ahrens 
and Jünemann conclude that these patterns resemble CME more than 
LME systems; it appears to be rather an arbitrary pigeonholing exercise, 




Ahrens and Jünemann accept that VOC is inadequate to capture China's 
economic transition. And they suggest that complementary institutions 
promote the transition process. For example, a combination of insecure 
property rights and guanxi based networks help to overcome institutional 
deficiencies. They say that VOC fails to account for China's political 
dynamics because it focuses on an actor-centred approach, in which 
firms are viewed as the primary creative agents, where economic policy 
evolves out of bargaining between individuals, firms, and their collective 
organisations and the government within a democratic environment. 
According to VOC theory institutional forms emerge out of compromises 
produced through this process. But the ubiquitous influence of China's 
Communist Party and its leaders, when elaborating and implementing 
various phases of transition - through the effective application of state 
power - contradicts this basic VOC framework (Ahrens and Jünemann, 
2010, pp. 30–33).  
 
Nevertheless, Ahrens and Jünemann believe that the VOC framework 
can be applied to China by making positive complementary institutional 
forms central to efficient markets. However, ‘China challenges the 
conviction of the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach and economic theory 
in general as it shows economic behaviour is embedded in a specific 
social, cultural, and historical context.’ (Ahrens and Jünemann, 2010, p. 
33) 
 
Whilst VOC's binary framework offers a poor match with China, the 
contention that there are different types of capitalism with common traits 
is eminently reasonable. And selecting the US and Germany as the 
prototype models of LME and CME systems, inevitably presents 
problems for comparisons with developing countries, and this problem is 




4.5. Japan as a developmental model 
 
Chalmers Johnson advanced the developmental state theory based on 
the Japanese experience of a highly interventionist type of capitalism. 
Beeson assesses its relevance to China, and McNally and Chu, and 
Kroeber, consider Chinese development within a wider East Asian 
developmental perspective.  
 
Chalmers Johnson's developmental state theory studied Japan's state-
led industrialisation and modernisation process. At its heart lies a 
structure of state-business relations that protects selected industrial 
groups. The state neither controls, nor is controlled by business interests. 
For Johnson it was the interdependence between state objectives and 
private enterprises that lay behind Japan's economic miracle - and 
similar patterns of industrialisation are discernable in other East Asian 
states like South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Johnson, 1999, pp. 50–
59).  
 
‘The Japanese case is actually one of an economy mobilised for war but 
never demobilised during peacetime.’ (Johnson, 1999, p. 41) An elite 
bureaucratic cadre is entrusted to select, nurture and promote, the 
desired industrial structure. State intervention based on market-
conforming methods compliments this through investment: extensive 
public-private risk sharing, publicly funded research, and an 
administrative framework that expedites policy implementation. The key 
state agency is Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) - a unique institution that controlled planning, energy, domestic 
production and international trade (Johnson, 1999, pp. 33–39). It 
mobilizes popular sacrifice and resources for state objectives. State 
authority rests on achievements that sustain the leadership's moral 
authority.  
 
Japan's 'keiretsu' are privileged interlinking business groups that 
dominate Japanese capitalism; retired public servants take leading roles 
in them, which links them to state objectives. The state incentivizes 
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private agencies to meet state objectives, but imposes its authority over 
them. And social stability depends on a collectivist corporate ideology 
reinforced by permanent employment contracts.  
4.5.1. Application of developmental state theory to China 
 
Mark Beeson examines China from a developmental state perspective. 
He explains that for hundreds of years Japan and China were ruled by 
powerful, centralized bureaucratic states. The developmental state is 
created and reproduced through a historically anchored set of political 
relations. Beeson locates the foundation of Japan's state capacity in the 
promotion of capitalism after the Meiji Restoration. This completely 
transformed the structures of governance and institutionalized ‘a 
powerful, centralized state at the heart of its long-run rise to prominence 
as an industrial and military power’ (Beeson, 2009, p. 13).  
 
US hostility to state interventionism in Japan was overcome by the Cold 
War it but increased after the Cold War ended. However, the self-
protective responses of the Japanese bureaucracy continue to reproduce 
its influence, although in a less coherent and integrated form (Beeson, 
2009, pp. 11–20). Beeson defines state capacity as the ‘ability to design 
and implement policy’ based on its power to penetrate and mobilize 
society (Beeson, 2009, p. 10). He says that China's state intervention 
and its emphasis on trade, emulates Japan's developmental state - as 
plans for socio-economic development shape resource allocation to 
overcome market limitations. Japan's bureaucratic agencies are 
intimately connected to society and to its economic actors, and this helps 
to prevent particularistic interests from capturing power (Beeson, 2009, 
pp. 9–10).  
 
Under Mao China established a sort of 'socialist developmental state' 
based on centralized state planning. But by the 1980s Deng Xiaoping's 
reforms exposed a conflict between ideological and economic pressures. 
Beeson notes that the Chinese bourgeoisie today has common interests 
with party officials but lacks the independent identity needed to lead 
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society. He believes that foreign investment provided China's elite with 
room for economic manoeuvre, and this helped to avert the kind of 
political crisis that felled Communist governments in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union (Beeson, 2009, pp. 21–27). 
 
China's state was disadvantaged compared to Japan, in Beeson's 
opinion, as its socialist heritage constrained the willingness of decision-
makers to eliminate loss-making companies. Beeson identifies 
‘institutional inertia and the need to overcome powerful vested interests’ 
(Beeson, 2009, p. 37) as the main problems which undermined Japan's 
rapid rate of progress in the 1990s and he fears that it could also do so in 
China today.   
 
China's rulers lean on state enterprises and private firms to acquire 
resources but export based firms and foreign enterprises are less easy to 
control. The open markets required by the World Trade Organisation 
make demands on China that Japanese protectionist policies did not 
face. And as world production is dominated by multinationals, China is 
compelled to find a niche within this setting, on terms shaped by 
ferocious external competition that it can't control.  
 
China's reliance on state enterprises and finance - according to Beeson - 
reinforces out-dated institutional relations and political forces, and acts as 
a hindrance to technical upgrading, industrialisation and modernisation 
(Beeson, 2009, p. 33). The CCP's reluctance to let companies go bust; 
reveals the continuing influence of vested interests - dark spectres from a 
bygone age - in Beeson's eyes. If they resist change, the old model will 
cease to be effective and the new one will not be embedded. Combining 
this with elements of the Western market model will inject further 
instability into the system (Beeson, 2009, p. 37). 
4.5.2. Differences between Chinese and East Asian development 
 
Whereas Beeson compares China to the Japanese developmental state, 
Mc Nally and Chu (2006) use Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea as 
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reference points to help explain China's economic development. They 
believe that modernisation was the initial impulse for China's economic 
development, but the collapse of the Soviet Union refocused political will 
on industrial development and economic reform. The CCP mustered its 
bureaucratic apparatus to mobilize resources and motivate its local 
cadres with market promoting incentives. And China became more open 
to foreign investment than Taiwan, Japan or South Korea (McNally and 
Chu, 2006, pp. 46–48). 
 
It confronted developmental challenges and the transition to a market 
economy simultaneously. However, reform of the state apparatus ‘did not 
establish anything resembling the Asian developmental state in terms of 
institutional arrangements.’ (McNally and Chu, 2006, p. 49). Also McNally 
and Chu present the CCP’s command and planning systems, and its 
state enterprises, as legacy hindrances to market-promoting managerial 
methods. Reforms to China's state bureaucracy have failed to produce 
institutional arrangements resembling Japan's MITI. However, they did 
grant local cadres a greater degree of autonomy. And this: ‘generated 
incentives and political space for economic experimentation, which 
enabled China's private sector to thrive.’ (McNally and Chu, 2006, p. 51). 
 
Forms of Chinese capitalism differ by region e.g. privatized state 
enterprises dominate in Jiangsu province whereas Wenzhou's capitalists 
(in Zhejiang province) are organized on family based guanxi networks. 
They smooth relations with government cadres and help private 
enterprises to thrive in adversity. A large variety of state-business 
relations exist, but restrictions on private entrepreneurship remain 
commonplace; producing what McNally and Chu describe as ‘the worst 
of feudalism, socialism and capitalism combined.’ (McNally and Chu, 
2006, p. 53) Despite attempts to discover common patterns between 
China and developmental states in East Asia. They conclude that ‘the 
PRC has not yet developed anything akin to the developmental state 
institutions found in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’ (McNally and Chu, 
2006, p. 54). 
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Like McNally and Chu, Kroeber (Kroeber in Kennedy, 2011) considers 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as appropriate comparator states for 
China. Kroeber examines the basis of China's economic development by 
considering technique, innovation, enterprise competitiveness, and 
political power, in a global context.  
 
Banks in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China all offered credit to 
promote industrial policy objectives and export industries, in price-
sensitive competitive markets. However, in China, planned prices 
remained deeply influential until the mid 1990s. And Chinese banks 
maintained 'uneconomic' state companies afloat, to an extent that - in 
Kroeber's view – would have been inconceivable in Japan or South 
Korea. He says China displays three major differences with East Asian 
developmental states: the extent of state ownership in China; the 
predominance of decentralized decision-making structures; and the level 
of positive support for foreign direct investment (Kroeber in Kennedy, 
2011)  
 
Kroeber believes that China's large private business groups are politically 
insignificant when compared with major Japanese corporations or the 
South Korea's chaebol business groups. In China state ownership 
dominates in large-scale industry and private ownership dominates 
amongst small firms. The segregation of the Chinese economy by 
ownership structures and sectors minimized direct conflicts between the 
private and state sectors. In addition, Kroeber believes the friction 
between state and private enterprises has been contained by offering 
CCP membership to entrepreneurs, and credit lines to selective private 
enterprises (Kroeber in Kennedy, 2011, pp. 44–47). 
4.6. Centrally Managed Capitalism 
 
Nan Lin suggests that China's system constitutes a new type of 
capitalism. He calls this Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC), which is 
distinct from other capitalist models and may eventually be emulated 
elsewhere (Lin, 2011). The idea of Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) 
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was developed to explain the character of China's political economy. Lin 
defines capitalism as ‘social institutions that sustain the production, 
accumulation, and reproduction of capital’ in which, the institutions of 
capitalism are defined as ‘calculating capitalists, free markets, wage 
labour, an expansive system, and a strong supporting state.’ (Lin, 2011, 
p. 64)  
 
Lin believes that two features of Chinese capitalism are unique 
1. The way that the state acts as a capitalist as distinct from supporting 
private capitalism 
2. Economic activity is nested in social relations based on guanxi based 
business networks  
 
He views China as a possible trailblazer of capitalist development and 
suggests it may even become an alternative model for capitalism. CMC 
rests on party control over appointments and incentive structures; control 
over the reward systems in organisations and enterprises; and control of 
capital. Lin predicts that ideological change will eventually eliminate the 
influence of Marxism and replace it with Confucian ideology based on 
moral and ethical leadership; and stability, order, and hierarchy. And he 
believes this will remove the need to explain the abandonment of 
socialist objectives.  
 
In pioneering countries of capitalism Lin says the role of the state was 
subordinate. However, the industrialisation of backward economies 
demanded active state intervention. Asian developmental states were 
autonomous and effective in defining national economic objectives, 
mobilising resources, and coordinating companies to attain them. Lin 
extends his theory to argue that a powerful state is essential in all 
capitalist systems. The state sets the rules governing markets and the 
containment of social and economic conflicts. But it must also protect 
capitalists to ensure their reproduction. And the state arbitrates disputes 
between capital and labour with a view to sustaining capitalism (Lin, 
2011, pp. 64–67). 
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State interference in markets is commonplace, says Lin, even in the 
United States. It protects markets and private sector entities when they 
run into trouble. Regulatory frameworks are crafted to support stable 
social structures, laws, property rights, taxes, finance, employment 
relations and other key regulatory spheres. State investment in 
infrastructure, research, and policies that foster prioritized sectors, is also 
commonplace. For Lin the state is vital in all forms of capitalism so it is 
not a developmental phenomenon at all. Rather, he attributes unique 
forms of state involvement in capitalism to their historical genesis, and 
sees state intervention as essential during periods of economic instability 
or dislocation. However, as the liberal capitalist model is closely 
associated with the ideology of free and unregulated markets, its 
deregulatory tendencies tend to provoke speculative frenzies and cycles 
of boom and bust (Lin, 2011, pp. 67–68). 
 
In the West, independent governance by a board of directors is the norm 
in major enterprises. In China the de-facto board of directors is the state. 
As a consequence there is greater coordination across firms in China. 
Personnel selection is more centralized, and the government picks and 
supports winners to the exclusion of competitors. The decentralized 
power of local governments appears to contradict Lin's CMC concept but 
he resolves this by reference to fuzzy relations and the need for flexibility. 
 
The term ‘state capitalism’ encompasses diverse traditions and contexts. 
For Lin, the specific constellation of Chinese power relations and 
economics is unique, and it is the ‘alignment and synchronization of a 
party-government-military-economy regime’ (Lin, 2011, p. 67) that merits 
its own classification as CMC. 
 
In CMC the state is an active capitalist. It creates and maintains 
enterprises by means of ownership and control over capital and 
appointments. It promotes free markets for capitalists and wage labour, 
and it is central to all aspects of the economy. State and private 
enterprises compete against one another, and the enrichment of 
capitalist elites is supported. However, these elites are subordinate to the 
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state. Workers in state enterprises, although they are not free to engage 
in labour unrest, are offered cosseted terms and security - similar to 
those of low-level state bureaucrats. National champions are selected, 
nurtured and supported, and the state's reward and punishment systems 
are applied to control the actions of leading enterprise cadres.  
In its transformation away from command-based structures - China 
developed a new combination. This uses capitalism to generate wealth, 
whilst maintaining the existing CCP controlled state as the guarantor of 
development and stability. The party encourages experiments with 
markets without establishing free markets. Privatisation occurred in 
housing, household goods production, services and the labour market. 
And profit based operations, capital accumulation, and investment 
operates with minimal state involvement. However, the marketization 
process is firmly under party control (Lin, 2011, pp. 70–73). 
 
Party interference extends into significant private sector companies e.g. 
the state may buy-up shares and impose its own managerial control, and 
family members of state officials often enter the private sector. But, the 
extent to which this mobility of power encompass private, public, political 
and economic sectors is of note (Lin, 2011, pp. 74–75).  
 
State banks and enterprises dominate Chinese capitalism and its 
sovereign wealth funds are major global investors. Rapid action by state 
banks enforced party and state decisions in 2008-9, when China 
launched a massive counter-cyclical investment programme.  
 
‘More than 75% of the stimulation fund ($586 billion) was allocated to 
infrastructure work, almost of all which was allocated to corporations 
owned, controlled, or affiliated with the state or local governments’ (Lin, 
2011, p. 78).  
 
The state also receives capital from state-owned companies - not only by 
means of taxation. The Party's control of shareholding enterprises is 
ensured through appointing the managers. State enterprises are also 
compelled to donate money on demand. Above all the need to fulfil 
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planning objectives. The integrated operational capacity of the state 
helps its enterprises to function effectively in world markets. Chinese 
infrastructure and raw material deals overseas are invariably signed by 
state-owned companies or state-near companies. The unified nature of 
state actions intensified after the Great Recession (Lin, 2011, pp. 78–80). 
 
The party controls appointments to a vast range of institutions, but 
permits them to operate quite independently. Local state enterprises and 
governments exercise considerable fiscal independence.   
‘The firms, as capitalistic entities, secure and accumulate resources, 
organize resources in the production process, recruit cheap labour, and 
explore and exploit markets where they can compete advantageously.’ 
(Lin, 2011, p. 80) 
 
Profit-making and market success influences decisions that guide local 
government-owned firms to form new enterprises and political promotion. 
A myriad of enterprises are created to undertake different tasks and 
intervene in different markets. Thus CMC reproduces itself as locally 
managed capitalism, which emulates the national system and operates 
with its own access to revenue and resources (Lin, 2011, p. 81). 
4.6.1. Ideological consequences 
 
Nan Lin's theory offered a coherent explanation of the CCP's ideological 
dilemmas. The party's revolutionary ideology rooted in class struggle and 
egalitarianism conflicts with the trajectory of development this presents 
major problems for ideological legitimacy. Pragmatic experimentation has 
defined China's path towards modernisation but economic success also 
caused a waning in the influence of Marxism. Two objectives were 
elevated to the basic props of state authority - growth and social stability. 
Lin examines the ideological options for the party and its dictatorship for 
the future and he outlines three alternatives: Western capitalist ideology; 
a mature form of socialism; or an authoritarian ideology rooted in 
Confucian traditions.  
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In recent years, a Confucian ideology of ‘great harmony’, based on good 
and virtuous government and prosperity, has been integrated into long-
term state objectives and appears in the speeches and articles of party 
leaders. In such an ideology, managerial skills supplant ideological purity, 
as they are based on a doctrine of orderly and stable socio-economic 
development. However, there has been no reasoned attempt to integrate 
Confucian ideas with the official theory that China is at the first phase of 
socialism. However, Lin believes that Confucian concepts offer the party 
a viable alternative ideological framework with which to replace Marxism. 
And this is particularly relevant as the CCP has not developed 
conceptual perspectives about the transformation from the primary stage 
of socialism to mature socialism, which should correspond with advances 
in economic prosperity (Lin, 2011, pp. 85–88). 
  
However, Lin notes that a veiled, and not so veiled, debate on 
democracy has taken place over the last decade, with senior party 
leaders variously defending, democracy, socialist democracy, or 
universal democracy, and others opposing Western multi-party systems 
outright. Anti-corruption campaigns play an important role in exposing the 
abuse of power and stemming the potential for anger to burst out into the 
open as generalized unrest. And nowadays there is scope for some 
forms of democratic expression, for example through residents 
associations and competitive village elections. In addition, Lin points to 
religious groups, which have recruited millions of people outside of state 
organisations. It is also noteworthy that democratic tendencies have also 
appeared inside the party with increasing frequency. Lin concludes that 
China fits a model of state capitalism - in the sense of providing its 
industries and enterprises with protection from world capitalist pressures. 
And such a form of state capitalism was applied in various developing 
states after World War II. China's difference lies in its genesis from state 
socialism and its increasingly tight control over the economy - through 
the party and the state. In the absence of a theory for the transition to 
mature socialism - and the expanded public property that this would 
entail - Lin believes a controlled and gradual process of enlightened 
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reforms will generate a more democratic form of centrally managed 
capitalism (Lin, 2011, pp. 89–93).  
4.6.2. Capitalist China? A critique 
 
Marshall Meyer (2011) challenges Lin’s CMC theory. For Meyer, the 
main question is not, what type of capitalism China is creating? But 
‘whether China is moving towards capitalism or away from it’? (Meyer, 
2011, p. 8) Meyer accepts that China's current trajectory is moving 
towards central management. But, having assimilated elements of 
capitalism, and emulated its appearance, China is pursuing a non-
capitalist path.  
 
Meyer rejects the idea that China's political economy corresponds to any 
comparative capitalist system. He highlights the contradiction, also 
flagged-up by Fligstein and Zhang (2011), that the factors which are 
commonly allotted a leading role in facilitating China's growth (e.g. the 
authoritarian state, nepotistic networks, fuzzy property rights etc.) are 
also held responsible for holding it back. To resolve this dilemma China's 
development is presented as if it were a long-distance hurdle race -where 
the preparation required to jump over the first hurdle, helps prepare for 
the next.  
 
So Meyer says ‘it is possible that China is not capitalistic, at least as 
capitalism is ordinarily conceived.’ (Meyer, 2011, p. 7) He defines 
capitalism as a system where private companies govern economic 
activity and compete for goods, services and capital. And affirms that ‘At 
the end of the day, a key test of a capitalistic enterprise is earnings 
(profits)’ (Meyer, 2011, p. 8). Meyer locates profits at the very heart of 
capitalism. They can be reinvested, paid in dividends to shareholders 
and bondholders, or used as incentives for employees. Profits are what 
motivate private investors to invest. For Meyer, capitalism - as an ideal 
type abstraction- seeks to minimize the role of the state, which intervenes 
only as ‘a last resort’ e.g. to limit monopolisation (Meyer, 2011, p. 9). 
True, state intervention is commonplace. For example U.S. state 
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intervention after the Great Recession of 2008-9 was huge; and 
developing states often subsidize private enterprises to pursue national 
economic objectives.  
 
Meyer challenges assumptions based on the unstoppable rise of private 
sector enterprises by differentiating between the indigenous and foreign-
invested private sector. He contrasts the state sector to the homegrown 
private sector, and finds that the gross output by state enterprises 
exceeds that of the private sector, as does the amount of value added. 
This emulates the emphasis of Huang in his influential book Capitalism 
with Chinese Characteristics (2008). Although private firms were catching 
up with the state sector this process was reversed after 2008. In the 
colossal state stimulus package that followed the Great Recession of 
2008-9, ‘massive assets were infused into state owned enterprises’ 
(Meyer, 2011, p. 10). If efficiently used, and that is a big if, Meyer 
believes this will enhance SOE performance and, if it is inefficiently used, 
it will exacerbate state sector burdens on the economy. Nevertheless, 
both scenarios contradict the idea that China is dominated by vibrant 
capitalism.  
 
The pursuit of profit by SOEs is not primary or easily deciphered. Central 
government has sought higher dividends from SOEs but less than 1% of 
its revenue comes from this source. Managerial stock options for SOEs 
have been restricted, which partially decouples the pursuit of profit from 
managers’ motivations. SOE earnings are largely impervious to scrutiny 
and unlisted firms rarely disclose earnings. Those listed companies that 
do disclose earnings are often so interwoven in complex ownership 
patterns (with parent, sister and child companies that are unlisted, and do 
not disclose their profits) that accounts can be conjured-up to reveal any 
desired profit rates on demand.  
 
The central driving force of China's political economy is not profits, says 
Meyer, but gross domestic product (GDP) and its local counterpart gross 
regional product (GRP). The statistics for this are ‘ubiquitous and 
published for four levels of the Chinese administrative system: national, 
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provincial, municipal or prefectural and county. GDP growth remains the 
most critical success measure for local officials; another critical measure 
is jobs.’ (Meyer, 2011, p. 11) 
 
A major contraction of foreign trade in 2006-9 was countered by a big 
rise in fixed asset investment by the central and local state - mostly on 
infrastructure projects. State banks and state enterprises were at the 
centre of this process and the career incentives for officials correspond 
with the focus on GDP targets (Meyer, 2011, pp. 11–14). Meyer 
concludes that: ‘Capitalism is driven by firms, GDP growth by 
government. Capitalism seeks profits; institutionalized GDP growth 
production, employment, and ultimately, social harmony.’ (Meyer, 2011, 
p. 14) 
 
From the 1980s until recent years, China's state encouraged an influx of 
Western foreign investment by offering cheap labour and low taxes. Now 
wages have risen and tax concessions are more restricted. After 2008 
the Chinese state acted to ensure that the rate of GDP growth would 
remain at around 8%. A ‘series of interventions has brought the Chinese 
economy increasingly under the control of the government. China is more 
centrally managed today than it was 5 or 10 years ago.’ (Meyer, 2011, p. 
15) 
 
Meyer believes that centralisation in China is driven by the state's 
institutional drive to growth - rather than the other way around. Lin's 
concept of CMC is rejected for this reason, as is the general contention 
that China's strengths derive from its movement towards capitalism 
(Meyer, 2011, p. 15).    
 
Meyer believes that the collapse of the Soviet Union portends badly for 
the durability of China's system and believes that a similar collapse 
would provoke a deep world recession. If ‘China reverts to a command 
economy, albeit a GDP-driven command economy rather than a Soviet-
style centrally planned economy, then the possible outcomes, from the 
perspective of Western capitalism’...are not pleasant (Meyer, 2011, p. 
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16). If China continues to develop rapidly while Western capitalism 
stumbles ‘capitalism as we know it could face a crisis of the sort 
anticipated by Marx and Engels’ in the Communist Manifesto (Meyer, 
2011, p. 16)..  Meyer rejects speculation that Chinese state intervention 
is a temporary detour on the path towards capitalism, and reiterates that 
the central driving force remains GDP based on massive investment in 
fixed assets (Meyer, 2011, p. 17). 
4.7. Two Marxist theories of capitalist restoration 
 
Hart-Landsberg and Burkett (2004) and Au Loong Yu (2012) maintain 
that market reforms transformed China into a capitalist state. They 
identify the following sequential stages of capitalist restoration:  
1) Central planning was weakened  
2) Markets were privileged over planning  
3) Foreign and domestic private enterprises were privileged over state 
enterprises (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2004, p. 61).  
4.7.1. Hart-Landsberg and Burkett’s theory  
 
From 1980s to the mid-1990s the decentralization of decision-making 
powers led state enterprises and local governments to function as profit 
seeking entities in markets. However, state banks engaged in excessive 
lending and soft-budget constraints applied. This resulted in a significant 
duplication of effort and overproduction, for example in the automobile 
industry (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2004, pp. 62–65). They cite 
overproduction and low wages as evidence that 'China has fallen under 
the sway of the exploitative and anarchic dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation.' (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2004, p. 72) However, 
although over-investment by state banks in state enterprises produces 
unsold goods, the resulting overproduction is not itself proof of the 
dominance of capitalism. The examples cited could instead be construed 
as illustrative of contradictions between local and national planning 
dynamics - where local interests seek to expand production without 
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adequately considering national productive needs, demands or 
efficiency.   
 
Hart-Landsberg and Burkett define this process as market driven in the 
sense that enterprises faced market competition. But it is clear that state 
enterprises were not actually functioning as profit-making enterprises, as 
their operations were based on state bank loans delivered and extended 
on a non- or semi-commercial basis. The bad debts accumulated by 
many state enterprises were eliminated by the wholesale privatisation of 
small and medium sized state-enterprises between 1998 and 2001. This 
dramatically worsened the conditions for tens of millions of laid off 
workers. Hart-Landsberg and Burkett claim that the privatisation of these 
small and medium sized enterprises brought with it a dramatic fall in 
workers' living standards and the destruction of welfare provision for 
health, education and pensions. However, the real wages of urban 
workers employed in formal sectors have risen consistently and rapidly 
even during this period of mass layoffs (Ge and Yang, 2014). In addition, 
the recreation of new forms of welfare provision from 2003, progressive 
labour laws introduced in 2008, and China's social housing programme 
to build 36 million apartments for social housing under the present Five 
Year Plan, simply do not fit the trajectory that Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett predicted.     
 
China's participation in the World Trade Organisation since 2001 requires 
that state enterprises operate on commercial lines and without 
government interference. Hart-Landsberg and Burkett predicted that the 
eradication of the remnants of a planned economy would follow from this 
loss of national economic sovereignty and China would become 
subordinate to imperialism. Foreign and private sector investment is said 
to have conquered such a dominant position within the economy that: 
'China's economic future now depends on the performance of privately 
owned enterprises' (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2004, p. 58), and its 
growth is 'dependent on the export activities of foreign transnational 
corporations' (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2004, p. 60). However, China 
is now generally regarded as an independent economic powerhouse. 
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Hart-Landsberg and Burkett examine the rising influence of the market 
and consider it to be synonymous with the dominance of capitalism: 
specifically foreign capitalism. The attempt to combine markets with 
socialism is presented as an inherently unstable state that automatically 
tends towards 'the full restoration of capitalism' (Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett, 2004, p. 115). The main concern of Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
is that any endorsement of China's development methods entails 
adopting criteria of success that focus on growth, and ignore the negative 
social impact of market relations. They believe any justification of the 
exploitation of China's workers undermines solidarity internationally.    
 
The central problem with Hart-Landsberg and Burkett's approach is that it 
implies that Maoist autarkic economic development, between 1949 and 
1979, was more successful for the mass of the people than the post Mao 
era from 1979 to today. This argument is based on the provision of 
welfare, employment and healthcare on an egalitarian basis. They also 
claim that economic problems evident in 1979 could and should have 
been resolved by greater popular participation in economic administration 
rather than by market mechanisms. This argument ignores overwhelming 
evidence of colossal improvements in life expectancy, life opportunities, 
and living standards for the overwhelming majority of the population 
since 1978. Life expectancy rose from 67.8 years in 1982 to 71.4 years in 
2000 (Lu, 2012, p. 10). The withering away of the serf-like restrictions on 
movement that the hukou imposed on rural residents drastically improved 
the life opportunities of the peasants. The disposable income of urban 
residents rose from 343 yuan to 13,786 yuan and those of rural residents 
rose from 134 yuan to 4,140 yuan between 1978 and 2007 leading to a 
dramatic rise in living standards (Lu, 2012, p. 3).  
 
Although Hart-Landsberg and Burkett assert that markets have replaced 
planning they present no evidence to verify their claim that planning has 
disappeared. Instead they simply assume that the rise of markets equals 
the destruction of planning.  
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4.7.2. Au Loong-Yu's theory 
 
Au Loong Yu (2012) agrees with and accepts Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett's basic theory of capitalist restoration. However, he 
acknowledges that the CCP controls political and state power based on 
command of state-owned enterprises (Au et al., 2012, p. 13) that 
‘exercise strategic control over the national economy as a whole’ (Au et 
al., 2012, p. 21). However, they operate ‘just like any other commercial 
company, so that today they rely more on the stock market to raise 
money than private capital does’ (Au et al., 2012, p. 21). The dominant 
role of bureaucratic capital arose from privatisation and corporatisation; it 
controls decisions and coercive power and promotes enrichment through 
bribery and corruption. He says, ‘the bureaucracy is the capitalist class’ 
(Au et al., 2012, p. 14). They earn salaries and extract surplus value 
because the state has been privatized, and the bureaucracy owns the 
state (Au et al., 2012, pp. 15–19). 
 
Au says the root of the problem lies in the fact that ‘historic role of the 
bureaucracy acting as a substitute for a bourgeois class in modernizing 
the country is a contradiction in itself: it was both the result of 
backwardness and also its embodiment’ (Au et al., 2012, p. 50). The 
CCP arbitrarily shaped class relations destroying landlords, creating 
proletarians, resurrecting the bourgeoisie, atomising the state workers, 
and building a new migrant working class. Only the party's exclusive rule 
and the objective of modernisation remained constant.  
 
Au's says the repression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989 was a 
precondition for complete capitalist restoration. After this, the iron rice 
bowl was smashed, privatization was carried out, managerial bureaucrats 
plundered assets of SOEs, but the state took over the debts of these 
firms even as it laid-off up to 40 million workers after 1998 (Au et al., 
2012, p. 25). Au says there is a ‘permanent fight between bureaucratic 
capital and private capital over bank loans and market share.’ For 
example, the private sector ‘did not benefit from the 2008 government 
bailout, amounting to 4 trillion RMB’ (Au et al., 2012, p. 22).  
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The privatisation of land generated a housing boom that the government 
stimulus measures after 2008 exacerbated. Accumulated debts imperil 
stability and consequently the national government is compelled to bail 
out local bureaucratic capitalism. Au believes that an economic 
slowdown will aggravate tensions between state capitalism and society at 
large, and the bureaucracy will be 'the common target of all classes' (Au 
et al., 2012, p. 43).  
 
In Au's theory of bureaucratic capitalism, private and state capital is 
unified in the hands of CCP cadres. State property is the core of the 
system and it is privileged over private capital. However, Au claims that 
the ‘planned economy has been dismantled’ so it cannot be the 
economic regulator. However, he nevertheless accepts that the 
bureaucracy ‘is more than capable of containing the economic cycle’ (Au 
et al., 2012, p. 49). It invests state capital, to the exclusion of private 
capital, in colossal infrastructure projects, as well on subsidies to 
farmers; higher wages for workers; and 'massive housing projects for the 
poor' (Au et al., 2012, p. 41) but these are clearly not market driven 
imperatives. Au's method elevates bureaucratic capitalist accumulation to 
the dominant economic regulator. However he fails to adequately explain 
how or why the pressures of class conflict shape the actions of the 
bureaucracy.  
4.8. State monopoly power 
 
The view that China's state enterprises act as a drain on society is 
forcefully advocated by Sheng et al., (2015).  SOEs are condemned for 
operating 'administrative monopolies' - defined as a business monopoly 
granted by government bodies. These monopolies are barriers to free 
entry, exit and market pricing. SOE monopolies are generally established 
by government entities rather than by legislation, and in real life, no 
power can negate decisions made in this sphere.  
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These state administrative monopolies evolved out of the 'planned 
economy era' (the Maoist period) but now the central government is 
dependent on the tax revenues that these state enterprises generate. 
Consequently, although the CCP supports the reform of SOEs it does not 
seek the abolition of their monopoly status. These firms retain their profits 
and are subject to pressure from internal interests to increase wages of 
workers, cadres and managers and to expand their administrative 
monopoly influence (Sheng et al., 2015).   
 
Sheng et al, focus on the administrative monopoly, illegal practices, 
corruption, and distortions to market' prices, which distort the economy 
away from its market equilibrium. They claim that administrative 
monopolies: lower efficiency, violate social justice, and undermine the 
very state authority that forms them. Thus SOE monopolies at the core of 
the economy are seen as a threat to the rule of the CCP - not as its 
foundation (Sheng et al., 2015, p. xxvi).  
 
The proposition that monopoly companies fix prices and erect unfair 
barriers that undermine the fluidity of market competition and efficiency, 
leads to the idea that the abolition of these monopolies will release 
wasted resources that otherwise should be used to improve the welfare 
of the people. Sheng and his colleagues model monopoly distortions and 
reveal the huge costs to each industrial sector that these distortions 
cause. So, for example, they say that low input prices feed into SOE 
monopoly profits but, if these SOEs paid normal market rates, the 
difference would go towards the people's welfare. As, if sales prices are 
set above 'natural' market rates, the savings that can be made could be 
spent on the people. They use this method to calculate, for example, that 
the telecommunications industry caused a social welfare loss of RMB 
441bn between 2003-2010, and the oil industry caused a social welfare 
loss of RMB 1.3tn. Similarly, high-speed railway is deemed too 
uneconomical to justify the scale of investment it receives, because 
roads and slower rail connections are in need of greater investment. And 
they argue that state banks pocket income through exploiting deposit-
lending differentials to produce excessive revenue. The cost of all this, to 
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the public and institutions, is estimated to be as much as US$1.15tn in 
2011 or 2.6% of GDP (Sheng et al., 2015, p. xxvii).  
 
This extensive study attempts to calculate the scale of accumulation that 
can be attributed to monopolistic power derived from the administrative 
authority of the party-state. However, it tends to focus entirely on the 
negative aspects of this process. Nevertheless, the data they present can 
just as easily be used to provide a reference point to explain how the 
urbanisation and industrialisation process - driven by the state - acts to 
facilitate the overall economic development in Chinese society. The 
disadvantages of monopoly state owned industries are strongly 
emphasised but the benefits, in terms of the capacity to combine the 
resources and manpower of SOEs to meet planning objectives, are either 
ignored or side-lined. This is like examining someone’s left hand and 
discussing its limited capabilities whilst ignoring the fact that the person is 
right handed and has two hands - which also greatly expands the 
potential of the left hand to engage in creative activity in combination with 
the right.  
 
So perhaps the most important issue is whether the benefits of state 
monopoly dominance outweigh its disadvantages. And whether reforms 
are designed to increase benefits to society through state planning, 
infrastructure etc., or to serve the personal enrichment of bureaucrats or 
capitalists.  
 
Global markets are already dominated by a tiny handful of private 
companies. So entry is not free and fair but restricted. Monopolistic 
enterprises can fight competitors through preferential access to credit; 
price wars, the manipulation of markets, political support, legal 
measures, and advantages in R&D etc. Cooperation between state 
enterprises and the party, government and state, multiplies the 
advantages that oligopolistic and monopolistic firms enjoy and bring to 
bear in order to realize state planning objectives. And it is this power and 
scale that permits China's SOE giants to realize colossal projects, which 
private companies are reluctant or unable to carry through. The unified 
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power of all SOEs, combined with the CCP's ubiquitous and exclusive 
societal organs of power and influence, can mobilize resources in ways 
that capitalist states are only able to emulate in wartime - when capital is 
controlled and subordinated to the military objectives of the nation.  
4.9. Multinational monopolies and state owned national champions 
 
Peter Nolan's (2014) analysis of the concentration of power in the hands 
of multinationals based in the advanced capitalist countries offers an 
enlightening perspective on the relative strength of China's large state 
and private enterprises. China sought to nurture state-owned national 
champions to compete with the leading multinational companies. Nolan 
says that these national champions operate in strategic industries, whose 
profile is broadly similar to the state-owned sectors established in many 
wealthy capitalist countries after the Second World War: banking, 
telecoms, oil and chemicals, aerospace, military related industries, 
energy supplies, metals and mining, construction. However, Nolan's 
passing analogy with post-1945 state intervention in Western Europe 
fails to take account of basic differences in the historical context. Western 
Europe was moving towards increasing state intervention to meet 
popular social objectives and to form a Keynesian type of welfare state. 
By contrast China's system moved from complete state dominance 
before 1978 to a more flexible and productive application of state 
economic power, which combined its universal agencies of political 
power. And it represents a far more ubiquitous and penetrating 
dominance over the economy and society than any post-war West 
European Social-Democratic model.   
 
Nolan explains that China's state enterprises secure government 
contracts, plan for the long-term, and mutually collaborate with each 
other. Although multinational companies also secure access to state 
dominated markets, they do this through providing technology transfer. 
The benefits of this knowledge can be assimilated, emulated and 
replicated within the state sector. China's SOEs operate in designated 
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spheres of influence, which are protected from multinational competitors 
by restrictions on FDI.  
 
The objective was to foster state giants that can surpass multinationals in 
important industrial sectors. In this way, China's state aerospace industry 
went from importing aircraft to building her own aircraft. And in the 
banking sector, technical and managerial systems emulated international 
corporate banking methods. However, many other sectors of China's 
economy are dominated by multinationals. Multinationals play an 
important role in the development of China's managerial and technical 
cadre - particularly those involved in the capitalist sector.  
 
An important vanguard of China's entrepreneurial class is composed of 
returnees, who have studied at leading overseas universities and worked 
for multinational companies. Their skills, bridge enterprise cultures and 
enable them to apply modern international corporate practices to 
increase efficiency in China. The state established high-tech zones to 
entice talented intellectuals to return. These returnees are prominent in 
the corporate legal profession and facilitate the IPO process. They have 
assumed commanding positions within most listed companies and inside 
foreign multinationals investing in China. With the breakneck expansion 
and provision of Internet access in China many enterprises invested in 
related technologies, services and finance. Backed by new Venture 
Capital firms; several Internet entrepreneurs mirrored the meteoric rise of 
similar leading Internet companies internationally. The role that returnees 
perform fosters the adoption of global corporate governance models. 
Chinese returnees also occupy senior positions in several of the world's 
leading financial institutions (H. Wang et al., 2011).  
 
Apple indirectly employs over 500,000 assembly workers in China and it 
earned $12bn in 2011 in Greater China. Foreign enterprises dominate 
China's new and high-tech sectors and its industrial exports and they 
employ an estimated 41% of China's scientists and engineers and 37% 
of its high technology workforce (Steinfeld cited in Nolan, 2014, p. 752). 
These multinationals lie behind the modernisation of state enterprise IT 
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systems, and global brands dominate the production of modern 
consumer devices.  
 
The widespread impression that China is a major buyer of advanced 
capitalist enterprises internationally is grossly exaggerated. The total 
stock of China's investments throughout the world stood at $424.8bn in 
2011 but Hong Kong accounted for $261.5bn of this total. By comparison 
the UK's total stock of FDI in 2011 stood at $1,700bn. Chinese FDI into 
wealthy countries stood at $62bn in 2011, but total FDI into China - 
mainly from wealthy countries - exceeded $712bn that year. China's 
investments in Singapore stood at $10.6bn compared to $9bn in the US, 
and only $2.5bn in the UK (Nolan, 2014, p. 757). Nolan maintains that 
China has failed to develop state owned companies that are capable of 
competing with the world's leading multinational companies; and that the 
few firms that are globally competitive are private firms. However, more 
recently China has certainly increased its investments in strategically 
significant companies.  
4.10. A new commanding heights? 
 
Nolan believes that globalisation redefined the concept of the 
commanding heights of the economy through the ubiquitous spread of 
information and communications technology. The process of 
globalisation also involved privatisation, trade liberalisation, and the 
opening of new markets. This created leading "system integrator" firms, 
which Nolan says constitute the modern commanding heights or the 
"organising brains" of the modern capitalist corporate system.  
 
Their operations are planned; and they exercise influence through 
technical, scientific, and commercial brand quality, and the huge capital 
at their disposal. So their economic footprint is far bigger than their 
nimble scale might suggest. For example, about 100 companies 
operating in high technology sectors account for about 60% of total 
global corporate R&D. Their capital and their power allows them to define 
the nature of technical progress and structure the character of supply 
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chains by pressure exerted through procurement (Nolan, 2014, pp. 750–
751). 
 
Back in 1970 the futurologist Alvin Toffler forecast that the introduction 
and exploitation of technology, knowledge, communications and 
information processing would transform society. Toffler contrasts 
economics based on scarcity to the inexhaustible nature of knowledge, 
as the use of physical objects is limited by space, whereas knowledge is 
intangible. Toffler explains that knowledge can be in many places at 
once, and it has the following characteristics: it is easily leaked; it 
increases with use; and small quantities can produce huge 
consequences. Intangible knowledge based assets are the substance of 
the assets of Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Baidu, etc., - 
enterprises, which Toffler now argues, are supplanting tangible capital. 
They rely on technical advances that entice consumers to become 
unpaid producers - like entering payment card details online, as opposed 
to a shop assistant taking your payment (Toffler, 2013, pp. 122–125). 
Toffler says that cyberspace constitutes a new continent for business, in 
which, Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) in outer space; streamline 
logistics, and increase productivity. And China's process of 
modernisation involves industrialisation as well as the simultaneous 
creation of an information society (Toffler, 2013, pp. 128–130).   
4.10.1. China's Internet giants 
 
In the last few years China's Internet giants came of age. They 
experienced a period of extraordinary growth in the scale of their reach 
and their economic influence. The first Chinese email was sent in 1987 
and China's connection to the Internet took place in 1994. But by 2012, 
45.8% of the population used the Internet (Yang and Mueller, 2014). 
China has over 688 million Internet users8 and is home to 4 of the top 10 
Internet companies in the world. Their market valuation at the end of 
2015 was: Alibaba Group ($233bn), Tencent Holdings ($190bn), Baidu 
Inc ($72bn), and JD.com ($48bn).9  
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Probably the most interesting is Alibaba. It operates in a way that 
conforms to Nolan's description of a "system integrator" company with a 
claim to commanding heights status. Alibaba first developed as a 
business-to- business portal, later it extended into consumer markets, 
cloud computing and finance, and it recently purchased Hong Kong's 
leading English language newspaper The South China Morning Post. 
Now Alibaba accounts for more than 60% of all parcels delivered in 
China and, through its databases, it holds a commanding lead in 
knowledge of Chinese consumer profiles and business patterns.10  
 
Its foray into finance circumvents state banks, which are reluctant to lend 
to small and medium sized private companies. Its financial role and its 
mutual interconnections with the country's private enterprises allow it to 
champion private sector interests, and its data profiling capacity is 
certainly envied by the party. In 2014 it launched a programme to 
establish 100,000 rural service centres that allow villagers to buy and 
sell, and to pay for various services and utilities. In addition, it teamed up 
with tech-savvy migrant workers to educate and assist villagers to sell 
their wares etc.11 Alibaba sold goods worth Rmb3tn ($462bn) last year 
compared to $341bn for the entire US ecommerce market in 2015. The 
stock value of China's Internet companies is amongst the highest in the 
world but these valuations assume that China’s 668m Internet users are 
buying and selling on a large scale.  
 
As most of China's Internet sales outlets do not have corresponding retail 
outlets, they have low operating costs and establish their online stores 
from scratch. This exploits the advantages of backwardness, (which 
Marxists call 'combined development'). This allows latecomers to adopt 
the latest technology without paying the cumulative costs of the historical 
evolution of the technology.  
 
It remains true that some 86% of Chinese Internet users earn less than 
Rmb 5,000 ($769) per month. Nevertheless sales through Alibaba's 
payment system - Alipay - reached Rmb12tn ($1.9tn) in 2015.  PayPal by 
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comparison processed a total of $282bn in 2015. So Alipay's total 
accounted for over 60% of global ecommerce.12  
 
In recent years China's technology, advertising and food processing 
industries posted rapid earnings growth, while profits at state owned 
industries fell by 14.5% in year to February 2016. However, profits in 
state controlled companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen fell less 
rapidly at 1.4%. But profits in private companies grew by 5.4%. And this 
growth is most evident in new economy sectors like technology, 
healthcare, travel and other service industries.13  
 
However, China has not been an easy terrain for international Internet 
companies. Google pulled out of its China operations in 2010 citing 
security breeches and cyber attacks. In response US Secretary Hillary 
Clinton called for global 'Internet freedom'. What followed was unique. 
The government established its own search engine called Goso, which 
was intended to replace Google. It was later renamed Jike and merged 
with another state owned search engine called pangsuo (Jiang and 
Okamoto, 2014a). Goso was seen as a means to ‘spread the Party's 
voice, strengthen the mainstream media's position, issue authoritative 
information, and showcase the Party's and country's image’ (People’s 
Daily cited in Jiang and Okamoto, 2014b, p. 92). This search engine was 
financed by the People's Daily, the official organ of the CCP. However, 
Jike failed to capture a dominant position in the search engine market 
despite state support.  No other state has attempted a similarly bold 
move - to create a national state-funded competitor and replacement for 
Google. So, despite is failure, Jike represents a significant symbolic 
example of the ambitious measures that the Chinese state is prepared to 
take on the Internet, and, perhaps, in other new-economy sectors if it is 
deemed expedient.   
 
Fuchs (2016) studies the rise of social media giants in China and 
compares them to similar US based Internet sites. He notes that 
Californian based companies dominate on the Internet, but 6 of the top 
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20 visited sites in the world are private Chinese companies listed on the 
US based NASDAQ market.  
 
Baidu is like a Chinese version of Google. In 2013 it accounted for over 
80% of searches in China; but Google processed 89% of all Internet 
searches. Over 99% of Baidu's profits come from adverts and marketing, 
indeed Baidu will place adverts preferentially for money. The directors of 
Baidu include various finance capitalists connected to other new 
economy enterprises like Intel, Cisco, Netflix, and GRS Ventures: these 
companies tend to sell services and hardware to Baidu. Like Google - 
whose founders own a big part of its stock- Baidu's, Robin Li, owns 
31.6% of all its stock. The company pays about 15% of its profits in tax 
(Fuchs, 2016, pp. 21–22).  
 
Sina Corp is also a NASDAQ listed web portal: it established Weibo in 
2009, which is similar to Twitter.  At the end of 2013 it had 123 million 
active users compared to Twitter's 240 million. Advertising and marketing 
made up 78.8% of Weibo's revenue. Both Weibo and Twitter 
experienced a period of big losses after 2008. Weibo faces stiff 
competition from Tencent's mobile messaging. Both Twitter and Weibo 
have struggled to generate sufficient revenue to justify their stock market 
valuation (Fuchs, 2016, pp. 24–26).  
 
Joseph Chen founded Renren in 2005. It is similar to Facebook. In 2013 
it had 206 million users, but it made a substantial loss in the face of stiff 
competition. It derives its revenue mainly from online games (it operates 
a games arm), and from advertising and marketing (through its social 
networking operation). The company's stock is owned by a few 
individuals: Chen owned 25% in 2013; and a Japanese financial 
company - the Softbank Corporation - owned 37.6% (Fuchs, 2016, pp. 
26–29).  
 
In Western scholarship the main narrative about China's Internet 
concentrates on surveillance, policing, propaganda and the enhancement 
of authoritarian power by the Chinese state. The coherence of this 
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storyline was ruptured by Edward Snowden's revelations of ubiquitous 
surveillance carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA), 
Britain's spy agency GCHQ, as well as other intelligence agencies in 
Europe and elsewhere. The intimate collaboration between US Internet 
giants and the NSA was exposed. The post 9/11 threat of terrorism was 
used to justify this. Big data and personal data - all produced by users - is 
exploited for the profit of private companies and the security apparatus of 
the state. Fuchs says: 
 
‘Given these revelations, the argument that the Internet is politically free 
in the West and politically controlled in China has become ridiculous’ 
(Fuchs, 2016, p. 31).  
 
Chinese and Western social media companies commodify the personal 
data produced by and about consumers, and use this, to precisely target 
adverts for products and services. They are giant advertising companies. 
However, advertising spending and revenue is much lower in China than 
in the US.  
 
Internet giants in China and the US are intertwined with finance capital. 
And even in the US return on advertising spending can be difficult to 
predict and can rapidly decline. All these companies are dependent on 
the unpaid labour that is user generated content. Some of the most 
prominent firms struggle to make profits and their share prices are often 
based on imagined possibilities, so the danger of such companies 
dwindling or disappearing is very real. The short history of the Internet is 
littered with tales of fallen giants: Netscape (search engine), Alta-Vista 
(search engine), Bebo (Social Network), Napster (music sharing), 
Myspace (social network), so there is nothing to stop some event - like a 
major security or privacy breach - from destroying confidence in today's 
Internet giants and causing a share price collapse (Fuchs, 2016, pp. 34–
36). 
 
The structure and behaviour of these private Internet advertising 
agencies in China and the US are very similar. This is evident in their 
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methods of exploitation; their financial backing; in the personal influence 
of company founders; and in their capitalist nature. However, collectivist 
influence is also evident in China's new economy and in use of social 
media by the working class.  
 
Nevertheless, the CCP has total control over China's entire 
communications infrastructure and over the government, media, 
education, police, judiciary and the military. So, although Internet giants 
may have established mechanisms that can assume an important 
position within the commanding heights of the economy, they are 
beholden to the state tolerating their independence, which comes with 
strings and demands that can undermine their operations, or may force 
them to integrate with state-owned or controlled entities. The main 
objective of the government is to ensure that cyberspace and China’s 
Internet giants cooperate to realize Party and state objectives.  
 
President Xi Jinping made his views on the future of the Internet clear in 
a speech on cybersecurity and IT application on 19 April 2016.14 China’s 
national plans for cyber development are integrated with the 13th Five 
Year Plan (2016-2020). Xi views information flows as a facilitator in 
innovation, technology, education, science, agriculture, health, 
governance and poverty alleviation through connecting rural areas and 
simplifying administration. The Party tries to ensure that expression in 
cyberspace does threaten stability, and yet simultaneously evolves into a 
means of improving administrative responsiveness to public opinion. This 
enables discontent to be detected early and nipped in the bud. 
Government and Party officials are expected to actively participate in 
Internet debates and discussions to keep abreast of social moods and 
attitudes.  
China prioritizes its cyber-independence and seeks to develop its own 
core Internet technologies, as otherwise, even large Internet companies 
can be brought crashing down. The focus on technical breakthroughs is 
designed to ‘enhance our planning in key areas and links with a view to 




When the CCP feels threatened by the consequences of social unrest 
coordinated by modern communications technology, as was the case 
during ethic unrest in Xinjiang Province the state has been willing to 
simply close down the Internet in the affected areas.  
4.11. Kornai’s theory of capitalism and its application to China 
 
Kornai’s book, Dynamism, rivalry and the surplus economy (2014) is a 
study of capitalism based on a comparative analysis with the socialist 
system. It provides a minimalist outline of the primary and essential 
features of capitalism, and of the consequent secondary features that this 
produces.  
 
Just as Kornai examined socialism by abstracting its essential features 
from a study of existing socialist systems, his study of capitalism 
generalizes from examples of real capitalism. This distinguishes between 
the ideals of proponents of either system and real life systems. In this 
way, a non-normative scientific approach based on evidence can be 
employed, and theoretical abstractions can be derived from the common 
features of a system. 
 
The core features of both systems are driven by ‘motivations, driving 
forces, and behavioural regularities of the economic actors’, which 
constitute and reproduce those “genetic programmes” that correspond to 
the nature of the system (Kornai, 2014, p. xii). 
 
In the last chapter I challenged Kornai’s contention that the three main 
characteristics of socialism no longer apply in China. However, in his 
recent writings on capitalism (Kornai, 2008, 2014, 2016) his emphasis 
shifts to focus on secondary characteristics of the system.  
 
Recently Kornai has attempted to align his analysis of capitalism and 
socialism with “varieties of capitalism” theory. He categorizes his 
varieties according to three politico-governmental forms: democracy, 
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autocracy and dictatorship. However, based on historical experience, he 
concludes that democracy can only exist under capitalism. Socialism is 
restricted to dictatorial and autocratic forms because ‘democratic 
socialism is impossible’ (Kornai, 2016, p. 569).16  
 
Chenggang Xu carried out a comprehensive review of Kornai’s book 
Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy, which applies his 
theoretical analysis of capitalism to China today (Xu, 2017).  
Xu explains that Kornai’s systemic comparison between socialism and 
capitalism identifies two key distinguishing features with which to assess 
China’s system. 
1. The prevalence of a surplus economy with hard budget constraints under 
capitalism  
2. The prevalence of a shortage economy and soft budget constraints under 
socialism.  
Capitalism is characterized by ‘excess supply, excess capacity, excess 
inventories and labour unemployment as long-run normalcy’ (Xu, 2017, 
p. 2). 
‘In capitalism, competition creates surplus, and surplus drives firms and 
entrepreneurs to compete fiercely for their survival and benefits. This 
fundamental force drives invention, innovation, creative destruction and 
the evolution of capitalism.’ (Xu, 2017, p. 5)  
 
Under capitalism the competition for markets between producers and 
sellers generates ferocious rivalry amongst capitalists. Kornai believes 
this makes capitalism inherently dynamic and innovative. Innovation is 
allotted a key place in Kornai’s systemic analysis of capitalism. The 
invention process under socialism is not matched by corresponding 
innovation, which involves ‘the organization of production and the 
diffusion of the new product or the application of a new organizational 
form’ (Kornai, 2014, p. 10). The main reason for the sluggish assimilation 
of new innovations under socialism lies, in Kornai’s view, in the absence 
of innovative entrepreneurship.  
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Kornai adopts Joseph Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter, 1942) view of the 
innovation process. According to this theory, capitalism ensures 
decentralized initiative, so inventors and innovators can set up a 
business without asking anyone for permission. Huge financial rewards 
flow to entrepreneurs at the cutting edge of technical progress. They are 
able to secure monopolistic rents even if their technical advantage is only 
temporary. Many entrepreneurs attempt to develop innovations; they 
carry out experiments, are highly motivated, and are willing to take risks.  
In addition, there must be sufficient flexible capital available for 
investment to ensure the rapid transformation of ideas into innovations 
and the diffusion of the products produced, including those that ultimately 
fail. Whilst technical progress and innovation is not always a product of 
the process of ‘creative destruction’, whereas capitalism is strongly 
aligned with rapid technical progress, socialism acts as a retardant to it.  
 
To illustrate his theory, Kornai lists 111 examples of revolutionary 
innovations in a randomly selected, wide range of categories for products 
and services developed from 1920-2010. He uses this list to verify the 
dynamism of capitalism compared to the conservative nature of 
socialism. The countries producing these innovative products were USA 
88, UK 7, Japan 6, Italy 2, Switzerland 1, France 1, Estonia 1, Argentina 
1, Sweden 1, Denmark 1, the Netherlands 1, and the USSR 1 (Kornai, 
2014, pp. 5–9). However, this list not only exposes the innovation deficit 
of the USSR, it also reveals the overwhelming predominance of the USA 
throughout the last century. Therefore, Xu qualifies Kornai’s capitalist 
innovation model by pointing out that revolutionary new products tend to 
emerge only in those advanced capitalist countries where the institutional 
conditions that facilitate this (such as venture capitalism) are present i.e., 
it is not an innate condition of the capitalist system. Rather, Kornai’s 
examples show that innovation is intimately connected to the world’s 
dominant capitalist country.  
 
In addition, it is certainly not always the private entrepreneur who stood 
at the helm of invention and innovation in the USA. Instead, huge state-
led investment programmes nurtured many of the core technologies that 
	 165	
were the basis for the innovation edge of the USA. The reason for this is 
illustrated by US government support for Nanotechnology research.  
‘Industry generally invests only in developing cost-competitive products in 
the 3-5 year time frame. It is difficult for industry management to justify to 
their shareholders the large investments in long-term, fundamental 
research needed to make nanotechnology-based products possible. 
Furthermore, the highly interdisciplinary nature of the needed research is 
incompatible with many current corporate structures.’17 
 
Nevertheless, the core argument of Kornai is that there are inherent 
innovation hostile tendencies within a bureaucratically planned economy. 
The socialist innovation processes is characterized by subservience to 
the central plan, and it depends on a vertical hierarchy for the approval of 
new initiatives. Monopolistic state owned companies do not compete for 
customers and the reward incentives for innovation are severely 
restricted. Experimental innovation is discouraged by the bureaucratic 
propensity to risk aversion and planned capital investment is high and 
consumes the available capital (Kornai, 2014, p. 21). 
 
Xu defines China’s system as ‘state capitalist’. The main difference 
between this state capitalism and Kornai’s theory of capitalism is to be 
found in the creative destruction process. ‘Creative destruction is not only 
a mechanism of creating surplus; it also determines the nature of 
competition, the winner of the competition, eventual consequences of 
winning and failing, and the path of the long-term evolution of capitalism. 
In this mechanism, capitalism and state capitalism are drastically 
different. In contrast to private firms in capitalism, state firms under state 
capitalism continually produce and expand unwanted and obsolete 
products because they are protected by Soft Budget Constraint (i.e., no 
“destruction” policy). The monopolistic power and government protection 
provide SOEs with the privilege of heavily subsidized capital. They 
imitate other innovations at extremely low costs because of favourable 
technology transfer deals from advanced multinational firms that are 
supported by the government and the monopolized super-large scale of 
the market (e.g., high-speed train technology).’ (Xu, 2017, p. 14) 
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An illustration of this process is China’s steel industry, whose output 
exceeds that of the USA, Japan, Russia and India combined. In 2016, 
the government demanded a cut in steel output. This led to a rise in 
prices and profits. So, state owned steel makers, which dominate the 
industry and its suppliers, interpreted this ‘price signal’ as a green light to 
expand investment. As a consequence: ‘Local officials, still hungry for 
growth, have dusted off their plans for big new coal mines. Officials have 
started to warn about a speculative bubble in the steel market. In 
Chinese ports stocks of iron ore, a vital ingredient in steelmaking, are 
near record highs.’18 The cut in production was not a horizontal response 
to market signals. It was a vertically imposed bureaucratic edict. In 
addition, cutbacks in production produced a bureaucratic solution. In 
state owned coal mines, rather than lay off surplus workers, or close 
‘uneconomic’ mines; the initial response from some coal industry bosses 
was to reduce annual working days to 276.19 
 
Xu attempts to resolve this problem by applying Kornai’s model, which 
holds that four factors generate surplus under capitalism; monopolistic 
competition, uncertain demand, economies of scale, and the process of 
creative destruction (Kornai, 2014, pp. 60–67). Xu affirms that China’s 
SOEs are oligopolies or monopolies, which compete nationally and 
internationally for markets. He believes that the need to compete with 
large private enterprises drives China’s decentralized government 
structures to encourage their SOEs to compete on the market. This 
competition creates a buyers market for final goods and China’s 
economy has a vast scale; it is the world’s largest market for many 
products.  
 
As distinct from market reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe, where 
market forces were weak, ‘the large-scale entry of non-state firms, 
particularly private firms, makes market competition the norm in the 
Chinese economy’. Therefore: ‘Even SOEs, which are subject to SBC, 
are driven to fierce market competition and regional competition. When 
high-powered incentives associated with these competitions are given to 
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the CEOs of SOEs for market share or for profits and when SBC serves 
as insurance against insolvency, SOEs are induced to take bold risks in 
competition for market shares. This situation seems to be the force that 
produces extraordinary surplus’ (Xu, 2017, p. 15). 
 
However, the remuneration of SOE managers came under scrutiny in 
2015 to appease discontent over high salaries in the public sector. 
‘Salaries for the chairmen and presidents of China’s five biggest banks all 
dropped 50% in 2015 […] Jiang Jianqing, chairman of Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the world’s biggest lender by assets, 
made less than 550,000 yuan ($85,000) in compensation last year. That 
was down 52% from 1.1 million yuan in 2014’20 This salary is miniscule 
compared to comparable positions at international banks. In addition anti-
graft measures have tightened up on many loopholes and perks. So, 
Xu’s argument that SOE managers are motivated by high incentive-
based-pay linked to the pursuit of market share and profits rests on 
shaky ground.  
 
Xu shows that soft-budget constraints emerge in advanced capitalism as 
well as in socialism. The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, 
and the associated banking crisis after 2008, is seen as a special variant 
of the soft-budget constraint. The subprime mortgage lenders transferred 
‘substantial bankruptcy risks to tens of millions of anonymous uninformed 
buyers globally.’ (Xu, 2017, p. 15) After the global market crash, the 
phrase ‘too big to fail’ was widely employed by governments to justify 
immense government bailouts for major banks, which socialized their 
debts to save the ‘system’. Xu shows that Kornai’s proposition that there 
is an organic affinity between public ownership, SBC and a shortage 
economy does not apply to China, and the affinity between private 
ownership, HBC and a surplus economy, does not apply to the USA.  
 
Xu’s definition of China’s system as one of ‘state capitalism’ is one in 
which all of the primary characteristic correspond to Kornai’s definition of 
socialism, but whose subordinate, secondary characteristics, consist of a 
hybrid mixture of capitalist and socialist appearances.  
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Thus Xu finds that although competition exists in the market for products 
and services, state ownership continues to dominate the economy.  
And, ‘in contrast to “pure” capitalism, private property rights are limited 
and insecure. In most important areas of the economy, the government 
monopolizes or controls property rights. All the land is state owned. 
Moreover, in the commanding heights sectors (a la Lenin’s New 
Economic Policy), including airlines, and communication, state ownership 
dominates and controls the governance of state owned firms and prices.’ 
(Xu, 2017, p. 13)  
  
‘The pre-reform socialism was a shortage economy, which is exactly 
consistent with Kornai’s predictions. Since the reform, China transformed 
into a particular type of hybrid system, that is, state capitalism, similar to 
that in Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy. Indeed Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping made it clear that his reform was influenced by Lenin’s 
New Economic Policy.’ (Xu, 2017, p. 13) 
4.12. Conclusion 
 
Although the view that China is capitalist is dominant in  
Sinology and in the field of economics and politics, there are few studies 
that attempt to identify what the system of capitalism is, before they 
define China as capitalist. However, there are many studies that describe 
various elements of Chinese history, economics, social relations, politics, 
etc., which are, by implication, taken to be indicative of capitalistic 
practices. Such practices are then selected and combined to fill a basket 
with capitalist things from China. Although this basket of evidence may 
contain many elements that exist in other capitalist systems, this method 
elevates analogy to equivalence in its definition of capitalism. 
 
This problem pervades the literature that I reviewed in these theories of 
Chinese capitalism. Coase and Wang’s historical survey of Chinese 
reform selects markets and planning as central definitional determinants, 
yet Coase himself was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for his 
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pioneering investigation of the firm under capitalism as a planned 
organization. However, it is my view that the forces identified by Coase 
and Wang as the motive driving forces of Chinese capitalism, such as 
good ideas and the desire to modernize, are not inherent to or definitions 
of capitalism. The resulting analysis recognizes that anti-capitalist forces 
continue to play a big role in the party, bureaucracy, and society. The 
influence of such forces is ascribed a negative role, and is attributed to 
‘remnants’ left over from the dying system of socialism, which is assumed 
to have no vitality, longevity or capacity for reproduction and expansion.  
On the other side, the existence and widespread operation of capitalist 
enterprises is viewed as illustrative of vibrant and energetic new forces, 
whose victory is assured. I believe that such an outlook is rooted in a 
normative rather than a scientific basis. 
 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory employs Germanic and US capitalist 
models as prototypes and looks at institutions that differentiate these two 
models. These types are seen as the most successful. Attempts to 
compare China’s system with either of these systems reveals defining 
distinctions that are directly connected to socialist characteristics or 
‘remnants’ in China’s system.  
 
Those scholars, who identify China’s system as a capitalist system from 
within an East Asian developmental state context, examine the historical 
development of Japanese institutional structures and those of other East 
Asian countries. They examine similarities and differences with China 
based on institutional arrangements that helped to plan their 
development and modernization in ways that overcame market 
limitations. Complexity is added to this equation by the idea that the 
theory of the developmental state can be applied to both socialist and 
capitalist states. The conclusions drawn from comparing China with other 
East Asian states always requires the qualification of the similarities by 
pointing back to the degree of China’s state ownership, the SBC, and the 
CCP’s control over society. Historical affinities; particularly linguistic, 
bureaucratic, and philosophical commonalities are said to be rooted in 
such long-term affinities.  
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Nan Lin’s concept of Centrally Managed Capitalism is a sophisticated 
variant of this theoretical school. It offers explanations of state 
intervention designed to overcome market failures, which play a positive 
role in fostering economic growth, through a unique constellation of 
power relations.  
 
However, differences in assessments of the inhibitory or facilitatory role 
of state actions reveal a widespread problem. For, if the promotion of 
capitalism and socialism are contradictory objectives, what are the 
conflicts between these systems based on? For Nan Lin this resolves 
itself into ideological choices between a new Confucian ideology and an 
as yet non-existent theory of mature socialism.  
 
In this respect, I find Meyer’s concentration on the pursuit of maximum 
profits for private investors as the driving force of capitalism to be a 
simple but valid defining and distinguishing criterion by which to assess 
China’s system as capitalist or not. China’s overwhelming focus and 
concentration on growth objectives is related to policies that enhance and 
expand the CCP and its state power. This is contradictory to capitalist 
profit seeking and so, when Meyer projects into China’s future, a radically 
different non-capitalist vision emerges.  
 
Au and Hardt-Landsberg’s historical presentation of China’s 
abandonment of socialism both derive from Marxist traditions, which 
should permit of clear systemic definitions. Instead, I find they produce 
rather formulaic concepts, which are imposed on China’s reality. The 
resultant conclusions and projections produce inconsistent and verifiably 
incorrect assessments of China’s recent past, despite their 
understandable moral outrage at the lot of the poor and the proletariat. 
However, as their conclusions are underpinned by rose tinted 
impressions of a lost egalitarian world under Mao Zedong, their 
arguments also lack potency.  
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Nolan’s focus on the global dynamics of investment by multinational 
companies, and the technical, organizational and scientific dominance of 
modern ‘system integrator’ companies offers a valuable counterbalance 
to much of the hyperbole about China’s rise and its supposed impending 
dominance of the world economy. His analysis also indicates the 
centrality of such firms in shaping the global economic trajectory, and 
argues that China lags significantly behind in these spheres. The 
emergence of similar firms in China in the recent past, begs the question, 
what is their potential to act as the pioneering champions of a modern 
and innovative capitalist class in China? Is this a class that will be able to 
gain dominance over the economy, influence opinion, change politics, 
and remould the state in its interests?  
 
I point to the cyber-policies of the Party and state to show that the CCP is 
cognisant of the threat posed by these entities and by the Internet, to its 
power and prestige. Indeed, it takes active measures in these spheres, 
whose scope and ambition is both bold and all encompassing.  
 
Having considered this sample of theories of Chinese capitalism, I return 
to the ideas of the main protagonist of this thesis, János Kornai. His own 
interpretation of Chinese capitalism is assessed, as is Xu Chenggang’s 
review of Kornai’s theory, which provides a penetrating insight into the 
advantages and problems that emerge when applying Kornai’s theory to 
contemporary China. This returns us to the political economy of a society 
in which the commanding heights of the economy are in state ownership 
but where subordinate private activity and markets are permitted and yet 
are simultaneously contained by the ‘Leninist’ party and state, as during 
the Soviet New Economic Policy. This framework is investigated in depth 
in the next chapter. 
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Evgeny Preobrazhensky (1886–1937) was a prominent Soviet economist 
in the 1920s. He sided with Trotsky and the Left Opposition within the 
Communist Party, and developed a method to investigate the 
contradictions that shape socialist economic policy in a backward 
country. 
 
János Kornai recognizes that when a sharp debate on the character of 
growth in the Soviet Union took place in the 1920s: ‘one of the foremost 
economists on the “left-wing,” Preobrazhensky, put forward the notable 
theory of primitive socialist accumulation.’  However: ‘By a tragic irony of 
history, Preobrazhensky and many exponents of his ideas fell victim to 
the terror of Stalin, who then went on to implement some components of 
his recommendations in a way even Preobrazhensky probably did not 
envisage.’ (Kornai, 2007, p. 198 [1992]) This chapter is dedicated to 
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explaining what Preobrazhensky actually did envisage.1 It examines the 
historical circumstances in which his ideas were debated and the way 
that some components of his recommendations were implemented.  
 
I will argue that Preobrazhensky’s theory is particularly relevant for 
understanding the macro-level dynamics of China’s political economy 
during the reform era. Preobrazhensky’s theory offers an alternative and 
supplementary explanation for the growth dynamics of socialist systems 
to that worked out by Kornai. Where Kornai regards reform socialism as 
an incoherent and contradictory system that tends automatically towards 
disintegration, using Preobrazhensky lens, it can be understood as part 
of the necessary and unavoidable dialectic of socialist development in a 
backward economy, which involves the articulation of two systems under 
the dominance of public ownership and planning.  
 
Preobrazhensky’s book The New Economics (Preobrazhensky, 1965), 
first published in 1926, develops a Marxist theory of the economic law 
governing the transition from capitalism to socialism. Preobrazhensky 
calls this primitive socialist accumulation (PSA).2 This proposes that 
socialist economic policy must consciously organize the accumulation of 
state capital from pre-socialist sectors of the economy. This extraction of 
a surplus from the pre-socialist economy means exploiting the capitalist 
sector and the so-called “individual economy” of peasant production, 
until, through investing the surplus extracted in this way, the economy 
comes to outstrip world capitalism.  
 
The chapter begins with a historical section, which examines the rise and 
fall of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union. This contextualizes 
the ideas that were debated and discussed, and reveals the nature of 
pressures from emergent bureaucratic forces that assumed a leading 
role in society. This led to the abandonment of the NEP and its 
replacement by tighter state control, widespread nationalization, and 
bureaucratic state planning and, in turn, established the system that 
Kornai defines as classical socialism, and others, like Trotsky, referred to 
as Stalinism.  
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Karl Marx’s theory of socialism presupposes a society based on 
advanced technique, high productivity of labour, and an abundance of 
wealth. In order to identify the consequences that follow from the material 
backwardness of the Soviet economy, Preobrazhensky adjusted Marx’s 
concept of capitalist and socialist transition to account for the 
transformation from backward capitalism to socialism. I dedicate 
considerable space to an exposition of this framework and method, 
because it examines an economy based on a combination of capitalist 
and socialist economic forces, in which the dominant levers of state and 
economic power are governed by planning. However, in these 
circumstances, the character of planning is also shaped and amended by 
the influence of the weak economic base vis-a-vis world capitalism. 
Preobrazhensky’s theory of Primitive Socialist Accumulation is based on 
this set of circumstances and the complexities that flow from this. His 
analysis was not simply an assessment of what was, but of what policies 
should be consciously pursued.     
5.2. The Soviet context in the 1920s 
 
The theory of Primitive Socialist Accumulation (PSA) took centre stage 
during the “Soviet industrialization debate”. It proposed that the socialist 
sector of the economy exploit the private economy to catch-up with 
advanced capitalism. The theory was subject to ferocious criticism, 
distortion and misrepresentation, and the debate was eventually resolved 
by violent means: through the repression of inner-party opposition in 
1927, and the forced collectivization of the peasantry after 1929.3 These 
measures, along with universal nationalization, and the introduction of 
the Five Year Plan in 1928, established the ‘classical socialist system’ 
that Kornai comprehensively describes.  
  
Karl Marx believed that early capitalist accumulation was accelerated by means 
of forced and unequal exchange with pre-capitalist economic formations, a 
process that Marx called “primitive accumulation”. Preobrazhensky’s theory of 
PSA was a modification of Marx’s analysis of the genesis of capitalism. 
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Preobrazhensky drew an analogy in which the accumulation funds for socialism 
would come from unequal exchange with pre-socialist economic formations. 
Economic backwardness defined Soviet developmental dynamics and 
produced the contradictory co-existence of capitalist and socialist laws of 
motion, which were the object of theoretical analysis and the subject of conflicts 
over practical policy. Contradictions between these economic laws appeared 
as conflicts between industry and agriculture, and the proletariat and 
peasantry.4 These dynamics were manifest through dislocations in economic 
development and clashes between the interests of social classes. 
Preobrazhensky supported rapid capital accumulation by state-owned5 heavy 
industry, which would come mainly at the expense of the peasantry.6 He hoped 
that rising peasant incomes, rural investment, and material support from 
successful international revolutions would ameliorate this exploitation (Filtzer, 
1979).  
 
In the mid-1920s, as the Soviet economy approached its pre-
revolutionary capacity; Preobrazhensky emphasized the need for large-
scale capital investment, which would entail sacrificing present day 
consumption for future benefits (Erlich, 1950, pp. 66–68). He thought that 
the gap between world market prices and those of indigenous state 
industrial price policy should gradually improve the industrial purchasing 
power of the peasantry and simultaneously maximize the flow of 
resources towards investment. Once such capital-intensive investment 
bore fruit it was hoped that the living standards of peasants and workers 
would consistently improve (Erlich, 1950, p. 74). 
 
For Preobrazhensky a socialist planned economy must limit and control 
the influence of the law of value. However, he understood that 
forecasting in a centralized economy created scope for grave errors to 
radically impact the economy - as compared to capitalism - where private 
interests adjust markets and counter-balance planning.7 Therefore 
economic guidance and forecasting would require a scientific theoretical 
method to help predict the consequences of planning in advance 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 6).  
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Before 1917 the majority of Russian Marxists held the view that a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution would precede a socialist revolution.8 
One exception was Leon Trotsky whose theory of ‘permanent revolution’ 
posited that the bourgeois revolution would pass uninterrupted into a 
socialist revolution. In his view, the development of the productive forces 
produced a contradictory correlation of class forces, where a powerful 
and militant working class faced a weak indigenous bourgeoisie tied to 
the Tsarist state and foreign capital. He thought the working class would 
overthrow the Tsarist state, and the bourgeois and socialist tasks of the 
revolution would be combined and become part of an international 
socialist revolution (Trotsky, 2007, p. 33 [1931]). 
 
The Revolutionary Foundation 1917-18 
 
In the first months after the revolution, radical changes were decreed e.g. 
peasant land seizure, workers’ control of industry, nationalization of 
essential enterprises, and the promotion of international revolution. This 
combination of revolutionary democracy and internationalism sought to 
strengthen internal cohesion and weaken external threats. But soon 
problems caused by economic dislocation were used to justify replacing 
autonomous workers’ organizations with hierarchical authority structures. 
Lenin’s hope for pressured collaboration with private capital was 
undermined by the ferocity of class conflict - as capitalists and old 
bureaucratic forces aligned themselves with the counter-revolution and 
were expropriated (Howard and King, 1989, pp. 290–292). 
 
War Communism 1918-21 
 
War Communism led to general nationalization, forced requisitioning and 
rationed resource allocation, the suppression of markets and trade, and 
the repression of democracy and political opposition. Bukharin theorized 
this practice – concluding that strict self-discipline and centralization is 
essential to military victory and proletarian rule. In his view, global 
economic decline would be followed by revolution, but this would be 
accompanied by further economic regression and civil war. The 
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overthrow of capitalism would replace economics with the conscious 
pursuit of proletarian interests - administrative controls would replace 
wartime confiscation, and regulate the relations between town and 
country. However, sharp class conflicts alienated the peasantry and 
weakened state and party power. Nevertheless, Bukharin’s theory 
remained influential within the party and leadership even after military 
victory (Howard and King, 1989, pp. 292–294). 
5.3. Rise and fall of the New Economic Policy 1921-29 
 
In 1918 Lenin used the term ‘state capitalism’ to characterize an 
economic system in which capitalist enterprises of various types worked 
under the control of the proletarian state. The core ‘commanding heights 
of the economy’ were composed of state enterprises and trusts, which he 
described as being ‘of the consistently socialist type’. After 1921, small 
enterprises were privatized, foreign investment was encouraged, and 
diplomatic relations were improved. Lenin exhorted communists to learn 
to trade, and supported emulation of capitalist methods by state 
enterprises to improve productivity. This included one-man management, 
profit calculation, and large wage differentials. He also warned that 
bureaucratic forces were steering the state, but hoped that party purity 
would be able to sustain the revolution and, if industry developed 
alongside peasant cooperation, the NEP could herald economic 
progress.  
 
Bukharin advocated industrial advance at a ‘snail’s pace’ based on 
encouraging peasant demand for consumer goods produced by state 
industry. He believed that an enduring worker-peasant alliance should 
avoid excessive demands being placed on agriculture. For Bukharin, the 
leading role of the workers meant class relations were based on a 
harmonious unity, and socialism could be realized within national 
boundaries. Agricultural growth would increase peasant consumption, 
stimulate light industry, and increase demand for heavy industry.  
 
	 179	
Leon Trotsky’s view was that socialism in one country was a reactionary 
doctrine. International capitalism was not stable, and revolutions were 
likely in the near future both in Western Europe and in certain less 
developed countries. He believed that if his theory of ‘permanent 
revolution’ were correctly followed, the opportunities that would arise 
could lead to revolutionary victories internationally. Also, the economic 
interests of European powers would foster trade relations with the USSR, 
and this could be used to integrate with the world market, import goods in 
short supply, and utilize national comparative advantages to acquire 
resources for state industry. To overcome the impact of the world law of 
value, the efficiency of Soviet industry would have to reach that of world 
capitalism. Trotsky saw political reform as the primary means of changing 
policy e.g., to permit criticism and rank and file control over the party and 
the bureaucracy. 
 
Stalin argued that splits between imperialist powers would prevent 
successful military intervention to overthrow the revolution and Soviet 
diplomacy and the Comintern could be used to neuter future threats. In 
the mean time, socialism could be built in the Soviet Union without the 
need for revolutions in other countries. For Stalin, the internal balance of 
forces would not lead to a life or death crisis, and thus Trotsky had 
‘underestimated’ the peasant. 
 
Preobrazhensky considered the rate of growth of the state vis-à-vis the 
non-state sector to be decisive. Rapid industrial growth could increase 
the consumption of peasants and workers; and increasing the strength of 
the proletariat, while weakening the wealthy peasants and traders, could 
help to maintain the alliance between the workers and the mass of 
peasants. However, large fixed investment was needed to outstrip pre-
revolutionary production and to secure growth into the future. So, 
Preobrazhensky’s sequencing projections were based on extending 
capacity to facilitate the manufacture of industrial consumer goods and 
alleviate the goods famine. His proposals were based on technical 
grounds rather than a fetish for heavy industry. Whereas Preobrazhensky 
advocated systematic planning to forecast and anticipate disproportions 
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and crises, Bukharin emphasized market autonomy (Howard and King, 
1989, pp. 294–309). 
5.3.1. The Left Opposition  
 
Trotsky formed the Left Opposition in 1923, to oppose bureaucratization 
of the party, encourage democratic rejuvenation through workers’ 
democracy, and promote economic planning. Preobrazhensky 
campaigned for the adoption of planning in the state sector of the 
economy. He argued that outbreaks of workers’ unrest in urban areas 
revealed the need for the party to restrict the growth of capitalist 
tendencies generated by the NEP in order to meet workers’ needs.9 The 
Left Opposition feared that concessions to petty bourgeois moods could 
act as a springboard for a reactionary authoritarian movement - drawing 
parallels with the period in the French revolution known as Thermidor. 
However, the expulsion of Leon Trotsky and the United Opposition10 in 
1927, was followed by an increasingly ferocious campaign against rich 
peasants. In 1929, an accelerated industrialization drive by the party and 
state, effectively identified the entire peasantry as a hostile bourgeois 
class - as the hoped for wedge between the poor, middle and rich 
peasants failed to materialize (Carr, 1971, pp. 419–429). 
 
The construction of the new state and society changed the functional role 
of the revolutionary party. Its proletarian credentials diminished as it 
assumed governing roles, with associated material privileges. Only a 
minority of party members had experienced pre-revolutionary struggle. 
Migration and urbanization changed the composition of the proletariat, 
and disappointment with the results of the revolution in everyday life, 
generated passivity. A small minority of enthusiastic proletarians threw 
themselves behind the constructive work of industrialization, but few 
workers responded to appeals by the Left Opposition to engage in a new 
struggle for revolutionary ideals, or to stand up for the opposition when 
they faced expulsion and exile (Carr, 1971, pp. 430–434).   
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5.3.2. The rise of the bureaucracy and the plan-market conflict 
 
In the mid-1920s the debate about the rate of growth and proportionality 
between sectors was initially one in which the Left Opposition advocated 
increased industrialization broadly along the lines of Preobrazhensky’s 
New Economics, and the party majority remained tied to the idea of 
gradual industrialization based on market laws, which was justified on the 
basis of the sanctity of the worker-peasant alliance. The arguments of the 
party majority shifted following the expulsion of Trotsky and his allies in 
1927. This had two main impulses. The first was the perceived defence 
needs of the state, and the second, the dynamic of pressure stemming 
from the expansion needs of heavy industry.  
 
Talk of forced industrialization and of finding the shortest path, to catch 
up with and overtake the advanced capitalist countries, became 
commonplace in the press, publications and at meetings etc. The political 
defeat of the Left Opposition in 1927 facilitated this, as the administrative 
and bureaucratic strata of the heavy industrial lobby won more influence, 
authority and power.  
 
Concerns about the impact on the peasant-worker alliance of the lag in 
consumer production found some echo, in particular with Bukharin. 
Although market equilibrium theories were widely accepted within the 
party in 1927, strains between planning and market concepts of 
development were tested to the maximum. On the one side, pressures 
were brought to bear on the recalcitrant peasants, and on the other, great 
efforts were applied to ensure that consumer goods production rose, to 
limit the impact of this. In January 1928 consumer goods production was 
26% above that of a year earlier.11  
 
Bukharin presented the conflict with planning as one of imaginary visions 
and plans - which he called ‘bricks of the future’- against market realities 
and their expedient needs.  Debate on the tempo of development 
dominated party discussions in 1928. The momentum developed by 
increased investment in heavy industry, heightened the confidence and 
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authority of its apparatus and associated officialdom. A bridge between 
these arguments was temporarily found in common hopes for productivity 
and efficiency gains. However, by the end of 1929 Bukharin’s arguments 
were labelled by Stalin as representing the kulak and the petty 
bourgeoisie. The concept of planned management, along with the ideal 
of rapidly catching up with, and overtaking advanced capitalism, became 
official policy (Carr and Davies, 1969, pp. 271–332).   
5.3.3. Tensions over agriculture 
 
From 1925-1927 party and state policy had reluctantly favoured 
individual ‘capitalist’ peasant forms of agriculture. The United Opposition 
advocated policies supportive of voluntary cooperation, intended to unify 
the interests of poor and middle-income peasants with state industry. 
Pressure to concentrate resources on heavy industry intensified, 
requiring long-term investment. This meant that consumer goods 
production, which otherwise might have enticed the wealthier peasants to 
sell their grain, was deprioritized exacerbating a goods famine. The 
mechanization and technical advances in agricultural production 
improved output regardless of ownership form, and this appeared to offer 
an alternative to political conflicts over class interests within the 
peasantry. However, the larger the farms, the greater the benefits, 
therefore control over large farms was fundamental. The peasant 
response to the consumer goods famine was to hoard grain as their store 
of wealth, and so the wealthier farms had greater power of resistance. 
The state could only rely on state farms to provide and sell grain on 
official terms. Thus the conflict with rich peasants was revived. However, 
the state appeared as an alien force seeking to wrest control from the 
villages, where its anti-kulak policies were generally regarded as anti-
peasant.  
 
In early 1929, Stalin concluded that urban grain requirements could only 
be secured by forceful measures against wealthier peasants, a widely 
held view within the party. Fear that the kulaks would reorganize the 
economy towards capitalism gained adherents. It was hoped that class 
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struggle in the countryside would unify the middle and poor peasants 
against the kulak, but party organization in rural areas was weak, and 
kulak agitation against outside interference tended to unify the peasantry 
against the party. Workers’ brigades were dispatched to support and 
encourage collectivism in the countryside as Stalin’s new policy to 
liquidate the ‘kulaks as a class’ was adopted in the summer of 1929. A 
drastic and radical shift to rapid and forced collectivization became policy 
at the end of 1929. This was the result of persistent grain collection 
crises, the exhaustion of measures against the kulaks, and a drastic rise 
in black market food prices, which threatened urban food supplies and 
jeopardized industrial expansion plans. A flickering faith in the potential to 
combine collectivization with mechanization, helped to summon up hope 
out of desperate circumstances for the final catastrophic dénouement 
(Carr and Davies, 1969, pp. 237–270). 
5.3.4 Preobrazhensky’s capitulation 
 
After Stalin imposed forced collectivization on Soviet agriculture many of 
the Trotskyist critics of Stalin capitulated to his rule. Some saw Stalin’s 
policies as the implementation of the policies that they had advocated. 
Preobrazhensky was expelled from the Communist Party in 1927. He 
capitulated to Stalin and was readmitted in 1929, then was re-expelled in 
1931, and again readmitted. Finally, he was executed in secret in 1937. 
His last major appearance was at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 
1934. As Alec Nove shows, Preobrazhensky used the opportunity to 
make what was almost certainly a veiled attack on Stalin’s policies. He 
condemned his own previous proposals saying: ‘I thought that by 
exploiting the peasants, by concentrating the resources of the peasant 
economy in the hands of the state, it would be possible to build industry 
and develop industrialization.’ (Cited by Alec Nove in Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. xiv–xv)   
 
Preobrazhnesky explained that Marx and Engels had not solved the 
question of the village economy under socialism, and Engels maintained 
that collectivist agriculture would emerge only gradually. However, thanks 
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to Stalin’s “remarkable far-sightedness,” the problem was finally resolved 
- by force! However, Preobrazhensky’s speech was crafted in such 
sycophantic language that it disarmed Stalin’s supporters, but the 
underlying message was clear. Stalin’s collectivization had carried 
through a form of primitive socialist accumulation in a single blow, to 
force industrialization. Stalin’s unique “contribution” was the violent way it 
was carried out (Alec Nove in Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. xv).   
5.3.5. The victory of planning 
 
The eventual ascendance of planning was not simply the result of an 
ideological clash or a battle between social classes. Planning emerged 
from within the commanding centres of administrative power. Initially, 
forces in favour of planning were segregated, spontaneously emerging 
from below. By the mid 1920s diverse agencies expanded the nature and 
depth of their activities. Planning impulses arose from within institutions 
governing finance, industry and government at various levels of 
hierarchal and geographical authority. They automatically groped 
towards planning, and their decision-making powers expanded, as 
infrastructure, enterprises and institutions at the centres of power grew in 
scope and influence (Carr, 1958, pp. 490–518)(Carr and Davies, 1969, 
pp. 787–897). For example the expansion plans of the vehicle industry, 
particularly tractor production, escalated in scale and significance in the 
late 1920s. Eventually, the centrality of these sectors to state objectives 
resulted in discussions and decisions about daily operational and 
organizational details of factory and industrial policy being taken in 
meetings of the leading bodies of the party and state. 
 
The victory of planning over markets was, in one sense, a vindication of 
Preobrazhensky’s theoretical contention that a clash of fundamentally 
counterposed forces characterized the NEP. However, the use of 
extreme violence and the rapidity of execution was a clear and 
unequivocal deviation from his approach. This produced the 
expropriation of the means of production of practically all non-state 
economic entities in a single blow, which meant that the exploitation of 
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the private economy was closed off prematurely, before its potential was 
exhausted, and before collective forms were able to outstrip them in 
productivity.  
5.4. Preobrazhensky’s definitions of political economy 
 
I now turn to the task of describing Preobrazhensky theoretical approach 
in depth. In this section I present his definitions and categories.  
 
Political economy is the science of the laws of development, equilibrium 
and decay of the commodity, and commodity-capitalist mode of 
production. Its fundamental categories are commodities, the law of value, 
wages, surplus value, profit, price and rent.  
 
The commodity expresses the type of general production relations 
where markets bind together independent commodity producers.  
 
Economic laws produce ‘a constancy of results following from the 
reproduction of a certain type of production relations.’ (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, p. 57) Political economy studies these relations between people 
in the process of capitalist production and ‘the types of regularity inherent 
only in this form, the types which reveal themselves on the basis of the 
operation of the law of value.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 48–49) 
 
The law of value is the ‘law of spontaneous equilibrium of commodity 
capitalist society. In a society without commanding centres of planned 
regulation, thanks to the operation of this law, directly or indirectly, 
everything is achieved which is needed for the comparatively normal 
functioning of a whole productive system of the commodity-capitalist 
type: the distribution of productive forces - that is, people and means of 
production – among the different branches of the economy; the 
distribution of the product of society’s annual production between 
workers and capitalists; the distribution of surplus value for expanded 
reproduction between different branches or countries, and its distribution 
among other exploiting classes; technical progress; the victory of 
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advanced forms over backward ones and the subordination of the latter 
to the former’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 147–148). 
 
The operation of the law of value means that ‘aims, plans, aspirations, 
and expectations of the agents of production’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 
49) cannot foretell the actual results. The absence of a planned 
distribution of the productive forces means that the law of value 
manifests itself blindly as if it were a law of nature.    
 
‘Wages and surplus value are the essence of the relations of production 
and distribution between workers and capitalists. The category of profit, 
as another form of surplus value, is a relation of distribution between 
capitalists, which passes thanks to the mechanism of the equalization of 
the rate of profit and the entire mechanisms of capitalist society into a 
relation of distribution of labour and means of production.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 148–149) 
 
Prices express labour productivity and distribution and act to redistribute 
productive resources between economic branches, shaping the flow of 
values within society. Rent is a redistributive relation between tenants 
and owners that transfers part of the surplus value to the latter.  
 
Capitalism is an unorganized spontaneously equilibrating system in 
which human relations are materialized. Its laws appear as accidental 
events and can only be grasped by critical and abstract analysis of 
fundamental and pure systemic features, which reveal its specific 
regularities. Marx developed his theory of abstract capitalism, within 
which real capitalism ‘lives and moves’ to provide the means to 
understand its laws of motion (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 43–48). 
 
Preobrazhensky describes Marx’s model of capitalism as “theoretically 
photographed” in ‘pure form in its native spontaneity’ (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, p. 150). But this pure form never existed in reality; the influence of 
large enterprises and banks and the rise of monopoly capitalism 
amended the law of value by restricting spontaneous competition. 
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Monopolies could push prices above their value or drive out competition 
by dumping. Their collective power altered economic dynamics and the 
laws of political economy. A number of capitalist countries introduced 
state planning, including price controls, the regulation of surplus value, 
and the redistribution of productive resources.  
 
Preobrazhensky believed that this indicated an objective tendency for 
socialized production to replace capitalism, and laid the basis for socialist 
production provided the working class came to power. He cited German 
“state capitalism” in the First World War as an example where commodity 
production was planned in key sectors, free competition was curtailed, 
‘and the working of the law of value in many respects was almost 
completely replaced by the planning principle of state capitalism.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 153) 
5.5. Capitalism, socialism and accumulation 
 
Preobrazhensky distinguished between methods by which capitalism 
surpassed feudalism and those a socialist economy could use to develop 
socialist capital. Capitalism accumulated and established a commodity 
economy within feudalism before bourgeois revolutions took place. 
Capitalist manufacture displayed superiority over craft production based 
on a few advanced enterprises. Its economic conquest occurred 
spontaneously and the export of capital stimulated capitalist economic 
development in petty-bourgeois economies. Capitalism also accumulated 
by means of primitive accumulation, the unequal exchange of goods, and 
the seizure of resources from pre-capitalist economic formations and 
nations, e.g., through the slave trade, exchanging cheap manufactured 
goods for gold, seizing common lands, etc. In contrast, socialist 
production can only begin after the seizure of power, and it can only 
conquer other countries by means of revolution (Preobrazhensky, 1965, 
pp. 79–80).  
 
‘The nationalization of large-scale industry is also the first act of socialist 
accumulation, that is, the act which concentrates in the hands of the state 
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the minimum resources needed for the organization of socialist 
leadership of industry.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 80–81) 
 
For Preobrazhensky socialist accumulation refers to surplus product 
produced for the self-expansion of the means of production of the 
socialist economy. This requires highly developed technique, 
organization and productivity of labour, corresponding with high capital 
intensity. To facilitate scientific planning and provide the basis for a 
unified advance of the whole interdependent state complex, socialism 
requires an accumulation of capital, equal, at least, to that of advanced 
capitalism. It requires adequate stocks and reserves to respond to 
circumstances like poor harvests, changes in market conditions, 
seasonal variations in demand etc.  
5.5.1 The law of Primitive Socialist Accumulation 
 
Preobrazhensky saw PSA as distinct from capitalist and socialist 
accumulation. PSA refers to the state economy accumulating resources 
from the non-state economy. He saw this as the basic and central law 
governing the motion and processes in the Soviet economy in the 1920s. 
It determined the distribution of the means of production and labour 
power, and the quantity of surplus product made available for the 
expansion of socialist production through its conflict with the law of value 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 84–85).  
 
Where planning operates, regularity of causation is consciously 
organized and shaped by state actions. It fights for its existence and 
consolidation and takes the form of expanded socialist reproduction. This 
entails increasing the proportion of the economy in state hands, 
integrating more of the workforce around these means of production, 
raising the productivity of labour, and struggling to expand reproduction 
of the system by maximizing PSA. 
 
This process is seen as ‘the whole aggregate of tendencies, both 
conscious and semi-conscious’ and is also ‘the economic necessity, the 
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compelling law of existence and development of the whole system, the 
constant pressure of which on the consciousness of the producers’ 
collective of the State economy leads them again and again to repeat 
actions directed towards the attainment of optimum accumulation in a 
given situation.’  (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 58) 
 
Defining the optimum rate is a complex task; inadequate foresight and 
excessive acceleration can produce negative consequences e.g., a 
goods famine and private sector accumulation. The study of economic 
regularity in the struggle between planning and commodity economy 
pleads for a method of generalization.  
5.5.2. Economic equilibrium in the USSR 
 
When Preobrazhensky wrote The New Economics in the mid-1920s. It 
was to be part of a larger work designed to facilitate the concrete study of 
the Soviet economic system: a theoretical framework that could be filled 
with the real data. The premise for Preobrazhensky’s model of primitive 
socialist economic reproduction was non-equivalent exchange - this 
assumes that different systems of ownership compete to regulate the 
economy during the transition to socialism - the law of value and the law 
of PSA.  
 
Marx’s model of pure capitalism studied reproduction of the means of 
production (department I) and means of consumption (department II). 
Preobrazhensky’s model of reproduction under PSA includes petty 
production and capitalist production as sources of accumulation, and as 
a means to acquire sufficient elasticity to maintain equilibrium 
(Preobrazhensky, 1980, p. 36). 
The following charts (figures 7, 8 & 9) present Preobrazhensky’s model 
of expanded reproduction for the three sectors of the Soviet economy 
(Preobrazhensky, 1980, pp. 182-183).  
Where the chart refers to C V and S (in upper case) 
C =constant capital  
V = Variable Capital 
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S= Surplus Value or Surplus Product 
MP1 = production of means of production 
MP2 = production of means of consumption  
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Figure 7. Chart of reproduction of the state sector in Preobrazhensky’s schema 
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The three charts (figures 7, 8 and 9) above represent Preobrazhensky’s 
sketch of economic reproduction in the Soviet system during the New 
Economic Policy. The charts divide the Soviet economy into three types 
of ownership: the state economy, the capitalist economy and the 
individual economy. Each of these is divided into two sectors: the 
production of the means of production and production of the means of 
consumption. This illustrates the spheres from which the state economy 
could accumulate resources during the era of primitive socialist 
accumulation. 
5.5.3. Contradictions of development and equilibrium 
 
Preobrazhensky identified the following contradictory foundations of 
development and equilibrium in the Soviet economy. Although some of 
these issues relate to specific problems of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, 
others relate to more general problems that would confront any 
developing socialist economy.  
 
• Accumulation by the state is based on non-equivalent exchange and 
seeks to advance the productivity of labour and raise wages 
• A rapid integration into the world market occurs in an external 
environment dominated by capitalism   
• Accumulation from expanding industrial raw materials production takes 
place at the expense of peasant producers 
• Accumulation from exports of consumption goods produced by the 
peasants, occurs while industrial prices only fall slowly 
• Stimulation of peasant production for the market occurs whilst protecting 
weaker sectors of the peasantry  
• Production rationalization and price reduction takes place whilst seeking 
to control unemployment.  
 
In the late 1920s, Preobrazhensky feared that the scale, severity and 
acuteness of these contradictions reinforced the need for international 
assistance i.e. if a revolution occurred in an advanced capitalist country 
	 195	
like Germany, it was assumed that a socialist Germany would provide 
material and technical assistance to help the Soviet economy 
(Preobrazhensky, 1980, p. 230). This issue lay at the heart of the conflict 
between the opposing factions of the party led by Leon Trotsky and 
Stalin. Trotsky argued for the need for revolutions in other countries to 
stop the degeneration of the revolution and prevent a counter-revolution, 
Stalin argued that socialism could be built on an indigenous basis and, 
therefore, international policy should aim to neutralize potential enemies.   
 
During the NEP, the capitalist sector was generally non-industrial and 
non-productive - exploiting opportunities provided by non-equivalent 
exchange. Private traders opportunistically exploited shortages or poor 
distribution. The main sphere of competition with state industry was light 
industry, where low capital costs and extreme exploitation predominated 
in the private sector. Wealthy peasants known as kulaks represented 
agrarian capitalism. The kulaks were hostile to the social system, which 
they blamed for restrictions on opportunities for enrichment. They 
engaged in strategies to accumulate at the expense of others. Their 
limited opportunities drove them to seek access to free markets by 
means of political opposition to the state.  
 
‘Here, the problem of economic equilibrium rests squarely on the problem 
of social equilibrium, that is, the relation of class forces for and against 
the Soviet system. Two systems of equilibrium are struggling for 
supremacy: on the one hand, equilibrium on a capitalist basis- which 
means participation in the world economy regulated by the law of value- 
by abolishing the Soviet system and suppressing the proletariat, and on 
the other hand, equilibrium on the basis of temporary non-equivalent 
exchange serving as the source of socialist reconstruction and inevitably 
signifying the suppression of capitalist tendencies of development, 
particularly in agriculture.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1980, p. 179)  
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5.6. Studying a transitional state 
 
This section provides an overview of the way that Preobrazhensky 
applied his theory of PSA to study the Soviet Union during the NEP. I 
focus on those concepts and policy proposals which are similar to core 
concepts and policies that have been pursued in China during the reform 
era.  
 
Preobrazhensky’s study of the dynamics of the New Economic Policy 
was concerned with the process of decay and disappearance of capitalist 
production relations. He attempted to identify which elements of Marx’s 
political economy were verified by experience and which needed to be 
amended. Studying the NEP, which was a system driven simultaneously 
by contradictory laws, was complicated by the impurity of both forms. As 
planning under PSA operates in conflict with the law of value, the 
interplay of these contradictions had to be unravelled.  
 
The state guided the economy, the government, and international policy, 
in opposition to the domestic private sector, and world capitalism. The 
relation of forces shapes the character and dynamics of the law of PSA. 
Studying the law means identifying its pure form and explaining its limits 
within this mixed environment.  
 
State policy during the NEP was composed of responses to difficulties as 
well as anticipatory actions. This added complexity to studying the 
system, as many freely chosen policies resulted from resistance by the 
private economy. 
 
‘The conscious decisions of the regulatory organs of the State are 
dictated equally by the optimum of primitive socialist accumulation and by 
the need to curtail this optimum as a result of resistance of private 
economy and the classes which represent it. To separate the optimum in 
its pure form from the actual policy, which is forced to retreat from this 
optimum, is a very difficult task. To fulfil this task we need a concrete 
analysis of the entire economic and political situation at each moment of 
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time, or at least in a definite period of economic development.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 62–63) 
 
For Preobrazhensky, the theoretical method used to study the Soviet 
system during the NEP had to be transitional between political economy 
and social technology. In other words the regularities of a mixed 
“commodity-socialist economy” were the object of study i.e., how 
collective production is shaped when linked to the private sector; and 
how the private sector behaves, in itself, and in relation to the state 
economy, when it is restrained and channelled by planning. As the 
commanding heights of the economy were in state hands, this created 
new processes in the state and private sector. Preobrazhensky saw his 
task as distinguishing, in pure form, the tendencies of the two conflicting 
principles and their methods of utilizing materials and labour 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 63). 
 
Preobrazhensky defined PSA as the conscious and semi-spontaneous 
tendencies towards the collectivist organization of labour driven by 
necessity. The organization of the productive forces, defensive power, 
and the determination of material proportions to optimize expanded 
socialist reproduction are shaped in conflict with the law of value, and by 
pressures from the non-socialist economy.  
 
This means that wage levels, price policy, trade policies and rules, tariffs, 
credits, import planning, government budgets etc., and the quantity of 
surplus extracted from the private sector, are all subordinate to the law of 
PSA (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 146). 
 
The law of PSA extends into the private sphere as an alien force, but the 
law of value also penetrates into the state economy (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 137–138).  This produces ‘the coexistence of two systems of 
economy which are different and by their very natures antagonistic, with 
different regulatory mechanisms, this economy, must inevitably be the 
arena not only of struggle but also of a certain equilibrium, and so, in 
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practice, of a certain coexistence of two different economic laws.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 138) 
 
This equilibrium is has two main features: 
 
1. The non-equivalent exchange of PSA, conflicts with the law of value until 
capitalist technique is surpassed. And the collective economy is in 
constant and unstable struggle against national and international 
capitalism and the world law of value. 
2. Planning must proportionately balance expanded reproduction to prevent 
the law of value from breaking into and disrupting the process.  
 
The import of means of production can alleviate internal disproportions 
and industrial backwardness. Such imports can be paid for by exports, 
purchased by the state from the peasantry. Close links to the world 
economy based on specific national characteristics, can help equip the 
means of production and finance raw material supplies. Planned imports 
of means of production become ‘an automatic regulator of the entire 
process of expanded reproduction’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 197–
203). 
 
PSA and the law of value produce a unity in their outcomes, but their 
clash of forces reflects an underlying and fundamental antagonism 
between social systems and classes fighting for supremacy and for 
methods of regulation that correspond to their pure form.  
 
Preobrazhensky thought that if the law of value became the sole 
regulator, the state economy would disintegrate. This would entail 
reorganizing the economy to facilitate the spontaneous reproduction of 
commodity-capitalist relations. In this scenario he predicted the abolition 
of the foreign trade monopoly, a reduction in the rate of industrialization, 
the closure of unprofitable enterprises, and the redistribution of 
productive forces between light and heavy industry, and town and 
country (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 64). 
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If the state sector strengthens – in defiance of the law of value – this 
indicates that another law, suppresses, modifies and amends the law of 
value. Knowledge of the existence of two conflicting laws facilitates the 
study and assessment of their relative weight, and an understanding of 
the characteristics of this constellation (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 138–
139). 
 
If the state sector pursued an optimal development scenario supported 
by international socialist change, then, planning would dominate, guide, 
and organize the economy. The proportions of the economy invested in 
the means of production, its distribution, and the use of labour, would 
differ substantially, both from reality, and to the capitalist alternative. 
Thus, the battle for the existence and development of the socialist sector 
reflects the impulse of its regulator to reproduce itself on an expanded 
scale and to shape the world in its image (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 
64–65). 
 
Expanded reproduction of the state economy means increased 
production overall. This enhances the relative weight of the state sector 
and rearranges economic forces guided by the needs of proportionality. 
PSA encompasses these processes, and ensures the transfer of 
resources from the private economy to the public. It determines the 
anticipated redistribution of resources of the future, based on the level of 
organization of the state economy. It organizes investment in capital and 
construction in anticipation of future proportions, and attempts to plan 
under the pressure of necessity, dictated to it as an external law. Its 
unique strength lies in its ability to gather and combine the productive 
forces of the state to implement plans corresponding to forecasts. This 
limits and excludes the law of value, which continues to dominate the 
unorganized economy. PSA dictates a proportional distribution of 
resources within the state sector, requiring preparatory accumulation. 
However, policy failures may generate crises that strengthen the 




Under capitalism the driving force of production is profit and its regulator 
is the law of value. Consumer needs are met by this mechanism and 
workers buy consumer goods out of their wages. The state economy 
must meet the social demands of its era, reflected in consumer demand 
on the one side, and an expanding rate of accumulation, requiring the 
restriction of consumption, on the other;  ‘expanded reproduction in the 
socialist sector means automatic, quantitatively-increasing reproduction 
of socialist production-relations, together with the corresponding 
proportions every year in the distribution of productive forces.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 72–73)  
 
The conversion of the state economy into a single trust composed of 
giant interlinked corporations, and improvements in technique and 
productivity, change the form of value and its relation to labour-
expenditure. These factors help to elevate the technical level of state 
industry (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 74).  
 
Preobrazhensky argued that as the law of value is systemically linked to 
private ownership of the means of production, therefore, unless public 
ownership of the commanding heights was merely a formal appearance, 
it was planned regulation that established proportionality in the Soviet 
economy, with the law of value making corrections to it. So, non-capitalist 
regulation produces its own objective economic needs and proportionality 
in a struggle against the law of value and its method of regulation on the 
basis of labour expenditure. So PSA ‘will always be the resultant of a 
struggle – though the direction in which the law of value and the law of 
socialist accumulation act may sometimes coincide in particular cases in 
real life.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 75)  
 
Preobrazhensky tried to establish how the new economic system would 
oust, subordinate, and eventually eliminate old economic forms, which 
imposed their laws of resistance. A study of this process was 
complicated by the weakness of the new form of economy. The socio-
economic influence of petty production and the peasantry also meant that 
an economic struggle would ensue between capitalist and socialist 
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accumulation from this large intermediate ‘nutrient base’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 77–78). 
 
As large-scale industry was nationalized, the law of value was 
undermined by state monopoly. However, petty peasant production 
exerted huge counter-pressure to develop on the basis of the law of 
value. 
  
These conflicts between market spontaneity and the state economy, 
‘explain the predominant type of all the upheavals and depressions which 
we have suffered, are suffering and will go on suffering in our economy; 
together, of course, with those complications that are bound to arise from 
the connection between our economy and the world market.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 162) 
 
Ties to the world market and the proportions of the economy in state and 
private hands determined the rate of accumulation. For Preobrazhensky 
over-accumulation of fixed capital was impossible during the NEP, as 
decades of development lay ahead, and private sector domestic demand 
would also rise (Preobrazhensky, 1980, p. 196). 
5.7. Methods of PSA in the NEP  
 
During the NEP Preobrazhensky applied his theory of PSA to concrete 
reality. His policy proposals were designed to rapidly accumulate state 
capital so that socialist economics could establish its dominance and 
reveal its advantages. He suggested a wide range of measures to secure 
PSA: taxes on profits; policies on banking, credit and foreign loans, 
extracting rent, exploiting inter-sectoral trade and the world market; 
controlling foreign trade and prices; and exploiting the power of state 
monopolies.  
 
The capitalist credit system had been progressive relative to the 
unorganized markets of simple commodity production. State lending and 
credit in the NEP helped to structure the peasant economy. And the 
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credit system reflected the relation of forces between sectors of the 
economy. However, within the state sector, money acted as a means of 
accounting and calculation, rather than a key instrument for achieving 
spontaneous equilibrium in production. The system of planning, 
accounting and control, stemmed organically from socialization of the 
commanding heights of the economy and generated different results than 
capitalist banking (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 209–217). It was 
Preobrazhensky’s view that the viability of state banks should be judged 
by the total societal benefit of their credit and lending policies. Indeed, he 
explores the idea that judicious loans to the private sector could become 
a tool to channel, influence and structure investments to meet state 
objectives (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 96–98).  
 
Foreign loans, for Preobrazhensky, 'constitute a synthesis of capitalist 
and socialist accumulation'. They could accelerate socialist accumulation 
and technology transfer and create employment. Such loans should be 
evaluated by advantages to the system as a whole (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 134–135). However, if basic branches of the state economy 
needed to grant concessions to secure investment, foreign capital would 
penetrate and weaken the system. So too, if the working conditions in 
such capitalist enterprises were superior to those in state enterprises. 
Nevertheless, he wrote: ‘When the socialist form is consolidated 
economically and technically, concessions will no longer be a danger to 
us.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 136) 
 
As land was nationalized, rent played a fundamentally different role to 
that under capitalism. Rent paid by state enterprises simply redistributed 
resources. The state appropriated rent from foreign concessions, mixed 
concessions, private farms, and wealthy ‘kulak’ peasants, who exploited 
wage-labour on public lands. These rents constituted a transfer to the 
socialist accumulation fund. Rent-tax on non-exploiting peasants and on 
the personal labour of kulaks, alienated surplus product from non-
capitalist agriculture, but excluded the poorest peasants 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 202–208).  
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Preobrazhensky proposed that trade policies between economic sectors 
be organized on the basis of the expedient requirements of PSA, such as 
reducing costs, edging out intermediaries and taxing private profits. He 
hoped that private capital could be coaxed into investing in sectors that 
benefit society (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 99–103). Thus, if private 
capital were ousted from trading state products this  ‘would undoubtedly 
intensify the process of transition of private capital into private industry, a 
process, generally speaking, which is economically advantageous and 
harmless provided there is a rapid growth in the state economy.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 103) 
  
Preobrazhensky saw the state monopoly of foreign trade, or “socialist 
protectionism” as a cornerstone of primitive socialist accumulation. It 
protected against the world law of value and helped to regulate the whole 
economy. As exports of agricultural commodities grew and trade 
increased, the foreign trade monopoly secured PSA from the surplus 
profits of these exports. Indeed, even loss-making foreign sales by the 
state could fund equipment purchases of benefit to the whole economy 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 104–108). The world law of value influences 
the distribution of labour, e.g., where costs and benefits determine if 
resources should be reallocated. State planning should exploit 
opportunities provided by the world division of labour (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 164–166).  
 
If the state made losses in its exchange with the private sector this would 
undermine large-scale state production and result in the sale of fixed 
capital and/or proletarian labour power at bargain prices. If neither 
system of ownership exploits the other, this would indicate that there is 
no fundamental clash of economic interests; and thus equilibrium can be 
maintained indefinitely.  
 
However, Preobrazhensky regarded capitalism as a system that always 
seeks to erode the socialist form, which, in turn, expands at the expense 
of the private economy. He advocated that the price policy of monopoly 
state entities should exploit the private economy but warned that where 
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private competitors participated in the same markets, state price policies 
could end up assisting private accumulation. And, as state price policies 
can adversely affect peasants and workers, he proposed measures to 
help counteract this, e.g. by means of credit and wages policy 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 108–112).  
 
Accumulation based on expanded reproduction of the state economy 
exploits the working class, i.e. it pays less than the value they produce. In 
War Communism production to meet emergency needs cost more than it 
produced, but losses had to be weighed against the alternative of zero 
production (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 116–117).  Preobrazhensky 
wrote: ‘socialist production has to pass through a fairly long period of 
accumulation of material resources, during which the individual 
enterprise of the state economy will inevitably be not superior but inferior 
to, economically not stronger but weaker than, a contemporary capitalist 
enterprise in an advanced capitalist country.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 
120) 
 
Under PSA, reconstruction required rapid accumulation, technical 
development, and the rational geographical distribution of industry. The 
more developed the initial economic base, the more surplus product the 
workers provide - so resources from pre-socialist production would be 
less important (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 120–121). 
 
The struggle of the state against private economy focuses on the 
accumulation of material resources and the redistribution of labour 
power. The victory of capitalism over petty bourgeois and natural 
economy is the product of competition, technique and efficiency. The 
competitive superiority of socialist production does not pertain in relation 
to world capitalism. Free competition would disintegrate and destroy a 
socialist economy unless it had almost universal superiority in productive 
technique and efficiency, as the products of state industry will be more 
expensive and of inferior quality to that of advanced foreign capitalist 
enterprises (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 124–127).  
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‘Inside the country private industry is weaker only because it is not 
allowed equal conditions for struggle. The state has held from the start 
the largest and technically most advanced enterprises. Furthermore, and 
this is most important, private industry is in every other respect placed in 
a less advantageous position than state industry.’ (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, p. 128) 
 
Although state enterprises may resemble private enterprises, the unified 
totality of state power produces its own necessities and demands. Its 
methods of gathering forces, and of finding and exploiting advantages, 
derive from the cooperative potential of “great economic masses”. 
Preobrazhensky forecast that the field of free competition with private 
enterprise would gradually contract, although competition could and 
should be used to help discipline and rationalize state enterprises. 
Ultimately, socialism would conquer by suppressing competition with pre-
socialist economic forms and by unifying state power with the state 
economy (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 129–132). 
5.7.1. State relations to petty production and cooperation 
 
Preobrazhensky wrote: ‘Capitalism by creating a single organism based 
on exchange provides the basis for a transfer to direct relations between 
state and petty production.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 131–132) 
 
Capitalism conquered society with people disciplined in its forms of 
stimuli, but socialist habits and culture had to be created within the new 
system. In 1923 Lenin wrote that cooperation under the economic and 
political dominance of the working class could realize many of the 
dreams of utopian cooperative advocates of the past. He simultaneously 
spoke of the need for a prolonged revolution in the cultural and 
educational level of the peasants, and for the remodelling of society to 
peacefully transform peasant production into cooperative forms. He saw 
this as dependent on material development and education, predicting it 
would take a minimum of one or two decades, or “an entire historical 
epoch”, to attain the cultural preconditions for this.12 
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Preobrazhensky believed that cooperatives linked to large-scale state 
production could influence the character of petty production and 
exchange, but private agriculture tends to expand faster than state or 
collective forms. ‘If the development of socialist relations in our economy, 
which have their basis in industry, were to stop or to be very much 
slowed down, and capitalist relations began to grow faster, then 
regardless of their social structure, the cooperatives would either break 
up at once, or else the majority of them would desert their positions as 
rear-guard of the state economy, in order to go over to the side of 
capitalism.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 220) 
 
‘The balance can be changed not by some socialist miracles on the 
territory of petty peasant production, taken by itself, but only by a more 
profound influence of large-scale urban industry on peasant farming.’ 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. p.222) Technology and industrial products 
from the state could be used to encourage socialization of agricultural 
production, but the tempo of industrial development at the socialist core 
of the economy would be decisive in determining the outcome.  
 
During the NEP, commodity production - making goods for exchange on 
the market - dominated private, state-private, and to a considerable 
extent, state-state relations. This could be positive, if increasing urban-
rural commodity exchange assisted rapid state industrialization and 
improved organizational capabilities. Monopoly capitalism gained 
dominance over capitalism based on commodity production, and this laid 
the foundation for socialism, which would increase the degree of 
monopolization, undermine “free competition” and create,’state monopoly 
in all large-scale and medium industry, transport, the credit system, and 
wholesale (and in part retail) trade, a state monopoly which surrounds 
itself with a powerful cooperative network.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 
141) 
 
However, where the law of value is partially effective, and the law of 
planning fails to create its own proportional relations of development, a 
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crisis may undermine state planning and enrich private capital. During 
harvest failures, imports can ameliorate shortages. However, declining 
prices would signal the need to purchase grain and expand exports. The 
exchange of consumer goods amongst peasants and artisans was the 
least regulated sphere of the economy. Peasants purchased most of the 
grain, food, and seed produced, but poor peasants often paid for this by 
working for wealthier peasants. So the law of value reigned supreme in 
market exchanges between peasants (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 180–
182).  
5.7.2. Surplus value and surplus product 
 
Preobrazhensky believed that surplus product takes the form of surplus 
value when the product created by the labour of exploited classes 
becomes a commodity. The product is only made in order to extract 
surplus value from the producer. The existence of free labour constitutes 
the final prerequisite for a transition to capitalist production 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 186). The realm of surplus value expanded as 
commodity production became capitalist production. However, in the 
USSR, Preobrazhensky observed the opposite process, a decline of 
surplus value, as socialist forms grew. The commodity was being 
transformed into the product, starting in state production of the means of 
production. Capital intensification extends the influence of production of 
the means of production, improving the quality and reducing the price of 
consumer goods.  
 
Preobrazhensky concluded that ‘the development of the productive 
forces must inevitably mean an increase in the relative weight of the 
production of the means of production, and this increase quite 
automatically intensifies the tendency for commodity production to 
disappear in the state economy and in this way undermines the category 
of surplus value.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 187) 
 
State industry produced monopolistically for the market and the state. In 
the latter, market relations were more apparent than real, as competition 
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was undermined or even abolished. With advances in rural productive 
forces, Preobrazhensky envisaged increasing peasant production for the 
market. But as state productive forces increase, and state planning and 
organization improve, so state commodity-production would decline, 
corresponding to a decline in the category of surplus value 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 187).  
5.7.3. Profit in the state economy 
Preobrazhensky emphasized the role that the equalization of the rate of 
profit plays in distributing productive forces under capitalism. Capitalist 
firms face a number of unknown factors in relation to orders, sales, 
prices, markets, and profits. Equilibrium is established by changes in the 
rate of profit that attract or repel investment. The proportions invested in 
constant and variable capital differ in various entities and sectors. 
Enterprises with a variable organic composition of capital are all subject 
to equalization in the rate of profit.  
 
Soviet state enterprises planned production in relation to planned 
demand, with greater fluctuations occurring where connections extended 
to non-state sectors. Input prices were either known - as state entities 
supplied them as part of a plan - or influenced, and contained. Wages 
were collectively agreed and could be planned for. Planned decision-
making in the state economy altered the nature of profit, and thus the 
influence of the rate of profit.  
 
Production based on standardized calculations undermines the 
regulatory role of prices and profits in the distribution of the productive 
forces, which are governed by general planning instead. The rate of 
socialist accumulation is regulated by planned inputs and sales. Profit 
ceases to be the source of accumulation or regulation (based on the law 
of value), determining the distribution of the productive forces 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 196–199).  
 
Under capitalism surplus destined for new investment flows into shares, 
which act as a spontaneous means of creating and distributing capital. 
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Although the Soviet economy also issued shares for joint-stock 
companies, the content differed from the capitalist form. State enterprises 
or institutions bought shares in each other. The state banking system 
was the primary means of distributing capital alongside the state budget 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 199–200). 
 
 The basic mechanism for distributing new capital was the state banking 
system and the state budget.  ‘This distribution cannot be otherwise than 
planned, because it is completely absurd to suppose that the process of 
expanded reproduction of state industry and transport, all new 
construction, etc., can proceed in a planned way in the sphere of 
fulfilment of production programmes and yet can be unplanned, relying 
on some process of self-activity and spontaneity within the state 
economy, when it is a question of collecting resources for expanding 
reproduction.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 200) However, Preobrazhensky 
noted the underdeveloped state of organizational forms designed to raise 
resources for expanded reproduction. These are forms that he says are 
inherent to the state economy and should correspond to a specific stage 
of primitive socialist accumulation.  
 
PSA in the NEP also developed spontaneously, in the sense that annual 
accumulation was not determined in advance using conscious and 
planned prices. Prices were developed by adding together the costs, 
rather than by working out the accumulation required and sharing this 
burden between various spheres of production.  
 
Under capitalism competition regulates the economy. The equalization of 
profit shapes the distribution of labour despite differences in the organic 
composition of capital and the quantity of surplus value that the invested 
capital produces. The law of prices of production facilitates reproduction 
under capitalism. Capitalist accumulation funds combine the total surplus 
acquired by capital from labour. This is distributed amongst capitalist 
enterprises according to the law of profit equalization.  
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Profits of Soviet enterprises weren’t divided into capitalist consumption 
and accumulation funds - there were only accumulation funds. However, 
a proportion was transferred to central state finances. The funds needed 
were worked out in advance as part of a production plan, and budgets 
and prices were adjusted to try to meet these plans. The accumulation 
fund was derived from price policy, and encompassed the entire state 
economy. Its component parts provided these funds from profits, which 
were more unequally distributed than under capitalism. Price policy and 
profits were designed to secure state accumulation (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 200–202). 
5.7.4. Labour-power as a commodity 
 
Preobrazhensky described a transitional condition where: 
 
• The private economy employed more people than the state13 
• The reproduction of labour power also reproduced the commodity 
economy 
• Consumer purchases came mostly from the private economy  
• The state economy regulated the total labour fund by means of PSA, but 
gradations in wage scales were regulated by supply and demand.  
• The wages fund related to the demands of planned accumulation not to 
fluctuations in the labour market; thus wages rose simultaneously with a 
labour surplus. There was a divorce between the wages fund and the law 
of value. 
 
Preobrazhensky explained that capitalist forms, particularly in small and 
medium sized enterprises, exploited the workers, the staff, and the 
owners. The hours and intensity of their work defied socialist legislation. 
In trade, self-exploitation by owners played a significant role. So it was 
hard to envisage how socialist means could compete on unit costs of 
circulation. In this respect, protection of labour was a disadvantage vis-à-
vis capitalist trading (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 133).  
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Primitive capitalist accumulation ruthlessly exploits labour, but is later 
constrained by the relation of forces. However, socialism restricts the 
exploitation of labour. The state economy produces for the consumption 
of the producers through the market exchange of commodities. The 
regulation of wages during PSA is not governed by supply and demand 
fluctuating around value, or by labour struggle, which is replaced by 
workers’ self-restraint.  Enthusiasm may temporarily boost production, 
but labour laws, regulations, social security and protection are more 
advanced than in comparative capitalist countries (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 122–123).  
 
Under the NEP the distribution of the wages fund remained bourgeois 
and was adapted to legacy forms and bourgeois incentives. Piecework 
was commonplace, but technical development began to restrict its 
operation. It was envisaged that individual and collective wages would 
merge and include provision by social institutions, crèches, clubs etc. 
Preobrazhensky used the term surplus product to characterize the fund 
acquired by state industry after satisfying workers’ consumer needs. This 
refers to the state economy, where new production relations were 
‘coming into being’. The reality combined elements of surplus value, 
surplus product and collective expanded reproduction (Preobrazhensky, 
1965, pp. 190–195).  
 
PSA integrates the planned and spontaneous processes towards rapid 
expansion of the state sector. The law restricts wages in order to 
accumulate state investment funds. Therefore it slows down the tempo at 
which wages are changed into consumer rations.  ‘The tendency to 
overcome the category of wages, that is, the tendency to intensify the 
socialist quality of production-relations, comes into contradiction with the 
tendency to quantitative extension of the territory of the state economy 
and its production-relations in their present form, that is, production-
relations at an extremely low stage of development in their socialist 
character.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 195–196) 
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For Preobrazhensky the development of socialist forces of production 
was simultaneously understood as the formation and expansion of the 
working class in itself and for itself, i.e. of its creation as a productive 
class, and of its consciousness and its capacity to assume command and 
control over the work process, and the state - roles that the Soviet 
bureaucracy had already usurped. Preobrazhensky saw the role of the 
party as that of the ‘guardian of the proletariat’s interests until the latter 
had acquired the numerical strength and the political sophistication to 
manage its own affairs.’ (Filtzer, 1976, p. 36)  
Preobrazhensky took the view that democratic control by the workers, 
rather than bureaucratic administration was an essential component of 
socialist development. As with Trotsky and the Left Opposition, he 
believed these contradictions, imposed by backwardness, could be 
ameliorated or resolved only with the support of revolutionary change in 
the advanced countries.  
As the working class remained a minority class with a low cultural level, it 
was incapable of assuming control over the administration of the 
economy and society. The factories were organised on capitalist 
principles, and non-proletarian specialists undertook the managerial and 
technical roles. This contributed to the formation and reproduction of a 
privileged bureaucratic stratum, which organized the process of 
industrialization (Filtzer, 1976, pp. 42–43). 
And as Filtzer notes: ‘Within the conflict between the law of value and the 
law of primitive accumulation there stood not just the class conflict of the 
proletariat with capitalist social groups, but also the nascent conflict 
between the proletariat and the bureaucracy.’  (Filtzer, 1976, p. 45) 
However, ‘the bureaucracy was unable to appropriate power and control 
other than through property relations that had survived with the revolution 
and on the basis of adopting “Marxism” as its legitimating ideology.’ 
(Filtzer, 1976, p. 46)  
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5.8. Ten propositions from Preobrazhensky that can help to explain 
China’s system 
I believe Preobrazhensky’s theory can also shed light on the way that 
China’s social and property relations have been produced and 
reproduced in the reform era. In this thesis I do not attempt to apply 
Preobrazhensky’s framework in detail to the study of China. However, I 
find that many of the features of China’s system in the reform era bear a 
close resemblance to the analysis and theory that Preobrazhensky 
worked out in the 1920s. The following is a list of ten propositions from 
Preobrazhensky that can help to explain the dynamics of China’s system.   
 
1. During the period of PSA, capitalist and state ownership, and their 
corresponding laws, are both effective. The collective economy operates 
in conflict with the capitalist economy. These contradictory ownership 
forms press to organize the economy in their own image, but there are 
also periods when they push in the same direction.	
2. State dominance of the commanding heights is essential for the survival 
of the system. Planning policy has to secure expanded reproduction, or 
else the law of value will disrupt the process and become dominant.	
3. Combining the strength of giant interlinked enterprises and raising their 
technical level secures state sector dominance. Expanded reproduction 
of the state sector is generated by its own internal impulses and acts to 
structure the overall economy. If the state economy advances, this is 
evidence that the dominant law governing the economy is planning 
based on PSA. Although, state enterprises may superficially resemble 
private companies, the cooperative potential of these great economic 
masses produces its own necessities and demands. Trade policies 
between the state sector, and the capitalist, and individual economy, 
should be contingent on policy objectives, e.g., supporting specific 
industries squeezing out competitors, reducing costs etc. 	
4. The unique strength of the state economy under PSA lies in its ability to 
gather and combine economic resources to implement plans. The state 
sector must act to contain the influence of the law of value. PSA must 
ensure that the public economy develops proportionately and this 
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requires accumulated reserves. Rents paid to the state constitute part of 
the socialist accumulation fund. 	
5. Economic planning should exploit the opportunities that close integration 
with the world economy provides. National comparative advantages 
should be designed to secure raw materials and advance the technical 
level of the means of production. Imports are an essential means to 
achieve technical progress. Competition with the private sector can help 
to discipline state enterprises.	
6. The economic geography of the country can be rationally planned and 
developed by means of PSA. The gigantesque scale of the investment in 
fixed capital required to modernize the economy makes a mockery of 
talk about the over-accumulation of fixed capital. Under socialism 
planned investment undermines the dominant role of profits.	
7. The success of state banks should be assessed by the degree to which 
society benefits. State banks should judiciously lend to private 
enterprises in order to channel their investments and assist state 
objectives. Foreign loans and concessions can be advantageous for 
technical development, provided the state economy is consolidated and 
secure. The organization of foreign trade needs to ensure that export 
revenues are beneficially used. Free global competition would 
undermine the state economy unless it is more efficient than world 
capitalism.	
8. In a country with a large peasantry, competition between capitalist and 
socialist forces, takes place over the surplus produced by this ‘nutrient 
base’. The socialization of agriculture should not be prematurely 
imposed, as its progress depends on state-led industrial development. 	
9. The rate of profit shapes the distribution of the productive forces under 
capitalism. Individual private capitalist enterprises are inevitably more 
‘profitable’ than state enterprises. If the private economy is treated on 
equal terms with the state economy this will undermine and ultimately 
destroy it. If capitalist relations gain the upper hand the state economy 
will begin to disintegrate and will be dramatically restructured in a way 
that undermines state planning. 	
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10. Over time the spheres where the state and private sector operate in 
competition with each other should decline, whilst maintaining and 
expanding the dominance of the public sector.	
5.9. Conclusion 
 
Preobrazhensky regarded Primitive Socialist Accumulation as the totality 
of measures that a socialist state can take to acquire resources from the 
pre-socialist sectors of the economy to help the socialist sectors to reach 
the productivity of labour of advanced capitalism. Capitalist primitive 
accumulation occurred prior to the overthrow of feudalism but PSA would 
be a general law for development of a socialist economy, unless the 
socialist revolution takes power in an advanced capitalist country. 
 
The specific conditions in the Soviet Union during the NEP demanded 
large-scale investment to reequip Soviet Industry at a new technical 
level. For this reason, the main source of the required accumulation 
funds would come from agriculture. Even then it was envisaged that 
differentiation between rich, middle, and poor peasants, would ensure 
that the exploitation of the peasants would be less arduous for most 
peasants than the burdens of pre-revolutionary forms of exploitation. As 
Preobrazhensky explains: ‘If capitalism took, say, 20 roubles from 100 
roubles of peasant income, why cannot the socialist state take say 30 
roubles from an income of 300? All the more since, through the channels 
of long-term credit, equally beneficial for the success of accumulation in 
industry and in agriculture, we shall return part of these resources to the 
peasant economy in the form of capital.’(Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 254–
255)  
 
In the Soviet Industrialization Debate, Preobrazhensky regarded the 
expansion of the relative strength of the workers and the state sector of 
the economy as a decisive main benchmark of success. His theory was 
that the law of value, based on market relations, had to be countered, 
contained, channeled, and subordinated to the socialist objectives of the 
state economy. This was why state planning had to be elevated in 
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importance but also had to be designed on the basis of the optimal 
accumulation. This optimal could be based on short, medium and long-
term objectives.  
 
When planning won the day in the late 1920s this appeared to represent 
a confirmation of the arguments of the opposition. The policies that were 
adopted: the introduction of five-year plans; a concentration on heavy 
industry; and the isolation of the kulaks and wealthy NEP traders, echoed 
the demands of Preobrazhensky and the Left Opposition made in the 
years before 1928.  
 
However, the way these policies were enforced represented the 
expression of the rising power of the bureaucratic apparatus led by 
Stalin. Whereas Preobrazhensky suggested multiple ways to acquire 
resources from the private economy whilst coexisting with it, Stalin’s 
methods, representing bureaucratic solutions, employed crude means 
based on the large-scale use of force.  
 
Preobrazhensky saw the conflicts that emerge in a mixed economy under 
PSA as inevitable expressions of conflict between the state and private 
economy. He believed that such upheavals would continue to break out, 
as they expressed the contradictions between social classes nationally, 
and internationally.  
 
As with the period after the consolidation of Stalin’s rule in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s in the Soviet Union, after 1949, China’s leaders also had 
to design policies that provided the means to modernize and 
industrialize. In China bureaucratic pressures also emerged 
spontaneously as a result of social pressure to develop the economy. 
This background closely corresponds to Kornai’s explantion of the 
pressures that automatically generated the dynamics of forced growth.  
 
However, rather than locate periods of greater market influence in China 
as expressions of trends to abandon state planning and control, I believe 
the greater role for the market and the private economy in the reform era, 
	 217	
created a terrain in which a richer variety of sources could be exploited 
for the purposes of primitive socialist accumulation - albeit in a 
bureaucratic form that automatically generates pressure to adopt forced 
growth. This pattern has held true in periods of centralization and 
decentralization.  
 
Ultimately, one can speak of primitive socialist accumulation as a catch 
all term for the whole epoch. And it can include all measures that acquire 
resources for the state sector from the private sector in a socialist 
economy. However, for Preobrazhensky’s PSA was explicitly not a policy 
of universal bureaucratic expropriation, as the accumulation process is 
closed off by universal nationalization. It is my view that the economic 
structure in China since 1978 bears a closer resemblance to an 
environment in which PSA can bear bountiful fruit than those systems 
that Kornai defines as classical socialism.  
 
Kornai’s theory is that reform socialism is a system that is by definition, 
automatically dysfunctional, incoherent, and doomed. This is clearly 
incorrect, if China’s system does indeed correspond to his model as I 
have argued in chapter 3. The vastly expanded terrain for accumulation 
from the private economy that China’s reforms permitted, simultaneously 
represents a vast extension of the terrain for PSA, even though this is 
realized in a bureaucratic form. In chapter 6 we look at how China’s 
modern working class was formed. 
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China’s ruling Communist Party (CCP) claims to represent the working 
class and the peasants. But China is host to some of the world’s largest 
capitalist factories, and has hundreds of billionaires and hundreds of 
millions of exploited workers. These contradictions lie at the heart of 
China’s political economy.  
 
This chapter studies the role of the working class in China’s political 
economy. It is informed by the Marxist approach to class adopted by the 
prominent US sociologist Erik Olin Wright. It begins with an explanation 
of his concepts of class, the working class, and class conflict. Wright 
identifies two forms of working class power - structural and associational: 
(Wright, 2000b, p. 962) structural power derives from location within the 
economic system; and associational power stems from voluntary 
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combination and action. These two categories frame this review of the 
historical development of China’s working class. 
 
I provide an overview of the genesis of the CCP’s administrative power 
structure and the working class between 1929-1949. This is followed by 
short summary of the processes, which created the working class 
between 1949-1981. This draws on influential studies by the Australian 
Sinologist Andrew Walder (1984, 1986). Comprehensive research on 
China’s social structure, conducted by Lu et al (2012) for the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, provides the material for my survey of the 
formation of the working class since 1979. Then, I consider the 
relationship between the working class and the trade unions, and 
examine a variety of displays of independent associational workers’ 
power in the reform era. I examine the forms and appearances that 
workers’ struggles adopt, and consider the relationship between social 
unrest, and Party and state power in China.  
 
However, prior to this broad overview of the development of the working 
class, I will return to one of Kornai’s key theories, the socialist propensity 
to generate the soft budget constraint, because I believe that the implicit 
role of the working class in this process deserves to be made explicit.  
6.2. The working class and Kornai’s soft budget constraint 
 
The role of the working class in China’s political economy is the subject 
of this chapter. Kornai’s systems theory does not deal with the working 
class as a direct subject. Instead it mostly gauges the influence of the 
working class through its impact on the soft budget constraint. He 
characterizes capitalism as a system of surplus production and surplus 
labour, and socialism as a system a shortage of goods and labour. And, 
whereas capitalism is governed by hard budget constraints, socialism 
produces soft budget constraints. Under the soft budget constraint, 
pressure to maintain peaceful relations in state owned companies and 
wider society, finds expression in paternalistic bureaucratic behaviour 
towards the workers. This is particularly significant where Kornai 
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describes “self-management” trends in which workers discover that they 
can exert pressure on higher-level authorities to dismiss managers. This 
compels managers to try to contain and avert threats to stability by 
‘representing’ the workers vis-à-vis higher authorities. This reinforces and 
reproduces soft budget constraints, as the fear of unrest encourages 
managers to expand investment in state enterprises and projects that are 
designed to contain unemployment and discontent (Kornai, 2007, pp. 
461–470). 
 
Kornai also says that under socialism labour shortage arises from the 
system’s innate characteristics and propensities (Kornai, 2014, p. 95). 
The appetite for investment is insatiable, as public sector entities operate 
under soft budget constraints, and investment is only tempered by the 
restrictions of bureaucratic allocation. However, in the early stages of 
socialist development, a transfer of agricultural labour to industry occurs. 
When this surplus labour is exhausted the rate of growth is hampered by 
labour shortages. In China, urban-rural demographic proportions were 
frozen for decades under the household registration system. The 
toleration of mass migration to the cities after 1978 and state 
urbanization plans to facilitate this, continues to generate a huge influx of 
labour from rural areas into the cities. This constitutes a fundamental 
distinction with the macro level environment that Kornai considered in 
The Socialist System (Kornai, 2007).  
6.3. Marxism, class and the working class 
 
Erik Olin Wright developed abstract Marxist definitions of class that are 
simultaneously consistent with empirically observable processes. At the 
highest level of abstraction is ownership of productive assets: control 
over these assets enables relations of class dominance and 
subordination to be reproduced. Exploitative class relations exist where 
property relations between people assign power over assets unequally 
and, as a consequence, social groups can enforce corresponding claims 
to live from the productive labour of others. The character of these claims 
on property and exploited labour define the specific historical form of 
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exploitation and its mode of operation. Antagonistic class relations 
reproduce both exploitation and mutual interdependence. The character 
of a social system is defined by: the qualities of the class structure; 
economic reproduction; the forms of distribution; and patterns of 
development (Chibber, 2009, pp. 355–356). 
 
Marxist theory approaches class from three perspectives: as a 
relationship between people and assets that can be used to generate 
income; as a macro level concept to explain historical variations in the 
way that economic surplus is extracted; and as a normative explanation 
of the changes required to end exploitation and oppression (Wright, 
2003, pp. 2–3). To emancipate humanity, Marxism advocates the 
transformation of social institutions and elaborates the historical 
conditions in which such changes can occur. The core of class conflict is 
class exploitation generated within production. Exploitation pertains when 
there is a causal interdependence between the material interests of the 
exploited and exploiter. This is based on excluding the exploited from 
access to productive resources, which enables the exploiters to 
appropriate the labour efforts of the exploited (Wright, 2003, pp. 7–8). 
 
The Marxist concept of class is concerned with relations of dominance, in 
which exploitation denotes appropriation of the surplus product produced 
by subordinate classes.  
The dominant class: 
1. Consumes in excess of their productive input and defines income 
distribution. 
2. Exercises disproportionate political power, shapes social change, and 
determines investments and social and cultural development (Wright, 
1979, p. 15). 
The concept of modes of production defines how surplus labour is 
appropriated depending on class position within the social economy. 
Ownership of the means of production generally determines the ability to 
shape the technical division of labour and to command authority over 
labourers (Wright, 1979, pp. 14–17). 
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For Marxists, the dominant mode of production defines the primary 
societal contradictions. It determines the character of class struggle as 
well as the nature of transformation that is possible as a result of such 
conflict. Marxists adopt a normative stance in supporting outcomes that, 
they believe, correspond to their socialist or communist vision of the 
future.   
 
Marx identified the proletariat as wage labourers collectively employed in 
commodity production to generate surplus value. He believed that the 
objective condition of the proletariat compels it to promote social 
revolution, in which, it assumes the leadership of the working class and 
the majority of society. Proletarian organisational power is externally 
imposed by capitalist discipline. The concentration of production and 
urbanisation of life creates the conditions from which its consciousness 
stems. Its class combination is a form of latent or actual struggle. The 
proletariat clashes with capital over its claim to exclusive power derived 
from private property rights. This reflects the fundamental contradiction 
between private appropriation and social production. It is the social 
position, power, and organic demands of the proletariat, that enable it to 
create a socialist society (Draper, 1981, pp. 34–48). 
 
Wright argues that the dominant paradigm in the 20th century 
characterisation of socialism was focused on the mode of production and 
the economic structure. Socialism entailed a system that negated 
production for profit maximization and market exchange.  
‘Since the pivot concept of capitalism is the private ownership of the 
means of production, generally this has meant that socialism is 
understood as public ownership in one form or another, most typically 
through the institutional device of state ownership.’ (Wright, 2010, p. 72) 
 
Wright developed a triangular power paradigm, which presents modern 
class conflict as revolving around a struggle for societal dominance 
between three loci of power, statist, economic, and associational. 
Complete state power would resemble a Stalinist tyranny. Complete 
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economic power would be a right-libertarian economic utopia - where 
money rules everything. And complete associational power would 
resemble Karl Marx’s vision of the highest phase of communism - where 
the state is supposed to wither away.1 His concept of power is defined as 
the ability to achieve objectives. 
  
Statist power is defined as the institutional ‘capacity to impose rules and 
regulate social relations over a territory, a capacity which depends on 
such things as information and communications infrastructure, the 
ideological commitments of citizens to obey rules and commands, the 
level of discipline of administrative officials, the practical effectiveness of 
the regulations to solve problems, as well as coercion.’2 
 
This concept of statist power helps us to consider how the CCP’s system 
of power was established between 1929 and 1949, and how it created 
the working class in a structural sense from 1949-1978 and thereafter.  
6.3.1. The origin of the CCP’s power before 1949 
 
The CCP was founded in 1921 under the influence of the 1917 Russian 
Revolution. It rapidly became a party of the working class but was routed 
from the main urban areas in 1927 by Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalist 
forces. Following this defeat the CCP’s main constituency of support was 
the peasantry. Mao Zedong ‘sinified’ Marxism by grounding it in local 
(rural) historical conditions. The CCP and its People’s Liberation Army 
developed the ability to lead peasant movements and sustain 
revolutionary bases for two decades: in diverse ecological and 
geographical terrain; and in villages of varied class composition and 
traditions (Rousset in Au et al., 2012, pp. 238–245). 
 
The CCP came to power and established the People’s Republic in Oct 
1949. However, from 1929-1949, Communists held power in what were 
called the ‘liberated areas’. They varied greatly in size, form and duration. 
At their peak, they ruled over tens of millions of people. The CCP 
constituted the commanding centre of a system of power and 
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administration, which could be rapidly created, exercised and 
abandoned. The party was a revolutionary organization conducting 
warfare. Land reform was selectively championed as a means to secure 
the support of peasant forces. The party was flexible in its approach and 
its roots were often tentative and transient. The need to anchor itself in 
local conditions led to alliances with all manner of social forces whose 
support was deemed expedient to securing, temporary or enduring, 
territorial hegemony, or to exploit tactical or strategic opportunities in 
military conflict.  
 
Liu Bin Yan, a former reporter for the People’s Daily, wrote about the 
formation of the state in the pre-Liberation era: ‘The first order of 
business for the military was to gain an understanding of the situation in 
the new area and determine who were its potential enemies; to do this it 
was necessary to reorganize the people’s lives and issue new 
government decrees. In as much as officials of the previous regime were 
not to be trusted, activists willing to work for the new regime came to the 
assistance of the military and the party, and the most loyal and 
competent among them were recommended or appointed by military or 
party officials as local officials... the Chinese party established a system 
of control over a nation of one billion people based upon its experiences 
in military control, in which a given area might be abandoned at any time. 
It is not a complex system: political loyalty to the party is the prime 
consideration in appointing an official, far more important than abilities or 
cultural level; the reinstatement, promotion or demotion of an individual is 
invariably determined by how an official higher up feels about him, rather 
than by his character, morals, abilities, or achievements or by how the 
masses feel about him. The bureaucrats’ children often intermarry, 
establishing a blood relationship or what is called a kinship relationship. 
School ties and such things as the place of birth unite the bureaucracy 
together. If one man commits a crime, the network is mobilized to form a 
protective cloak around him; it is very effective. In 1957 Mao revealed 
that ‘there were at the time 1.8 million officials throughout China.’ There 
are now 27 million.’ (Liu, 1989, p. 61) 
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In central China a significant proletarian cadre, composed of 
revolutionaries from Shanghai, fertilized the New Fourth Army, whose 
methods and territorial base diverged significantly from that of Mao’s 
better known Eighth Route Army. Thus, for two decades in advance of 
1949, the CCP created diverse forms of statist power involving a wide 
range of social forces and alliances. So, the origin of the CCP’s 
administrative state system was 1929 not 1949. The specific 
characteristics of this form of state power and the social base that 
sustained it differed depending on the material environment and the 
tactical and strategic objectives being pursued (Benton, 1999, 1992). 
6.4. Class and social strata in official ideology 
 
The structures of state and economic power are based on social relations 
between different strata and classes in society. This system of social 
stratification is now the focus of investigation. 
 
The official theory of class relations in China begins from the following 
arguments: 
1. China is at the primary stage of socialism. 
2. The working class is the leading class and the peasants are its allies. 
3. The rule of the working class is reflected in the dominance of public 
ownership, the ideology of the party and state, and the rule of the CCP. 
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Figure 10 above is based on a survey of 1% of the population of China 
carried out in 2005.3  
 
The National Bureau of Statistics grades China’s current class structure 
into 10 social strata. This is shown in the table above, which follows the 
method developed by Lu Xueyi (Lu, 2012), who is a keen advocate of 
strata based analysis defined by ‘occupation... the possession of 
organizational authority, economic and cultural resource(s)’ (Lu Xueyi 
cited in Goodman, 2014, p. 28).  
 
Wang attempts (Wang, 2015) a comprehensive Marxist theoretical 
analysis of China's class relations by drawing on the CCP's present-day 
ideology. Central to his argument is the view, drawn from Mao Zedong, 
that there are contradictions that are antagonistic and others that are 
non-antagonistic. Wang says that the establishment of the People's 
Republic as a socialist state led by the CCP abolished exploitation and all 
fundamentally antagonistic class relations: a rather bold claim. 
Consequently, conflicts that emerge are conceptualized as non-
antagonistic, i.e. they can be resolved within the system by good 
leadership. The struggle over the interests of various strata within 
classes is the form of antagonism that replaces class struggle and 
constitutes a 'contradiction among the people' (Wang, 2015, p. 176). 
Wang identifies the character of such interests by ownership of the 
means of production, roles in processes of production, income, and 
various social factors. He combines this with stratification methods to 
elaborate different layers within classes.  
  6.4.1. The elite 
 
China's billionaires are testimony to the rapid rise of the capitalist class. 
In 2013 there were 212 dollar billionaires, 7500 yuan billionaires, and just 
over one million people are defined as millionaires (people with wealth 
exceeding 10 million yuan (approx. US $1.6 million). The average 
millionaire is 39 years of age: half of them own a business; 20% are 
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investors; 15% are in real estate; and 15% are executives (Goodman, 
2014, pp. 75–76). Half of China's entrepreneurs previously worked for 
the state or the party. Connections to the party remain a precondition for 
operating anything other than a very small business (Goodman, 2014, p. 
83). Such connections facilitate access to resources, loans and permits, 
etc. Private sector elites originate overwhelmingly from inside the party-
state. One report claims that 90% of China's millionaires are children of 
high officials (Dickson cited in Goodman, 2014, p. 88). In 2007, a survey 
found that 37.8% of private entrepreneurs were party members. Their 
influence in the state is illustrated by the fact that thirty-one billionaires 
were elected to the National People' Congress in 2013. However, half of 
China's wealthy people plan to emigrate (Goodman, 2014, p. 76).  
 
According to Goodman, China's economic elite constitute about 3-4% of 
the population, when defined as those with an annual income in excess 
of 500,000 yuan ($80,603 US) (Goodman, 2014, pp. 89–91). He 
combines the economic elite with the 500,000 leading cadres of the party 
and state to construct his definition of the ‘dominant class’. But, in doing 
so, Goodman assumes a relatively stable correspondence of interests 
between the 500,000 leading cadres and the wealthy elite. However, the 
evidence shows that cadres and capitalists have contradictory material 
interests, and the conflict between these groups is rooted in the class 
structure of the state and society. The subordination of the capitalist 
class to the party and the state may help to explain why half of China's 
wealthy elite intends to emigrate4 including many better placed party 
leaders, and they also tend to send their children abroad, together with 
the significant resources. I believe that this indicates a lack of confidence 
in the security of their property and their position in society, and it 
illustrates the insecurity of those cadres who have accumulated wealth 
by illicit means. 
  6.4.2. The middle classes 
 
In recent years the primary official objective in social class formation has 
been the creation of a large middle class. The middle class category is 
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said to include ‘most state and social administrators, small and middle-
sized business owners, managers, professional and technical personnel’ 
(Zhao in Lu, 2012, p. 239). They are normally graduates who own a 
home and car (Goodman, 2014, pp. 95–96).  
 
The middle class is seen as a buffer between the elite and the poor, as 
inequality provokes social antagonism and conflict (Hu, Li & Li in Lu, 
2012, pp. 397–436). Lu claims that the size of the middle class is growing 
at 1% a year (Lu, 2012, p. 59) and will reach 35% of the population by 
2020 (Lu, 2012, p. 55). The objective of the state's policy on class 
formation is said to be the creation of an ‘olive shaped hierarchical 
structure’ which is supposed to represent a modern class structure 
(Yang, Fang & Wang in Lu, 2012, p. 125). However, in official discourse 
the parameters of this middle class are diffuse and it appears to be more 
of a political objective than a social reality (Goodman, 2014, p. 93). 
 
Academic estimates of its size vary from 5% to 28% and assume a 
minimum household income of about 60,000 yuan a year (about $9670 
US) (Goodman, 2014, pp. 102–103). However, large geographical cost of 
living disparities reduce the value of this benchmark figure, and higher 
income groups are more numerous in wealthier cities. Although 
homeownership is a common international determinant of the middle 
class, in China the rate of homeownership is very high at 89.7% overall, 
and it is 85.4% in urban China5 (Li Gan cited in Goodman, 2014, p. 115). 
So homeownership cannot be an effective determinant of class in China. 
A large expansion in higher education has also fostered the image of an 
expanding middle class as annual graduate numbers rose from 1 million 
a year in 2001 to 6 million a year in 2011 (Goodman, 2014, p. 112). 
Goodman concludes that the middle class comprises about 12% of the 
population, and is composed of entrepreneurs, office workers, 
professionals, and managers (Goodman, 2014, p. 119). They are divided 
between system 'insiders' and system 'outsiders' with 80% being insiders 
employed by the state (Wang and Davis Goodman, 2014, p. 120). Li 
Chunlin, using a broader definition of the middle class than Goodman, 
says that, although a drift towards the creation of a middle class inside 
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the private sector is evident, 62% of the better off middle class and 54% 
of the more marginal layers of the middle class work for the state. 
 
‘This has resulted in an important feature of China’s middle class: public 
sector members have a closer relationship with the state than private 
sector members because they depend on the state for their 
socioeconomic well-being. Some of them, especially the upper new 
middle class, exert strong influences on policymaking and public opinion’ 
(Li Chunling in Li, 2010, p. 147). The fact that a big majority of the middle 
classes are state sector workers reinforces the intimate connection 
between public property and party interests. This illustrates the 
challenges that confront the reproduction of capitalist power relations 
through the existing state.    
6.5. Are the capitalists a ruling class? 
 
Mel Rothenburg takes up the question of whether China's capitalists can 
be said to constitute a ruling class. She explains that the transformation 
of China's class structure, alongside its rapid economic development, 
produced a society in which the working class and peasantry constitute 
the overwhelming majority of society. But bureaucratic interests that 
secure privileges for its members shape the inner dynamics of the party. 
However, ‘despite its monolithic structure, groupings and tendencies 
reflecting the politics of various existing classes and class factions’ and 
the internal politics of the CCP, ‘represent some fundamental visions and 
divisions about the path China should follow.’ (Rothenberg, 2015, p. 29) 
 
Rothenberg uses a Marxist definition to define governing as the exercise 
of power through appointed positions of authority and believes that the 
class interests served by political power define the concept of the ruling 
class. Governance is directly based on the command of force, class rule 
may also exercise power by force, but it depends on consent or 
acquiescence, and relies on discreet forces and habits that ensure the 
social reproduction of existing class relations. A stable and developed 
system of power requires that governance and rule are separate - as 
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conflicts within the ruling class that endanger social stability need to be 
resolved by negotiation or force. If force is needed to resolve matters 
such force should be applied by a nominally independent state. Or if 
governments lose their authority, the ruling class can support another 
government but still remain the ruling class.  
 
Rothenberg cites this illuminating analysis by Poulantzas: ‘The state is 
not an instrumental entity existing for itself, it is not a thing, but the 
condensation of a balance of forces. The correspondence in question is 
established rather in terms of organisation and representation: the 
hegemonic class or faction, beyond its immediate economic interests 
which are of the moment or at least short term, must undertake to define 
the overall political interests of the classes and fractions that constitute 
the power block, and thus its own long-term political interest.’ 
(Poulantzas cited in Rothenberg, 2015, p. 30) 
 
Rothenberg suggests that the capitalist class is the only viable candidate 
to be defined as the ruling class. But she says that the CCP acts as both 
the governing apparatus and a substitute ruling class. This endangers 
the system, as stable systems are based on a separation between the 
ruling class and government. Thus in Western democracies the ruling 
political party can lose office but this does not have to have any impact 
on the wealth and power of the ruling class. Rothenberg's chronology of 
Chinese reforms and the rise of Chinese capitalism claims privatisation 
was the primary source of capitalist primitive accumulation. She believes 
that before the 1980s the CCP was ‘based on the peasants and workers’ 
a legacy that ‘continues to casts a deep shadow over the Party’ 
(Rothenberg, 2015, p. 35). Capitalism does not dissolve the division of 
labour between the ruling class and the state, mainly because of the 
danger to social stability that this represents. However, the separation 
between the CCP and the capitalists does not itself, disprove the concept 
that capitalists are the ruling class. However, nor does the growing 
wealth and influence of the capitalists automatically transform them into a 
ruling class (Rothenberg, 2015, p. 36).  
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Rothenberg tries to locate the position of Chinese capitalists within 
ideological debates. There is an influential right-wing trend that wants 
China to evolve into a mature capitalist state, similar to advanced 
capitalist states, where the government and economy are run by, and for, 
private capitalists. The neoliberal proponents of this view tend to support 
the CCP, and seek gradual change. Many are western educated and are 
intellectually supported by the Western media and by mainstream 
economists, who garner support from the capitalists, sections of the 
middle classes, and those young people who are opposed to CCP rule. 
The ruling faction promotes a centrist position, based on the continued 
dominance of public ownership. Although, they support capitalist 
economic activity -the official objective is to modernize the economy and 
move towards a mature socialist society. Debates on the reform of SOEs, 
privatisation and fundamental reform have raged for three decades but 
they have never actually resulted in privatisation of the commanding 
heights. This faction is cautious and relies on taking measures that 
sustain and reproduce social stability whilst modernising. So they 
promote policies like extending welfare provision and labour rights that 
are an anathema to the neoliberals (Rothenberg, 2015, pp. 37–39). 
 
Another tendency inside the party is based on leftist ideology and leans 
on workers, peasants and the poor for support. This found expression in 
the ideas and policies pursued by Bo Xilai which were supported by 'new 
left' intellectual currents outside the party. This tendency is clearly rooted 
in basic historical traditions of the CCP's socialist ideology (Rothenberg, 
2015, p. 39).  
  6.6. Social strata within the working class 
 
In classical Marxism the working class refers to those who live by selling 
their labour power for a wage and the proletariat are those employed by 
capitalists to produce surplus value (Draper, 1981, pp. 34–38) After the 
1949 revolution in China a section of the workers were combined with 
officials of the party and state into a privileged category defined as 
'employee-workers'. This category of workers referred exclusively to 
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those employed by state enterprises. They were also provided with 
extensive welfare rights and provisions known as the 'iron rice bowl'. 
Below this, were workers of lower status employed in collective 
enterprises, and under them, were various gradations with worse terms, 
conditions and rights. At the lowest rung were peasants, peasant-
workers, seasonal, and temporary workers. The residence restrictions 
called the hukou entrenched this hierarchal stratification system.   
 
Today China's working class is composed of different strata each with 
different status, wages, conditions and rights. The largest section of the 
working class occupies a position at the lower end of the spectrum. They 
are not legally recognised as being workers and so are not protected by 
labour laws, as they operate in the informal economy.  
 
In the early reform era, peasants worked in rural industrial enterprises as 
a supplement to agricultural work. Later mass rural to urban migration 
was permitted. This generated an army of workers without status or 
rights: workers laid-off by state enterprises; workers employed in small-
scale private enterprises; and people who engaged in individual 
economic activities. Huang, using Chinese census statistics from 2010 
shows that the urban formal economy employed 36.8%, and urban 
informal sectors employed 63.2% of the workforce (Huang, 2013, p. 354). 
However, this ratio changed dramatically in 2013, when employment in 
formal sectors rose to 47% and informal sectors fell to 53% according to 
figures from the National Bureau of Statistics, which rely on the same 
data sources.6  
 
The informal sector is composed of private enterprises, individual entities 
and unregistered workers. The category of private enterprises in China 
refers to incorporated entities. Private urban enterprises employed about 
60 million people in 2010 with an average of 13 employees and 
registered capital of about $200,000 US. In both rural and urban areas 
there were 6.24 million such private enterprises, employing a total of 90 
million employees, an average of 15 per enterprise. Employment in this 
private sector rose to 125 million employees in 2013, composed of 82 
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million urban and 42 million rural employees.7 In 2010 individual entities 
(the urban self-employed) engaged 44 million people with an average of 
2 people per entity - generally family members - but their average capital 
was a miniscule $6,290 US (Huang, 2013, pp. 355–356). 
 
Unregistered workers in the informal economy appear in government 
statistics as the difference between total urban or rural workforce and 
those employed in formally designated employment categories (Huang, 
2013, p. 354). In urban areas this figure fell dramatically, from 113 million 
in 2010, to 90 million in 2012 and 60 million in 2013. This fall appears to 
be attributable to the government's drive to formalize migrant workers 




Figure 11. Graph of urban employment by ownership type 2009-2013 
 
The graph above shows urban employment by sector from 2009-2013. 
The data is drawn from China's National Bureau of Statistics.8 Note the 
large rise in urban employment in Limited Liability Corporations of over 
22 million in the year from 2012 to 2013. Share-holding Corporations 
grew by 4.7 million whilst employment in SOEs fell by 4.7 million; 
probably indicating a change of categorization of some SOEs into Share-
holding entities.  
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Hired labour in agriculture does not exist as a statistical category in 
China and there seems to be no research on its exact scale. Rural 
statistics reveal that agriculture remains dominated by family farming with 
only about 3 to 10% of work being conducted by wage labour. This is in 
stark contrast with India where the figure for wage labour exceeds 45%. 
Nevertheless China's agricultural output value has risen by 6% a year for 
30 years. Huang says it is the restructuring of food consumption and the 
corresponding shifts in agricultural production that drove this progress. In 
certain sectors, such as dairy farming, eggs, fruits and aquaculture, wage 
labour has grown to make up about 20-30% of labour-time based on 
capitalist farming. Nevertheless farms that account for 93% of China’s 
sown agricultural land employ wage-labour for less than 10% of their 
work (Huang et al., 2012, p. 143).  
 
  6.6.1. Class stratification and CCP support 
 
The bureaucracy is the gatekeeper to the cities for those with a rural 
residence status; as access to urban social provision, welfare, education, 
and housing is regulated and controlled. The stratification of classes in 
China has mainly been defined by hukou residency rules since the 
1950s. Apart from during periods of political upheaval, the party has 
ensured that urban workers and cadres lived in secure and stable 
circumstances. State enterprises guaranteed the so-called iron rice bowl: 
the provision of cradle-to-grave welfare internal to workplaces. The 
quality of the contents of the rice-bowl was partly dependent on the 
importance and type of enterprise, with large state owned enterprises 
offering the greatest provision.  
 
The difference between agricultural and industrial prices, known as the 
price scissors,9 was exploited to help finance urban development and 
peasants were able to move to the cities only under exceptional 
circumstances. This created a permanent entrenched division between 
urban and rural inhabitants. The price scissors in relation to China is 
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considered as the transfer from agriculture to finance industrialisation. In 
the 1950s it took the form of the compulsory deliveries of foodstuffs by 
procurement, where low agricultural prices were set by the state (Knight, 
1995, p. 130). 
 
After 1978, in the reform era, this rigidly stratified social structure 
remained the basic social foundation of China's planned economy and 
state. Transfers from agriculture to finance industrialisation continued in a 
different form (Knight, 1995, pp. 133–134). When the residence rules 
were relaxed and mass migration from the countryside in search of urban 
employment took place, the migrating peasant-workers provided low cost 
labour for all types of employment from locally owned Township Village 
Enterprises, to vast state financed construction projects, as well as to 
indigenous and foreign owned private sector enterprises. This system of 
stratification protected the existing urban workforce from downward 
pressure on their wages and conditions that would automatically occur in 
a free labour market when tens of millions of people with no labour rights 
compete for work. Indeed, the living standards of peasants and workers 
rose simultaneously.  
6.7. The structural formation of the working class in China 1949-1981 
 
This section examines the historical origin and structural formation of the 
China’s working class from 1949-1981. It has been convincingly argued 
that an entirely new working class was created by the Chinese revolution 
(Walder, 1984) (Walder, 1986). The rate of accumulation and 
industrialization and the organization of the workers’ lives was shaped 
and designed by the CCP within an external demographic environment 
that: ‘limited improvements in the standard of living and dictated changes 
in patterns of growth, employment, and welfare.’ (Walder, 1984, p. 4) 
Proletarianization took place under bureaucratic control and the near 
universalization of public or collective property forms. The new working 
classes were rigidly stratified in a way that entrenched vast differentials in 
living standards, social security, welfare, and life prospects. 
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In the first eight years after 1949 private enterprises were nationalized. 
From 1949 to 1957 state owned industry more than doubled its workforce 
from 3 million to 7.9 million and even tiny enterprises were combined into 
large cooperatives (Walder, 1984, p. 6). Industrial output grew rapidly 
and a new regime of workplace power relations took the form of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy emulating that in the Soviet Union. The new 
workforce were employed, paid, trained and integrated into new state 
institutions based on ‘worker dependence and managerial paternalism.’ 
Party and union entities controlled the formation of the working class and 
everyday workplace relations (Walder, 1984, p. 12). 
 
China’s planned economy was established in the 1950s. One unique 
aspect of the system was the hukou - a hereditary household registration 
system introduced in 1959. It bound people to their registration status at 
birth and was a powerful bureaucratic planning constraint. The hukou 
acted to limit rural-urban migration by rationing life essentials, which were 
tied to one’s hukou location. There was a big rise and fall in the urban 
population at the time of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s but 
overall, from 1959 to 1978, only 329,000 people were permitted to move 
to the cities (Wang Chunguang in Lu, 2012, p. 269). This entrenched 
urban and rural divisions, which took three key forms:  
1. Registration defined agriculture or non-agriculture as one’s economic 
activity  
2. Urban and rural administration and services were founded and operated 
on different principles.  
3. Property rights in the countryside were collective, but in the cities there 
was public ownership and cooperatives. 
The urban focus of government policies ensured that agriculture 
transferred vast resources towards industrialization and urban social 
services; both as direct transfers, and by means of the price scissors, 
which rigged the terms of trade against agriculture. Urbanization lagged 
behind industrialization. Indeed, from 1959 to 1978 the rural population 
(defined by hukou) actually rose from 17.92% to 18.41% of China’s total 
population (Wang Chunguang in Lu, 2012, p. 271).  
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In 1949 China was composed of large cities and vast, dense, rural 
populations engaged in productive, but labour intensive agriculture. This 
limited the scope for urbanization. Between 1949 and 1957 the urban 
population rose from 57.6 million to 99 million. This was due to natural 
increases and rural-urban migration. The Great Leap Forward (1958-
1960) involved vast labour mobilization - industrial employment rose by 
15.8 million between 1957-8. The urban population reached 130.7 million 
in 1960, but fell to 100.7 million in 1965, after the failure of the Great 
Leap. Non-agricultural employment declined from over 50 million in 1960 
to 32 million in 1963, only returning to its 1960 peak in 1971 (Walder, 
1984, pp. 13–19). 
 
Measures to prevent rural-urban migration were seen as the only means 
to avoid chaotic and uncontrolled population flows that might disrupt 
planned urban development. The collectivization of agriculture in 1957 
facilitated the control of rural to urban migration because rural production 
teams distributed essential rations. The priority in urban areas was to 
employ urban residents; this was achieved by a low wages-high 
employment policy. The urban working class, and the urban population in 
general, were insulated from external demographic changes. However, in 
the period 1965-75, 16 million urban youths were ‘sent down’ to the 
country to ‘learn from the peasants’. Millions returned to the cities 
between 1976-1979.  
 
The annual number of youths entering the urban labour force for the first 
time was about: 1 million during the 1950s; 2 million from 1966-1976; and 
3 million in the early 1980s. These numbers swelled to 5 million a year in 
1977 because of the influx of sent-down returnees. Urban employment 
growth failed to satisfy demand. In 1980: 37% of new urban workers 
were sent to state enterprises; 43% to collective enterprises; 6% became 
self-employed; and 14% were allocated temporary work. Walder argues 
that rural proletarianization was completed in the form of collectivization 
in the 1950s, but proletarianization through urbanization was stopped 
and, indeed, reversed by 1980 (Walder, 1984, pp. 19–22). 
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Urban wages rose rapidly in 1949-1957, but then wages for state 
employees fell, from an average of 741 yuan in 1964, to 632 yuan in 
1977 – 58 yuan below the 1957 level. As the workforce rose, entry-level 
wages were kept low and wages were generally frozen. Per capita 
housing space also fell from 4.3 square meters in 1952 to 3.6 square 
meters in 1977. Average per capita calorie intake declined slightly 
between 1957 and 1977 and was lower than Pakistan or Indonesia. The 
rationing of supplies compounded the burden of securing adequate daily 
nutrition. Differences between sectors of the urban working class were 
most evident in non-wage payments. Larger state enterprises provided 
all encompassing welfare provision: lifetime employment; sick leave; 
medical care for employees and their families; retirement provision etc. 
These enterprises might have their own hospitals, clinics, schools, 
crèches, canteens, cinemas etc. The average value of such non-wage 
benefits for state sector workers was equal to 527 yuan, or 82% of their 
cash wages in 1977. The long-term fall in wages was also countered by a 
rise in the number of wage earners per household. A decline in the 
average number of dependents meant that per capita urban income rose 
(Walder, 1984, pp. 22–25). 
 
The limited capacity of state enterprises to provide employment meant 
that urban collective enterprises, which originally developed out of 
handicraft coops, grew. Similarly rural collective industries soaked up 
rural surplus labour. In addition, urban industries employed temporary 
labour forces. By 1980, 20 million rural workers were employed by what 
were the forerunners of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). They 
grew out of communes and brigades operating small scale collectively 
owned enterprises. These enterprises could not offer the benefits of 
urban enterprises and often employed workers seasonally. In 1982, 9 
million rural workers were employed by urban enterprises temporarily, 
largely by informal means. Local labour bureaus would act as the labour 
suppliers and work was often seasonal. State enterprises contracted 
nearby communes to provide labour for a period of time or for specific 
projects. Similarly, urban residents could find temporary work with state 
enterprises on terms somewhat better than their rural counterparts, but 
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these workers didn’t have farms to return to, to act as a safety net 
(Walder, 1984, pp. 28–33). 
 
In 1980 there were 15 million employees in urban collective industrial 
enterprises administered by local governments. These workers received 
lower wages (an average of 632 yuan in 1981) and less social security 
than state enterprise employees. The larger the enterprise, the more 
stable and secure the employment, and the more the firms were 
integrated into planning. These firms employed a predominantly young 
and female workforce. By 1980, such collective enterprises were 
assigned 43% of urban job allocations. Such employment excluded later 
transfer to state enterprises (Walder, 1984, pp. 34–36).  
 
State enterprises employed 34 million workers in 1981. They were the 
best provided for in terms of the welfare rights known as the Iron Rice 
Bowl. They made-up 42% of the urban workforce, produced 75% of 
industrial output, and average earnings were 854 yuan a year. They were 
guaranteed lifetime employment, gradually rose up an 8-grade wage 
scale, and received comprehensive welfare provision. The larger the 
enterprise the greater the benefits (Walder, 1984, pp. 37–38). 
 
Growth of the labour force was greater than the capacity of the capital-
intensive state sector to employ new workers. Average investment in 
fixed capital per worker was 10,000 yuan in the state sector, compared 
with 2000 yuan in urban collectives, and 950 in rural collectives. So a 
relative decline in the percentage of workers employed in the state sector 
was inevitable. Workers in state enterprises were often able to secure 
employment for their children within the enterprise, creating a closed 
entry system. Demographic conditions contrasted sharply with the USSR 
where labour shortages and job mobility became commonplace in the 
1980s. Consequent divisions between sectors of the workforce were far 
less pronounced in the USSR than in China. The engrained inequalities 
in China, particularly between urban and rural, were extraordinarily rigid.  
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In 1980 China’s urban workforce was highly stable and fixed, in the state 
and urban collective sectors. Workers’ families pooled incomes to 
increase their consumption. The increase of the urban working class by 
means of urbanizations was halted. However, proletarianization took 
place through rural industrialization via commune enterprises, which then 
became TVEs. Markets did not define workers’ lives. Instead, their 
prospects were determined by their residence status, and by the type of 
enterprise they worked in. 
 
This system divided the working class. The state enterprise workers 
were… ‘absorbed into the lower statuses of an economic bureaucracy’ … 
‘their consciousness was increasingly dictated to them by bureaucrats in 
a Party claiming to be their historical agent’ (Walder, 1984, p. 42). 
6.8. The structural formation of the working class in the reform era 
 
The urban-rural gap declined from 1978-1985, farmers were permitted to 
sell their surpluses and do non-agricultural work, and both township 
village enterprises (TVEs) and private firms grew.10 From 1985-9 these 
rural enterprises boomed, private sector industry also advanced rapidly in 
some urban areas, particularly on the eastern seaboard. Labour 
migration to the cities became a flood. In 1989 the independence of 
township village enterprises was repressed. 
 
Between 1992-2001 urban State Owned Enterprises were restructured 
resulting in millions of layoffs, the corporatization of many of the largest 
enterprises, flourishing foreign investment, and tax policies favouring 
central government. Urban state entities gained from land sales and their 
domains of influence expanded with urban growth. The urban-rural gap 
continued to rise. With TVEs performing badly, rural conditions 
worsened. Social unrest amongst the peasantry increased and migration 
to the cities generated a rural crisis. In response, the state abolished 
agricultural tax and invested in rural social security between 2003-5. 
However, despite relaxing registration restrictions on migration to urban 
areas, the floating population continues to experience a form of social 
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apartheid in the cities. This is expressed in their restricted rights to: 
housing; education; healthcare; pensions; employment rights etc. (Lu, 
2012, pp. 274–278).  
 
Human development inequalities in China are largely defined by the 
urban-rural gap. China’s urban inhabitants are ranked at position 30 on 
the UN’s world human development index. That is close to South Korea. 
However, the position of China’s rural inhabitants is 125th in the world 
index. That is close to Botswana. Power, wealth and resources are 
concentrated in the cities. The working class is the largest social class in 
urban areas. The transfer of resources from rural to urban has 
accelerated since 1978. It takes the form of a flow of finance; land 
acquisition; and the exploitation of rural migrants (Lu, 2012, pp. 283–
287).  
 
The dominant forms of objective class analysis in present-day China 
divide people into the following occupations or strata:  
‘State and social administrators, managerial personnel, private 
entrepreneurs, professional and technical personnel, clerical personnel, 
individual-operated business proprietors, commercial and service 
personnel, industrial workers, agricultural labourers, and the unemployed 
and partially employed.’ (Guo, 2012, p. 734) 
 
Inequalities are presented as part of the technical division of labour 
rather than as products of exploitative relations. Guo (2012) points to a 
trend to fetishize an idealised middle class; when, for example, they are 
presented as incarnations of progressive thought and a harmonious 
future. The official promotion of an olive-shaped form of societal wealth 
distribution, acts to reinforce a middle class ideal. Mao had earlier called 
China egg-shaped. This not only de-emphasises the working class; it 
also allows the identity of the bourgeoisie to be cloaked under a middle 
class mantle. Guo sees this as an expression of the failure of official 
ideology to find a consistent and adequate theoretical justification for the 




The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated a total rural workforce 
in 2007 of 476.4 million, 150.9 million employed in Township Village 
Enterprises, 26.7 million in private enterprises, 21.9 million self-
employed, and 276.9 million ‘others’ a category composed of all 
‘agricultural, migrated and surplus labourers.’ The migrated, defined by 
living more than 6 months in urban areas, constitute approximately 150 
million workers (Cai and Wang, 2010, p. 74). Many take seasonal work in 
urban areas and are also part-time farmers. The fluidity of rural-urban 
migration makes identifying the number of pure farmers difficult, and 
there are no statistics on this. But if we deduct 150 million migrants from 
‘others’ we’re left with about 126 million (Yang, 2013). 
 
The concentration and centralization of employment location is a feature 
of the growth of private sector investment since 1978. China’s centres of 
world manufacture are creations of the reform era. They are 
concentrated in eight areas: Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong and Hebei. The main concentration of 
industrial investment and employment pre-1978 was in the North East of 
China. And the urbanization of the west of China lags nine years behind 
that of the east.  
 
Private sector urban employment mushroomed from 0.68 million in 1992 
to 45.8 million in 2007.  Urban self-employment grew from 150,000 in 
1978 to 33.1 million in 2007. Employment in joint stock enterprises 
(corporations, limited liability companies and joint-stock companies) grew 
from 1.64 million in 1993 to 30.3 million in 2007.11 Employment in foreign 
and Hong Kong and Macao companies grew from 600,000 in 1990 to 
15.8 million in 2007. State enterprises reached a peak employment of 






Figure 12. Chart of changes in urban employment by ownership type 1978-2011 
 
Figure 12 above charts changes in the number of urban employees (unit: 
10,000 people) by ownership type from 1978-2011.12 It includes a 
category labelled “total state” which combines the workforce of State 
Owned Enterprises, Limited Liability Corporations and Share Holding 
Enterprises. This definition of the total state owned sector broadly 
corresponds to the arguments made by Huang (2008).  
 
Production workers are a large percentage of the workforce in Zhejiang 
43.7%, Tianjin 39.1%, Shanghai 36.2%, Guangdong 35.3%, Jiangsu 
31.5%, and Fujian 31.2%. Business people of all types are highly 
represented in the same provinces: Zhejiang 11.6%, Guangdong 10.9%, 
Jiangsu 9.4%, Fujian 10.2% and in Beijing they constitute 15.8% of the 
workforce (Lu, 2012, p. 159). 
 
Workers with rural registration constitute 52.4% of non-agricultural 
employees. They make up the largest section of the working class. They 
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compose 67% of those employed in secondary industry and 40% of 
those in tertiary industry. In the following seven industries they are the 
majority of the workforce: construction 97%; manufacturing 68%; resident 
and other services 61%; accommodation and catering 59%; wholesale 
and retail 53%; mining 51%; transport, postage and storage 51%. 
Migrants also make up: 34% of technical and professional staff; 33% of 
administrators of government and party organizations; and 28% of 
clerical and related staff (Lu, 2012, pp. 155–156). 
 
Various occupations within the total workforce changed as follows in the 
years 1982 and 2005: managers of enterprises and institutions, 1.1% to 
1.2%; clerical staff, 1.3% to 3.1%; business personnel, 1.8% to 7.0%; 
service workers, 2.2% to 5.2%; production and transport workers 16% to 
17.9%. Rural workers in agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal husbandry 
and water conservancy fell from 72% to 57% of the total national 
workforce during the same period (Lu, 2012, pp. 150–151). 
 
Labour relations shifted in favour of employers in important ways. 
Absolute employment stability was replaced by flexibility in hiring and 
firing, particularly in new and private workplaces. The enhanced power of 
employers over workers, particularly migrant workers, resulted in 
increased labour intensity and duration. Employers often ignore health 
and safety and have scant regard for their legal responsibilities. This 
generates high death, injury and sickness rates.13 The workers share of 
GDP declined from 53.4% in 1996 to 39% in 2007. The ‘earned surplus’ 
of enterprises as a percentage of GDP increased from 18.8% in 2001 to 
31.3% in 2007 (Shi Xiuyin in Lu, 2012, p. 170). 
  6.8.1. The impact of mass unemployment on wages 
 
The vast lay-off of workers in state owned enterprises between 1998-
2001 is commonly seen as marking a watershed in Chinese labour 
relations by destroying workers’ rights. Thus Tim Pringle, a scholar of 
Chinese labour relations, says, ‘figures are staggering: 25.5 million 
workers made redundant in 3 years! How did the Communist Party of 
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China succeed in tearing up the so-called social contract between the 
party and the working class?’ (Pringle, 2013, p. 194) 
 
Yu claims that 60 million workers were sacked between 1995 and 2003 - 
‘a scale never seen in history’. He says that state owned enterprises and 
collective enterprises provided ‘good jobs’ which were replaced by ‘bad 
jobs’ and ‘a great social regression’ (Yu, 2011, p. 144). 
 
Laid off workers were generally categorised as xiagang: this meant they 
remained tied to their work unit but were not engaged in employment. 
This provided some cushion particularly in larger enterprises where 
extensive welfare provision existed, but many other xiagang workers 
relied on family support.  
 
Such a dramatic rise in unemployment would cause a fall in wages in a 
free labour market. However, between 1992 and 2007 the average real 
wage of all workers rose by 202% and the wages of state sector 






Figure 13. Chart on the wages of urban workers designated as staff and workers 
 
Figure 13 shows the rising wages of urban staff and workers (formally 
employed workers) from 1995-2012. 14 
 
Noteworthy too is the fact that wage rises were highest amongst state 
employees. State owned enterprise wages overtook private sector wages 
in 2003 and the gap has increased since then. Thus private sector 
enterprises are compelled to offer higher wages to attract talent (Yang et 
al., 2010, p. 487). 
 
How could the vast shake out of 25-60 million urban workers 
simultaneously produce sharply rising wages? One explanation is that 
the reduction in costs to state enterprises generated a rise in productivity 
and retained state employees benefitted. Also, some geographic and 
demographic component could have been partially responsible, as older 
workers were more likely to be laid-off in regions dominated by state 
owned heavy industry, the so-called rust belt of Northeast China. These 
laid off workers were either, not in the market or weren’t considered 
suitable for work in Southeast China’s private, foreign owned, or joint 
venture companies.  
 
More recently the cause of rising wages was sought in demographic 
factors. Pringle says labour shortages began to appear in early 2003 
‘initially confined to skilled and experienced workers required in coastal 
provinces, the shortages have spread to other areas of the country.’ As a 
consequence ‘the balance of forces has tipped from capital toward 
labour.’ (Pringle, 2013, p. 197) As China’s working age population begins 
to shrink from 2015, the shortage of urban labour will put migrant workers 
in a position to demand a ‘substantial enhancement of wages and other 
incentives’ to replace the declining urban labour force (Cai and Wang, 
2012, p. 8). Cai and Wang believe China is at the Lewis Turning Point: a 
moment when expanding labour demand exceeds labour supply - 
causing wages of unskilled workers to rise (Cai and Wang, 2012, p. 9). 
However, national data shows that the wages of unskilled workers have 
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risen consistently since 1992, eleven years before the Lewis turning point 
is said to have arrived (Ge and Yang, 2014, p. 10). If so, it seems that 
market forces aren’t the primary determinant of wage rates in China.  
6.8.2. Trade Unions: structural and associational power in the reform era 
 
Within the CCP led state system the main agency that is supposed to 
represent the workers is the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU). It is a bureaucratic organization and the sole official 
representative of the workers. Feng Chen’s (2009) study of the power of 
the ACFTU uses Wright’s distinction between associational power, 
stemming from collective workers’ organisation, and structural workers’ 
power, derived from the union’s strategic position within the economic 
system. I look at the ACFTU’s structural power and then at spontaneous 
associational forms of workers’ power during the reform era.  
 
The ACFTU was formed as a militant workers’ organisation in 1925. 
However, after 1949, the union generally acted as a transmission belt to 
assist the party and management to increase production and promote 
party ideology. The ACFTU’s was designated as the sole representative 
of workers’ interests from 1949-66 but this status was subsumed under 
the CCP’s general claim to have established a socialist state that 
eliminated fundamental class contradictions. The ACFTU’s limited 
influence was revealed by its position in the party hierarchy. It acted as a 
workers’ welfare agency and dealt with such issues as wages, labour 
protection and insurance, housing, sport, and cultural activities. During 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the ACFTU ceased operating 
entirely, yet paradoxically, it was in 1975 that the right to strike was 
included in the constitution.  
 
When the ACFTU was revived under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, leading 
cadres of the union took positions in the Politburo. However, the right to 
strike was removed from the constitution in 1982 following the strikes in 
Poland led by Solidarity. The ACFTU was allotted the role of maintaining 
stability in times of radical social transformation. Four new departments 
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were created which enhanced the ACFTU’s portfolio of institutional 
power.  
 
Their ambit is ‘collective contracts, democratic management, legal affairs, 
and grassroots organizational construction. By design, these new 
departments tend to be more proactive. They were created to work in 
new areas that have emerged with the market reforms, and thus are 
expected to initiate, explore, experiment with, and establish new rules 
and practices suitable for changed labour relations. These departments, 
in other words, are more action oriented.’ (Feng Chen, 2009, p. 671) 
 
At the time of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the ACFTU 
expressed support for the students, but new independent workers’ 
organisations, like the Beijing Autonomous Workers’ Federation (BAWF), 
claimed the right to supplant the ACFTU as the voice of the workers. The 
Party leadership saw these organisations as a direct challenge to CCP 
rule. Thus, after the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests, 
plans for greater autonomy for the ACFTU were shelved.15 The ACFTU’s 
bureaucratic authority was enhanced to facilitate closer supervision of 
urban workers and of the union itself. It became increasingly 
interconnected with the government apparatus. This integrated the union 
more closely with the party and state and afforded it greater scope and 
power within which to operate (Feng Chen, 2009, pp. 667–671). 
 
Feng notes that the ACFTU plays a significant role in promoting 
legislation that advances the rights of workers. Its power derives from 
being an official institution of the state subordinate to the party. It 
operates as a governmental agency and its structure parallels that of the 
party and state. Feng sees local union cells as being in an embedded 
relationship to company management (Feng Chen, 2009, pp. 663–664). 
 
The ACFTU’s role within the state bureaucracy became increasingly 
important as market reforms and the growth of capitalist labour relations 
provoked workers’ unrest. The status and influence of ACFTU cadres at 
all levels of the state bureaucracy grew. They were expected to manage 
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labour relations. However their role in grass roots labour mobilisation has 
been negligible. Union officials are often managers or party appointees 
rather than being elected from below. Where labour protests break out 
the union generally intervenes as a mediator whose authority derives 
from its governmental status (Feng Chen, 2009, pp. 665–667). 
 
The ACFTU’s legal department proactively drafts legislation and supports 
its implementation by establishing legal service centres: in 2000 there 
were 2,363 with 4960 staff; in 2006 there were 3,856 with 11,059 staff16; 
and in 2007 there were 6,178 with 18,433 staff.17 This mechanism 
ensured that a high percentage of worker’s legal cases were wholly or 
partially successful.18 One might say that the legal sphere is a terrain of 
class conflict mediated through bureaucratic forms. The following 
exasperated blog from an attorney acting for foreign companies in China 
is indicative of the view of business interests.  
 
‘I know a German factory in a first tier city here [in China] that hired the 
wrong Finance Director. When they let her go, she took them to 
arbitration. The factory had followed the law in how they hired her and in 
how they let her go. However, even after following the law, they still had 
to pay an extra three months salary beyond what they had already 
offered her. The decision shocked the German company… 
‘Every story I have ever heard of a foreign company going to arbitration 
in China against a terminated employee ends similarly (or much worse). 
The foreign company pretty much always loses. I think this is not so 
much because the foreign company is a foreign company but because 
China is still a communist country and workers’ rights are still (at least in 
theory) paramount.’ 19  
 
With the growth of the private sector and multinational investments, the 
ACFTU straddles the division of interests between capital, labour and the 
state. Scholars have emphasised the problems of trade union legitimacy 
that this role engenders (Xiaoyang and Chan, 2005)(Shen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the ACFTU has promoted changes from above, which 
significantly improve the legal rights of the working class, like the 2008 
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Labour Law. These new legal rights often act as a focal point around 
which workers’ activism is galvanized.  
 
Occasionally there are signs that reformers within the ACFTU are trying 
to engage the key issue of fostering democratic workers’ representation. 
At a structural level the union organized an extraordinary unionisation 
drive in recent years. Unionisation grew at incredible speed. Membership 
was 87 million in 2001, 239 million in 2010,20 and 280 million in 2013.21 
Studies indicate that the decision to join the union is overwhelmingly a 
voluntary act, with persuasion by shop stewards more common in private 
companies.22 The growth of the ACTFU and the spread of collective 
bargaining and collective contracts are legal and organizational 
measures designed to regularize labour relations. 
 
One example of the ACFTU taking grass roots organization seriously 
was the unionization campaign at Wal-Mart. At a clandestine meeting on 
29 July 2006, 25 workers in Quanzhou City took on the largest 
corporation in the world and won. They formed the world's first Wal-Mart 
trade union committee. The mood was said to be euphoric and workers 
sang the Internationale as Ke Yunlong, a 29-year-old meat-packer, was 
elected to represent the workers. Subsequent grassroots action led to a 
campaign by the ACFTU to rapidly unionize all Wal-Mart stores in China, 
this campaign followed a call by President Hu Jintao to build party 
organizations and trade unions in foreign-invested enterprises (Chan, 
2006). 
Analysis of workplace unions indicates that although the trade unions are 
generally controlled from above and are intimately connected to party 
organisations, there is nevertheless a notable degree of flexibility. At the 
fringes a variety of official representative entities and institutions this 
flexibility takes on forms that are genuinely voluntary, associational and 
at times are militant.  
 
Research into the outlook and practices of trade union chairpersons 
indicates that in a significant minority of workplaces, workers utilize 
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workers’ congresses and official union structures as avenues to express 
grievances and competitive democratic elections for union presidents 
take place. These processes tend to be more frequent in state or 
collective enterprises rather than private or foreign funded enterprises 
(Hishida, 2010). The increasing differentiation and complexity in work 
environments has brought about variations in forms of workplace 
representation by the unions.  
 
The ACFTU represents workers as a structural power whose position in 
the political and state bureaucracy enables the union to play the pivotal 
role in designing and enforcing labour laws that enhance workers’ living 
standards and workplace rights, the union also imposes compromises on 
employers. As a general rule, the ACFTU does not act as an agency of 
associational power in Wright’s sense. However, it champions labour 
laws, which often become the focal point around which the associational 
power of the working class is organized and mobilized. There are also 
rare but significant instances where the ACFTU instigates or supports 
workers’ associational activity, either with support from the national CCP 
leadership or with the support of grass roots union cadres.  
 
6.9. Workers’ associational power in China in the reform era 
6.9.1. Tiananmen and the events of 1989 
 
‘1949 China overthrows Capitalism 
1979 Capitalism saves China 
1989 China saves Communism 
2009 China saves Capitalism’ 
 
A Chinese viral Internet joke 
 
In popular consciousness the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is symbolic of 
the end of communism. The upheavals of 1989 began as student 
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protests in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. These protests were repressed 
on 4 June 1989. But subsequently a wave of revolts shook other states 
ruled by Communist parties across the Eurasian landmass.  
 
Students led the protests in China, which began on April 15th by 
mourning the death of former General Secretary of the CCP, Hu 
Yaobang.23 Protestors raised slogans against corruption and profiteering, 
and for democracy. Au and Bai see the movement on Tiananmen Square 
in 1989 as the culmination of increasing unrest amongst the working 
class at the consequences of market reforms, anger at corruption, and a 
sense of being betrayed by party leaders. They cite as evidence Deng 
Xiaoping’s actions in banning the right to strike in 1982; promoting 
entrepreneurial rights and private property; collaborating with world 
capitalism; and keeping Hong Kong capitalist after its return to China in 
1997 (Au et al., 2012). 
  
Many workers visited the Tiananmen protests, were supportive of the 
students’ demands, and joined in their debates. A small group of workers 
formed an independent workers’ organisation called the Beijing 
Autonomous Workers’ Federation (BWAF), to defend the students and 
promote this new movement amongst the working class. BWAF 
demanded wage rises, price freezes, and income declarations from 
officials. BWAF was only open to workers. It initially declared adherence 
to the national constitution and sought to develop an alternative to the 
ACFTU. 
 
The students sought dialogue with the party leadership but intransigent 
responses in the party press provoked a student hunger strike. This 
increased the sympathy and support of the working class. ‘Under heavy 
pressure from their own members, the ACFTU donated 100,000 yuan to 
the students. Cadres from the official trade unions took part in 
demonstration (sic) to express solidarity with the students.’  (Au et al., 
2012, p. 138) 
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Lower level ACFTU cadres and students called for dialogue with the 
students; a free press, monitoring of officials, punishment of corruption, 
political reform, trade union reform, and self-management of the unions 
(Au et al., 2012, pp. 134–138). BAWF called for ‘an honest and 
incorruptible Chinese Communist Party, one which has the Chinese 
proletariat as its mainstay’ (Au et al., 2012, p. 139). 
 
Autonomous workers’ organizations developed in various cities. In 
Beijing BWAF’s influence increased and its demands became more 
radical. On May 19th they called for a one-day general strike if the 
government did not accept the demands of the students. Even though 
BWAF’s declarations claimed to speak as the voice of the workers and 
the leadership of the movement, it never became powerful enough to 
make their strike calls materialize. 
 
A split in the leadership of the CCP on how to handle the conflict led to 
the resignation of Zhao Ziyang, then General Secretary of the party. He 
went to Tiananmen Square, tearfully apologized, and pleaded with 
students to end their hunger strike. His plea was ignored and he was 
placed under house arrest until his death in 2005. On 20 May martial law 
was declared and troops entered Beijing. Protestors erected barricades 
to stop troop-carrying trucks from reaching central Beijing and attempted, 
with some success, to fraternize with soldiers. Troops withdrew on 24 
May. Student leaders remained hostile to workers’ participation and often 
held rather elitist views about their superiority over the working class.  
 
At the end of May Beijing government enterprises were instructed to dock 
the pay of those workers who join the protests, which Yu claims ‘explains 
a temporary decline in the number of workers participating in the events.’ 
(Au et al., 2012, p. 142) 
 
Troops re-entered Beijing on 4 June, forcibly removed barricades and 
cleared Tiananmen Square - the focus of the protests. Yu argues that the 
movement was defeated because it underestimated government 
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determination, and the autonomous workers’ movement appeared too 
late and lacked experience. 
6.9.2. Associational power after 1989 
 
When resistance to privatisation and the restructuring of state owned 
enterprises came to a head in the late 1990s. Overt workers’ unrest by 
state employees from the 1990s until 2002 often drew on Maoist ideology 
and slogans. Freidman and Lee argue that these protests slowed down 
privatisation, ‘convincing the state to hold on to a significant number of 
large enterprises’ (Friedman and Lee, 2010, p. 518). 
 
Radical changes in labour contracts and welfare provision increased the 
power of employers and shifted welfare provision outside of factory walls 
by means of contributory insurance plans. New labour laws were largely 
ignored by private and foreign enterprises, which provided most new 
employment opportunities in urban areas.  Labour unrest in the mid-
1990s often took the form of ‘short-sit ins outside local labour offices 
aimed at provoking government officials into ordering capitalists to obey 
labour laws’ (Pringle, 2013, p. 196). 
 
Legal measures to address grievances have become a focal point for 
workers’ unrest. Claims and disputes taken to arbitration rose 
dramatically throughout the last 20 years, both for individual and 
collective cases.24 This has been particularly evident in high growth 
regions.  Workers and state bodies treat arbitration seriously. In the event 
of local officials conspiring with employers, workers commonly resort to 
collective action to secure the active intervention of higher-level 
government agencies (Friedman and Lee, 2010, pp. 517–518). 
 
In chapter 3, we found that fundamental features of János Kornai’s 
description of a reform socialist system25 remain dominant in China. This 
framework can help us to assess some unique characteristics of current 
workers’ struggles and the balance of power relations in China. One 
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pertinent observation made by Kornai was the tendency for self-
management to emerge under conditions of reform socialism.  
 
In China, as a concession to the workforce in the process of reforming 
state enterprises, increasing lip service was paid to the democratic 
management rights of the workers as defined in the constitution. Under 
articles 16 and 17, state-owned and collective enterprises ‘practise 
democratic management through congresses of workers and staff and in 
other ways in accordance with the law.’26 The process of restructuring in 
state-owned enterprises often gave rise to conflicts. The organisational 
focus for some successful forms of resistance was the ‘Staff and 
Workers’ Representative Councils’ (SWRC), which are legally entitled to 
veto and control management (Xiaoyang and Chan, 2005)(Philion, 2009). 
 
Chapter 5, Article 52 of the Enterprise Law defines the rights of the 
SWRC thus: 
‘1. To be informed and to examine major strategic policies such as long-
term plans, annual plans, basic investments, reinvestment plans, plans 
for leasing and subcontracting, and so on; 
2. To examine, agree to, or veto policies related to wages, bonus and 
industrial safety issues, and regulations pertaining to penalties and 
merits. 
3. To examine and decide on policies related to the staff and workers’ 
welfare, distribution of housing, and other important welfare matters. 
4. To monitor and assess the performance of responsible cadres at each 
level and to make suggestions on how to reward, penalize, and dismiss 
them; and 
5. To elect the factory manager according to the arrangement of the 
supervisory government bureaucracy, and to report the election results to 
the said bureaucracy for approval.’ (cited in Xiaoyang and Chan, 2005, p. 
12) 
 
These legal rights can become a sharply contested domain of struggle 
within workplaces. And they are not simply remnants from a distant 
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Maoist past. For example, in 2010 the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Congress adopted comprehensive regulations seeking to extend the 
Workers’ Congress system throughout all Shanghai enterprises 
regardless of ownership type.27 
 
Extremes of labour exploitation and abuse in contemporary China have 
come to global attention. They particularly shock those nostalgic for the 
slow pace of work and ubiquitous welfare provision in many urban state 
owned enterprises in the 1980s. In recent times cases came to light 
which shocked the nation: workers beaten and subject to ritual 
humiliation; children sold as slaves to work as beasts of burden in brick 
kilns, some of them were beaten unconscious and thrown into mixers.  
 
Foxconn, one of the largest employers in the world, manufactures for 
major global brands like Apple, but only young people can cope with the 
intensity of work. The factory regime is strict and punishing, and the 
isolation of individual workers is rigorously imposed in their vast factories. 
The regularity and copycat nature of suicides, by jumping from a height 
inside the factory, made world news and safety nets were put up around 
the factory to prevent suicides. Fines, illegal detention, delayed wage 
payments, abuses of authority, and all manner of ruthless and barbaric 
exploitation often used to control labour discipline in private and foreign 
enterprises.  
 
In 2004 only 12.5% of migrant workers with rural residential status were 
employed on a labour contract. In 2006 a State Council research team 
reported that the majority of migrant workers were paid irregularly or late, 
68% had no rest day (Friedman and Lee, 2010, p. 510). However, a 
campaign to stamp out the prevalence of wage arrears amongst migrant 
workers was initiated by former Premier Wen Jiabao in 2004. After this, 
the percentage of migrant workers experiencing wage arrears fell 
dramatically (Meiyan, 2009, pp. 157–160). 
 
Labour laws introduced in 2008 led to an increase in labour unrest. 
Disputes are defined as ‘workers’ initiation of labour disputes and other 
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collective actions such as complaints and strikes.’ (Cai and Wang, 2012, 
p. 11) Disputes increased every year. There were 169,000 disputes in 
1999, but numbers doubled to 931,000 in 2008, and then fell slightly in 
2009. Disputes are categorized as ‘accepted’ (the majority) or ‘mediated’. 
‘Accepted’: means labour arbitration bodies dealt with them. ‘Mediated’: 
means cases resolved before reaching arbitration.  
 
In the year to 2008 disputes increased by 98% in the east, 50% in the 
centre, and 61% in the west of China. Disputes in the eastern region 
made up 76% of all disputes in the same year and are more common 
relative to urban employment there. The more developed provinces have 
the highest incidences. The poorest areas have far fewer disputes. In the 
first half of 2009, disputes affected 25% of state owned and collective 
enterprises, 7.5% of private enterprises, 13.8% of foreign invested firms 
and 11.8% of others (this category includes joint ventures, limited liability 
and joint stock companies) The larger the enterprises the higher the 
incidence of disputes: 36.8% of companies employing more than 1000 
workers reported disputes in 2008 (Cai and Wang, 2012, pp. 12–16).  
 
The main reason for disputes were wages (43% locals, 48.6% migrants), 
wage arrears (8.5% locals, 34.4% migrants) labour contracts (21.7% 
locals, 0.6% migrants), working time (17.1% locals, 0% migrants), 
workplace safety (7% locals, 14.8% migrants) and welfare disputes 
(2.6% locals, 1.7% migrants) (Cai and Wang, 2012, p. 19).  
 
Informal and flexible labour employment was often organized in the form 
of dispatched labour (labour organized to work at a location for a specific 
time by a labour supplier). The 2008 Contract Labour Law permits the 
use of dispatch labor to fill ‘temporary, auxiliary or substitute job 
positions’. However, the practice spread from foreign enterprises to 
private and state owned entities as a means of bypassing the legal 
responsibilities and obligations that would apply to workers on full-time 
contracts. In 2010 a survey of the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) reported there were 60 million dispatch workers.28 However the 
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legal loophole was closed in December 2012 by amendments to the 
Labour Law.  
 
Freidman and Lee describe the political economy of Chinese 
employment as being based on the authoritarian and monopolistic power 
of the CCP over society. This has three characteristics that shape 
relations with the working class: local accumulation aids and abets pro-
capitalist actions by local government; rule by law seeks to legitimize 
official channels by mediating and controlling the regulation of labour 
related issues; and the migrant labour system ensures that unrest tends 
to be limited and localized (Friedman and Lee, 2010, pp. 514–516). 
 
Protests by migrant workers tend to respect legal channels until/unless 
they appear exhausted or inadequate. Then, the protests may involve 
strikes, blockades, sit-ins or the threat of mass suicide. Some cases 
involved killing bosses or kidnapping them. Factory occupations and riots 
also appear as part of the armoury of tactics used by migrant workers.  
 
Freidman and Lee look to autonomous workers’ organisations as the 
remedy to the ACFTU’s failure to represent at a grass roots level. They 
argue that there is an embedded relationship between employers and 
union officials, and there is an engrained and fundamental opposition to 
independent trade unionism in the ACFTU and the CCP. Independent 
labour NGOs and advocates engage in advisory work, which is generally 
aimed at rights awareness, but this can also lead to direct participation in 
disputes.  
 
However, the 2008 Contract Labour Law significantly improved the legal 
position of the workers. Contract workers now have far greater security of 
employment; jobs for life automatically follow after two-contract terms or 
10 years employment. The provision of severance pay has also 
improved. Freidman and Lee view the promotion of formal employment 
as a mechanism for the state to control labour unrest by channelling it 
into safe legalistic pathways. They acknowledge that the burden this 
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places on labour bureaus exceeds their capacity to process them and 
foresee an inevitable rise in labour unrest.  
 
In April 2007 a strike by dockworkers in Shenzhen spread to another port 
in the city, and pushed the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions to 
intervene on the side of the workers. The general tendency is for such 
outbreaks of unrest to come to a partial or full victory for the workers’ 
demands (Friedman and Lee, 2010, pp. 518–520). 
 
In  2008-9, when the world economic crisis affected Chinese exporters 
most sharply, many employers absconded without paying wages. Angry 
protests by workers followed. Workers anger led local governments to 
put pressure on employers to limit the negative impact of the economic 
crisis. Cases of overt collusion in maintaining illegal employment 
practices, or of local government turning a blind eye to Contact Labour 
Law provisions were also evident.  
 
Yu Jianrong works at the Social Problems Research Centre of the Rural 
Development Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences and is probably the most influential scholar monitoring social 
unrest in China. He identifies several characteristics of mounting worker 
discontent. These include, the sudden and spontaneous nature of 
disputes, the disbelief in official responses, the distrust of local 
authorities, and the faith in national government.29 Protests generally 
concentrate on rights specified in the law. The availability of modern 
means of duplication and access to information has enabled militancy to 
be energetically channelled into exposing the discrepancy between the 
arbitrary nature of the exercise of power on a local level, and the 
contrasting positive legal rights of the poor. Indeed, simply photocopying 
and sharing laws and directives can act as a shield and weapon. The 
subaltern classes have discovered a powerful means of unifying their 
actions, morale, and sense of just cause, whilst avoid the repressive 
measures traditionally associated with dissidence and rebellion.30 
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Yu reports that workers at the Tonghua Iron and Steel went on strike 
against a takeover bid by the privately owned Jianlong Steel Holding 
Company in 2009. ‘On July 24, 2009 Tonghua Iron and Steel had a strike 
[during which] the general manager was killed. Afterwards, [workers] in 
old state-owned enterprises in many places came up with slogans. One 
of them was “When the Tonghua Big Boss is doing [bad] things, what 
should one do about it?” This scared a lot of bosses at state-owned 
factories that were being restructured so much that they didn’t show up 
for work. Why? They were afraid of being killed.’ 31 
 
Surprisingly perhaps, popular opinion appeared to consider the killing of 
the boss to be justified. The incident was widely seen as indicative of 
proletarian anger and popular resentment. One consequence of the 
strike was that the Jilin State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) cancelled privatisation. Zhang 
Wangcheng, a professor of the China Labour Studies Centre at Beijing 
Normal University, blamed the trade union for the failure to pre-empt the 
unrest and reduce tensions.32 A month later the ACFTU published a 
statement that privatisations are illegal unless agreed by the workers’ 
congress.33 
 
When a strike broke out on May 17th 2010 at Honda’s components 
factory in Foshan, it began as a dispute about low salaries, soon some 
1800 workers joined in. They proactively demanded wage rises, new pay 
scales and career structures, and democratized their workplace union 
representation. This brought to a head the need for unions to be 
controlled by the workers themselves.34 The ACFTU leadership nationally 
announced that democratic elections would replace the appointment of 
union officials from above, ‘step by step’, which seems to endorse the 
Honda workers’ ideas.35  
 
An appeal by the strikers indicates the development of a national 
workers’ consciousness. ‘Our struggle for rights is not a struggle to 
protect the mere interests of 1800 workers. We are concerned with the 
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rights and interests of the workers in the whole country. We want to 
demonstrate a good example of the struggle for rights of workers.’ 36 
 
The strike lasted for 17 days and involved 1,800 workers who initially 
raised over 100 demands including a pay rise of 800 yuan a month and 
the democratic election of workplace union representatives. The 
management tried to intimidate the workers and local trade union officials 
attempted to subvert the strike. The intervention of Zeng Qinghong tipped 
the balance. Zeng is the CEO of Honda's (50% state owned) joint-
venture partner and a member of the National People's Congress. He 
encouraged the workers to elect their representatives in his presence. 
They issued an appeal stating that their strike was for the wider interest 
of workers throughout the country. The company backtracked and 
initiated departmental workers elections. Negotiations drew in the local 
government, the enterprise union chairperson, the workers’ delegates, 
Chang Kai, a sympathetic labour professor from Beijing, and Zeng 
Qinghong. A wage rise of 500 yuan (32.4%) for ordinary workers and of 
600 yuan (70%) for student interns was agreed.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Honda strike a wave of similar disputes 
broke out in factories across China, but were most common in 
Guangdong province. In order to regulate and control these spontaneous 
outbursts, the Guangdong Province People’s Congress discussed a new 
law, the ‘Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises’. 
The proposed regulations envisaged a significant extension of workers 
rights, for example, if 20% of workers in any enterprise demand an 
increase in wages, the workers would have the right to elect their own 
representatives to negotiate with management. In the event of their 
demands being ignored the workers would be able to strike, and the 
management would not be able to sack them.37 The proposals also 
envisaged that workers would be guaranteed a one third representation 
on the board of directors and be able to negotiate on a wide range of 
issues. Hong Kong manufacturers claim to have successfully lobbied 
Beijing to shelve these proposals, warning that giving workers a say in 
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management will provoke ‘endless fights in the boardroom’ because 
‘employers want to pay less and employees want to get paid more’.38 
 
After the Honda strike there were no reprisals against worker activists, 
but the area trade unions manoeuvred to weaken representation of more 
militant workers. Nevertheless at negotiations one year later, the workers 
also won big wage rises. The Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU) responded to this challenge of workers' militancy by initiating 
direct elections in 163 workplaces with over 1000 workers (Chan, 2013, 
pp. 129–130). However, student activists took jobs at five factories that 
were declared to have model trade unions and discovered multiple 
breaches of the Labour Law and minimal sporadic engagement between 
the union and the workforce. This, despite numerous encouraging 
statements from Wang Tongxin the vice-chairperson of the SFTU 
promoting democratic trade union representation.39 
 
Yu Jianrong notes that the strike participants were mainly born in the 80s 
and 90s, and in a break from the pattern in recent years: ‘’They were not 
only protecting existing rights, but were seeking to expand their rights. 
This indicates a new phase in the rights defence movement of the new 
generation of wage labourers, which may hasten the birth of a new 
workers’ rights movement.’ (Yu, 2014a, pp. 86–87) 
6.10. Social unrest and the CCP’s pursuit of stability 
 
‘The CCP’s historical ideology and legitimacy declares that the “workers 
are the ruling class” and “peasants are allies” (of the ruling class). Yet, 
the capitalists’ status has been raised far more in the past decades of 
reform. The nation is entering a stage of being a well-off society while 
hundreds of millions of peasants and workers cannot make ends meet. 
This gap between reality and professed ideology will inevitably shake the 
political root of the CCP’s ideology and stability of its rule. Avoiding the 
escalation of social conflict will require, at a minimum, a better protection 
of the fundamental rights and interests of all citizens, particularly workers 
and peasants.’ (Yu, 2007, pp. 13–14) 
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A study by Yongshun Cai into collective labour unrest against factory 
closures and job losses in SOEs, revealed that protests were led by 
people from the following backgrounds, 29.2% previous enterprise 
leaders, 22% party-member workers, 17% current enterprise leaders, 
9.8% military veterans, 22% others. In other words sections of the CCP 
and state bureaucracy led the majority of such disputes (Cai, 2006, pp. 
107–108). 
 
Similarly, Yu Jianrong’s research indicates that a layer of people with 
internal knowledge and experience of the system often constitute the 
unifying force which galvanizes and expresses social unrest: ‘The 
foundations for mass social movement in China may already be laid as 
there are indications that workers, peasants and the lower class of 
intellectuals are forging a common identity. Up to this point, workers and 
peasants have not yet merged into one coherent social group, even 
though they share a common social status and interests. The formation 
of their common identity and goals may require an outside group that can 
act as the bond to bring workers and peasants together. This group could 
be the 20 million demobilized and retired soldiers living in rural China, 
which possesses the social capital, organizational, networking and 
mobilization capabilities to be the bridge between workers and peasants. 
 
‘They have already been prominently contributing to peasants’ movement 
to reduce tax burdens and protect land rights. In some southern regions, 
demobilized and retired soldiers have launched movements to mobilize 
both workers and peasants. For example, in some regions in Hunan 
Province, demobilized and retired soldiers built a 100,000-person ‘anti-
corruption brigade’ that was mainly comprised of laid-off workers, poor 
peasants and lower class intellectuals. In fact, corruption may be the one 
factor that could bring workers and peasants together since both see this 
as the root cause of their current predicament and misery. In all past and 
current social conflicts that involve a combination of workers and 
peasants, their demands have universally held up anti-corruption (sic) as 
the common enemy.’ (Yu, 2007, p. 11) 
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Yu found that 60% of outbreaks of rural unrest revolve around violations 
of peasant land rights and 80% of all protests nationwide are defensive 
conflicts. In other words, Yu believes that they can be resolved with 
money. By default he maintains that the CCP’s designation of such 
economic conflicts as “contradictions among the people” is correct as 
they are do not threaten the system of power itself.  
He suggests that granting land tenure would be the best means to 
alleviate the pressure of persistent outbreaks of rural discontent (Yu, 
2014b).  
 
Whilst Yu believes that China’s overall system is stable, he qualifies this 
designation as one of ‘rigid stability’. It is based on those in power 
dividing up the spoils. This means that unrest rapidly escalates into a 
challenge to their power. Yu advocates reform to establish system of 
‘resilient stability’ based on a fair and impartial distribution of wealth, 
democratic empowerment and popular control over People’s Congresses 
at the country level, and judicial reform to institutionalize procedures and 
establish the rule of law (Yu, 2014a). 
 
The existing system relies on agencies of surveillance and repression 
and on pressure relief outlets, like the petitioning system, which allows 
aggrieved citizens to petition high-levels of government. However, this 
channel encourages bolder and more determined petitioners to target 
higher-level authorities as soon as they can, and to mobilize people to 
increase the pressure. The flip side of this is that local governments 
accused of wrongdoing often try to hinder petitioners from taking their 
protests up the hierarchal ladder. Cases of petitioners being dispatched 
to mental asylums, being detained by local police, and of their petitions 
being deregistered by means of bribery, have been commonplace (Yu, 
2014c). 
 
Stability maintenance known, as wenwen is one of the highest priorities 
of the Party and it encompasses a vast range of state institutions from 
pinnacle of power down to neighbourhood and village level committees. It 
consumes much of the domestic security budget said to be US $25.6bn 
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in 2016.40 However, stability maintenance activities are so all 
encompassing that they draw on funds and personnel from a very wide 
range of state and party agencies as well as from SOEs and private 
sector enterprises (Chen, 2013, p. 61) 
 
One of the central characteristics of the wenwen system is the 
willingness of state agencies to spend inordinate sums on containing 
perceived threats posed by determined activists. This can entail 
repressive measures; or it can involve official agencies going out of their 
way to pacify and resolve conflicts. Chen cites an example when 
relatives of someone killed in a traffic accident in Hubei Province were 
unable to secure adequate compensation they launched protests to 
pressure the police. Police officials found them a lawyer and police funds 
were used to pay the family, and this even involved a collection from 
officers. Such conciliatory state and party actions tend to encourage 
copycat displays of militancy. Stipulations restricting the use of legitimate 
force hamper local officials seeking to contain unrest, so they often turn 
to underhand methods, underworld gangs etc., as a means of bypassing 
official procedures. However, it is also common for judicial organs to 
bend the rules to the benefit of more militant protestors (Chen, 2013, pp. 
62–63).  
 
This rigid form of stability is identified by Yu Jianrong as a fragile system 
particularly when confronted by social unrest. Those in power view 
protest action as a destabilizing threat to their power, which is seen as a 
zero sum game, wherein instability poses a threat to those who hold 
power. As the core of stability policy is containing unrest. It is a system 
for the management of unrest after it breaks out, rather than a 
preventative one. When unrest does break out everything is done to 
secure a resolution. The pressure on officials to contain instability 
occupies much of their time and energy. And the complexity of many 
issues that arise is often beyond the capacities of local officials to 
resolve. Such officials may be stuck in a position where they can’t satisfy 
their superiors and can’t control the anger of the lower classes (Yu, 
2014a, pp. 88–89).  
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Yu captures the dynamics between upper and lower levels of the Party 
and state and wider society succinctly, with a phrase, ‘the central 
government pressures the local government, the local government 
pressures the people, and the people pressure the central government’ 
(Yu, 2014a, p. 90).  
 
Studies of workers' unrest point to the economic nature of most disputes. 
Yu notes that common forms of workers' unrest include petitioning higher 
levels of government, sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and blocking traffic. 
In order to deflect from allegations of illegal assembly and action, 
protestors often employ innovative and comical methods when 
negotiating with police or other authorities. For example, to avoid the 
consequences of being accused of organising illegal demonstrations and 
marches, such events occur under the auspices of ‘taking a walk’ or 
‘going sightseeing’. Legal rights are often used to frame the demands of 
protests but the legal framework also hinders workers’ action, as 
channels of legitimate expression are ineffective, and local state 
agencies may collude with employers. However, when put in a corner 
agencies of the state often grant wholesale concessions.41 
 
The issue of corruption took centre stage when Xi Jinping became the 
party's General Secretary of the CCP and the country's president in 
2012.  
For Yu these patterns reveal the urgent need to take active measures to 
enforce constitutional legal rights as what he calls the baseline of social 
stability. He views a system based on legal rights as being superior to 
'rigid stability', centred around the state monopoly of violence, ideology, 
and controls on societal organizations. 
 
Workers' conflict plays an important role in influencing party and state 
policies. However, the nature of long-term policy initiatives that enhanced 
workers rights, such as the 2008 Labour Law, and the introduction of the 
right to form democratic workers' congresses in all workplaces - private 
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and state, - in the Shanghai municipality in 201142 are not simply 
reactions to immediate threats.  
 
Nor can such measures simply be dismissed as remnants of Maoist 
rhetoric or trickery, rather they constitute contemporary attempts by party 
and state agencies to construct mechanisms to channel and contain 
workers' discontent. These laws and regulations are couched in terms 
drawn from the dictionary of democratic workers' self-management - a 
trend that Kornai describes as being wholly socialist in origin (Kornai, 
2007, pp. 461–463). Some scholars of China’s workers’ movements have 
noted examples of workers' protests that revolved around official 
legislative structures for workers' management (Xiaoyang and Chan, 
2005; Philion, 2009). 
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6.10.1. Perspectives on workers’ associational power 
 
Walder presents an image of the CCP’s state creating a working class 
from 1949 to 1979. This provides a useful framework to consider the 
structural formation of production, the working class and state 
organisation. However, in Walder’s work the workers are mainly seen as 
passive objects of manipulation rather than active or reactive participants 
or historical protagonists. The Marxist historical school associated with 
E.P Thompson informs Xing’s (2011) sophisticated assessment of 
China’s working class as a ‘class-for-itself’. Xing investigates the way that 
contemporary struggles and consciousness assume a variety of forms 
that invoke Maoist language and believes that this historical workers’ 
culture expresses a positive identification with the ideals, experiences 
and struggles, that took place under the Maoist form of socialism. These 
forms affect workers’ consciousness in various ways, shaping their 
attitudes to concepts like: ‘workers are the masters of the state’; 
collectivism; egalitarianism; and their perception of fundamental 
categories such as capitalism and socialism.  
 
Xing finds that Chinese workers’ invocation of Maoist phraseology is 
neither nostalgic nor tactical but forms part of the core identity of their 
subjective consciousness, expressing itself in their communications and 
culture. Lee argues that workers’ struggles are primarily rights struggles 
rather than class struggles, which, when invoked, are simply fading 
reflections from the socialist past (Lee, 2007). However, the CCP claims 
its legitimacy based on its revolutionary heritage. ‘The memory of the 
revolution and Maoist socialism has become an ideological and cultural 
resource for class- consciousness and the recomposition of the Chinese 
working class in the post socialist transformation’ (Xing, 2011, p. 23). 
 
The forms that workers’ communications take: in song; poetry; and in the 
popular reaction by millions on the Internet to issues dear to the workers 
hearts, present evidence to back up Xing’s theory. Xing points to the 
development of Hyde Park, Speakers’ Corner type centres of debate: on 
socialism, capitalism and reform, in locations previously designated as 
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workers’ cultural palaces. These debates are dominated by a broadly 
Maoist framework and language. Xing takes the view that this 
consciousness is a real factor defining struggles of the workers and 
perspectives for a future democratic socialist transformation in China.   
6.11. Conclusion 
 
China’s class structure is unique in the history of socialist states and it 
has understandably come in for criticism from opponents of capitalism.  
 
To help interpret the character of contemporary class relations in China, I 
re-examine Kornai’s concept of soft-budget constraints. I relate this to his 
idea that the dilution of socialist ideology and the loosening of the 
system’s internal coherence under reform socialism can strengthen the 
hand of the workers. This is particularly, but not exclusively, true within 
public enterprises and institutions at the commanding heights of the 
economy.  
 
The soft-budget constraint is not only a category of economic 
inefficiency; it emerges spontaneously from social relations in production 
between the working class, the party and the bureaucracy. It expresses 
multiple forms of pressure that the workers are able to exert on the 
bureaucracy at a micro and macro level. But it also corresponds with the 
internal motives of the bureaucracy. SBC is ingrained in the relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the workers, and represents one of the 
fundamental characteristics of Kornai’s theory of reform socialism. As 
such, SBC plays a central role in defining the actions and behaviour of 
the bureaucracy and the party.  
 
Wright’s theory of class power employs concepts that evaluate the 
structural position of the workers in the productive system, and the forms 
of associational power that they can bring to bear within a system. His 
concept of a triangle of power between the workers, the capitalists and 
the state, offers a useful framework to evaluate China’s class system. 
The CCP state created China’s working class between 1949 and 1981, 
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and continues to claim that it rules on their behalf. As a consequence, the 
legal and moral structure of state power continues to derive its 
legitimacy, vis-à-vis the workers, from its ‘communist’ and ‘socialist’ self-
identity. The proliferation of capitalist enterprises generated a new 
working class in the reform era. Policies designed to harden budget 
constraints and discipline the workforce in the state sector have been 
promoted and implemented on numerous occasions since the 1980s.  
 
The immense growth of the migrant labour force was exploited by 
indigenous and foreign private enterprises to create pliant workers with 
few rights. These enterprises encircle state enterprises and operate 
under conditions of hard budget constraints. So, under the pressure of 
market discipline, many state enterprises were closed, sold off, or 
restructured. However, the reformed state enterprises not only survived, 
they improved their operations, increased their workforce, and sealed 
their dominance over the economy by means of their semi-monopolistic 
status, backed by government support through easy credit. Tens of 
millions of workers were laid off between 1998-2001 but in direct contrast 
to the laws of supply and demand, urban wages rose rapidly, regardless 
of the dramatic spike in unemployment that occurred. Similarly, when the 
Great Recession hit China and the world economy in 2008, another spike 
in unemployment, emanated from the private sector. It was during this 
time that the state introduced labour legislation, which represented a 
significant improvement in the rights of workers. These moves were 
synchronized with an immense unionization drive, which anchors and 
extends the role of official trade unions within all types of enterprises. 
This represents a means to extend the influence of the party and the 
state into the private sector and to ameliorate and contain workers’ 
discontent within official institutions and structures. Similarly, the recent 
introduction of legislation extending the rights of Staff and Workers’ 
Representative Councils to veto managerial decisions can probably best 
be understood as a means to pre-emptively contain spontaneous 
outbursts of unrest, by channeling their focus into institutional forms 
dominated by Party officials. This process to contain unrest is also 
manifest in the focus of the CCP leadership on maintaining social 
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stability, which Yu Jianrong has brilliantly described as a system of rigid 
stability, in which the dynamics of national-local bureaucratic power 
relations are shaped by the need to respond to outbursts of social unrest.  
















































































40 Finance ministry statement reported in http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-security-



















7. Conclusion: Is China still socialist? 
7.1. What is the significance for Kornai’s theory if China is still socialist?  
7.2. What about the workers?  
7.3. What relevance does Preobrazhensky’s theory have for studying China?  
7.4 Questions for a future research agenda 




This thesis addresses the question of whether China is still socialist. To 
answer this question János Kornai’s theory of socialism acts as my 
primary reference point. His theory is deeply influential in the field of the 
political economy of socialism, and played an important role in top-level 
academic and policy debates on reform in Eastern Europe and China.  
 
I believe that socialists should welcome the research and insights offered 
by János Kornai in his book the Socialist System. Its overview of the 
basic social and economic regularities of a bureaucratic socialist state 
offers profound insight into the socialist systems that held power over a 
third of humanity in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
Kornai believes that the encirclement of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
economic base by capitalist enterprises, and the internal corruption of 
party cadres, has produced a system whose outer shell resembles a 
socialist system, but whose inner nature is defined by its interpenetration 
with capitalist interests, which produced a qualitative transformation into 
capitalism (3.3). By contrast, I show that China conforms to Kornai’s own 
definition of socialism.  
 
The categories that Kornai uses to define socialism have a systematic, 
coherent, and logical structure. He employs three primary definitions.  
1. Rule by a Communist Party that is hostile to private property.  
2. Public ownership of the commanding heights of the economy. 
3. Bureaucratic coordination of the economy by means of planning.  
In addition, he identifies a number of secondary features and tendencies, 
which appear with regularity in those societies that are based on the 
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above three characteristics of socialism (2.4.1-2.4.3) 
Of these secondary features of socialism, I focus attention on the 
dynamics of forced growth (2.3.3.1), socialist economic cycles (2.4.3.2), 
vertical dependence (2.6.1), soft budget constraints (2.6.2), and market 
socialism (2.5.2).  
 
Kornai’s method of categorization and analysis of socialist states is 
rooted in his observation of systems that ruled over a third of humanity in 
the 20th century. During his intellectual voyage from being an advocate of 
Marxism to become a supporter of capitalism, he developed his systems 
theory. This approach originates from the Marxist method employed in 
the analysis of capitalism as a whole, and to study socialist systems in 
the 20th century as a totality.   
  
In order to verify if China fits Kornai’s definition of socialism, I draw on 
specialist English language literature and scholarship on Chinese 
economics, politics, and class relations. However, no previous scholars 
have attempted a detailed assessment of this literature with the express 
intention of comparing China to Kornai’s theory of socialism. Where 
statistics are relied on to clarify ownership relations, for example in 
Limited Liability Companies and Shareholding enterprises (3.7-3.7.2), it 
must be conceded that the data may suffer from deliberate and 
accidental attempts to conceal the facts. This may serve as a means of 
protecting interest groups and individuals from critical scrutiny or even 
criminal charges. This is a particularly important phenomenon in 
contemporary China, where the scope of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign has generated a widespread sense of fear within bureaucratic 
administrative circles at the upper and lower levels of the Party and state 
(3.9).  However, to mitigate the risks of relying on potentially misleading 
data, I draw on analysis and research from leading China scholars with 
scrupulous credentials for accuracy who are widely recognized by 
academics in the field (Dickson, 2011; Bruce J Dickson, 2014; Goodman, 
2014; Heilmann, 2017; Heilmann and Melton, 2013; Huang, 2008; Lin et 
al., 2003; Lin, 2012; Naughton, 1996, 2013, 2017; Oi and Walter, 2011; 
Shambaugh, 2016, 2008; Walder, 1984; Andrew G Walder, 2004; 
	 277	
Walder, 2011b; Xu, 2011, 2017) 
 
I believe that Kornai’s approach, whose central focus is on the evaluation 
of the social relations of power in the context of the socialist system, is 
broadly correct. It draws special attention to the Party’s exclusive control, 
the bureaucratic hierarchy, the appointment system, social organizations, 
the mass media, the education system etc., in other words, to the full 
panoply of its instruments of power (3.4-3.8).  
 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that although China’s system 
provides a very close match with Kornai’s theory of socialist systems, this 
match stretches the parameters of his original concept to incorporate 
elements that were certainly not part of the experience of socialism 
before 1989, e.g. there were no billionaires (4.2), and although private 
businesses existed in reform socialist countries, the size, scale, quantity 
and quality (4.10.1) of private business operating in China today, dwarfs 
anything that existed in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, or in China itself 
before 1989.  
7.1. What is the significance for Kornai’s theory if China is still socialist? 
 
Kornai’s foray into the study of capitalism as a system (4.11) puts its 
main emphasis on one feature; the “surplus economy”. He defines this as 
a “system specific feature” of capitalism, and the “shortage economy” as 
a system specific feature of socialism. However, although Kornai 
previously employed these categories as systemic features in his earlier 
work on socialism, they were relegated to secondary and subordinate 
role, and so, were not used to define the system.  
 
The problem with his new approach is twofold.  
1. It risks undermining the internal coherence of Kornai’s general theory 
of socialism.  
2. If, as I contend, China’s three core systemic features correspond with 
Kornai’s original theory of reform socialism, then either the phenomenon 
of a surplus economy is compatible with socialism, or China’s system 
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shows that capitalism can also be based on the three basic foundations 
of socialism.  
 
Xu Chenggang who is a close collaborator with Kornai, attempts to 
resolve Kornai’s dilemma by identifying China’s system as a Leninist 
form of “state capitalism,” similar to the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 
the Soviet Union during the 1920s (4.11). Whilst I concur with Xu’s view 
that the Chinese system displays core features that resemble the NEP, I 
find that his employment of the term “state capitalism” conceals more 
than it explains. State capitalism under Lenin was the use of capitalist 
methods to improve the economy of the socialist state. Indeed, Kornai 
identifies the Soviet Union in the 1920s as a “revolutionary transitional 
system” and views Leninism as the original prototype of all future 
socialist states (2.3).  
 
In Kornai’s view the central political difference between capitalism and 
socialism is that while socialism and capitalism can both be dictatorial 
political systems, socialism can never be democratic (Kornai, 2016, p. 
569). However, if, as Kornai holds, China is already capitalist, then there 
is no objective hindrance to China becoming democratic. Then the 
hypothetical question arises, what if China’s system were to become 
democratic and yet simultaneously retain a dominant role for the state 
economy? And what if outbursts of discontent find expression in 
demands for a democratic form of socialism? Kornai categorically 
excludes the combination of socialism with democracy. His justification 
for this assessment is based on the experience of real socialist states but 
this clearly contains a powerful normative element. 
 
If public ownership of the commanding heights and a dominant role for 
planning are, at least potentially, neutral systemic features, this signifies 
that the degree of hostility or tolerance towards private property by the 
ruling political power is the quality that defines a system as either 
socialist or capitalist. Then, when public ownership of the commanding 
heights and planned coordination predominate, the choice of socialism or 
capitalism is simply a subjective decision made by political leaders. If so, 
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there is nothing socialist about the combination of public ownership of the 
commanding heights and planned coordination of the economy. If 
changing system is a purely subjective choice, then selecting between 
socialism and capitalism is a capricious affair. However, if the property 
forms of each system are aligned with specific class and bureaucratic 
interests, then even the most determined attempt to change to or from a 
socialist system may encounter stiff or insurmountable resistance.  
 
I think this goes some way to explain why declarations and resolutions, 
like the decision of the Third Plenum in 2013 that championed markets 
and private sector interests in China are thwarted by a coalition of 
bureaucratic interests (3.8). Similarly, in capitalist democracies, Social 
Democratic parties that are elected on a popular mandate to elevate 
public interest and public property above capitalist interests, meet stiff 
resistance from forces defending capitalism.  
 
Indeed, Kornai interprets the mass unrest in China in 1989 as an 
expression of popular antipathy against capitalist reforms (6.9.1) 
‘The man in the street …lumps together higher earnings earned by 
real merit with those accruing from privileges of power, and market 
profits with the ill-gotten gains of corruption. A surge of hatred for 
‘speculators’ and ‘corruption’ breaks out. That was one factor 
influencing the atmosphere of the 1989 student demonstrations in 
China. Stuck halfway, the reform process digs the ground from under 
its own feet, alienating a sizable section of the general public.’ (Kornai, 
2007, p. 510 [1992]) 
7.2. What about the workers? 
 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established liberated zones from 
1929 onwards. It designed and exercised local state power in these 
areas until 1949. These are the earliest and most enduring examples of 
isolated statelets ruled by a Communist party and its guerrilla army 
(6.3.1). After 1949, all state power passed to the CCP, and its organs of 
exclusive power penetrated into every institution, community and family.  
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The economic foundation of the system was state-ownership of the 
commanding heights. This political-legal ownership form is also the 
economic foundation of socialism according to Kornai and 
Preobrazhensky. The official ideology continues to operate within the 
terms of reference of communism and socialism and this ideology is not 
accidental (3.4 and 3.7.4). Rather, I believe it is embedded in the specific 
historical relation of forces between various classes and interests as 
Rothenberg suggests (6.5) and I attempt to show this in relation to social 
unrest ((6.9.2 - 6.10.1). I show that bureaucratic power emanates from 
the vast panoply of the CCPs interwoven agencies of control and 
organisation over society (3.5-3.8). 
 
Although Kornai excludes the possibility of combining socialism and 
democracy, he nevertheless points to self-management as a democratic 
socialist tendency that recurrently finds expression in socialist countries 
(2.5.3). The reason why this trend emerges repeatedly in socialist states 
is rooted in the contradictions between communist ideology and the 
reality of workers’ conditions. These contradictions are inherent to the 
nature of socialist systems. In addition, in those socialist countries which 
experienced a long-term labour shortage, Kornai notes that this 
generates workplace relations where: 
 
‘It was generally realized how much this circumstance weakened labor’s 
discipline. Employees justifiably felt they would not be dismissed even if 
they did not try very hard, or even if they shirked entirely. If they were 
dismissed, they could easily find other employment. All managers and 
supervisors continually complained of this. Many of the workers did their 
work properly out of an underlying sense of honesty and identification 
with the job, and in some places where it could be done effectively, they 
might be rewarded for this financially. But they were not haunted by the 
disciplinary specter of unemployment. The situation, let us admit, had 
some advantages for the employees.’ (Kornai, 2014, p. 104) 
 
It is with this feature of Kornai’s theory of socialism in mind that chapter 6 
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considers class and labour relations in China. In particular, it looks at 
how the identity of the party and state, which claims to be the expression 
of the world historical interests of the proletariat, affects the character of 
social and class struggles, and the responses by different levels in the 
party to them. For example, the legitimacy of the CCP rests on its claim 
to incarnate the workers’ interests. Thus, examples of demands from the 
workers to veto enterprise management decisions and to democratize 
trade union elections, particularly in state owned or state controlled 
enterprises are recurrent features in China. Indeed, I would go so far as 
to say that there exists a particular set of economic, political and class 
relations between the Communist Party and the working class within 
socialist systems, which merits classification within Kornai’s system as a 
specific feature of socialism (see parts 6.9.2. and 6.10.). 
 
Kornai attributes those advantages that accrue to workers in socialist 
systems to the persistent tendency to labour shortage. This phenomenon 
also finds expression in system specific types of workers’ unrest, e.g. 
protests, strikes, and other forms of resistance, that break out in socialist 
states. Indeed, “self-management” tendencies are one of the ways that 
the party and bureaucracy reflect and respond to such forms of unrest. 
 
A related phenomenon in Kornai’s theory is the soft budget constraint (see 
parts 2.6. and 6.2.). This is rooted in the structure of social and class relations 
and expresses pressure at the enterprise level, at an industry wide level, and 
through pressure on urban authorities to satisfy the needs of the masses. It 
expresses a myriad of ways that the working class and the peasantry are able 
to exert pressure on lower and upper-levels of the party and bureaucracy to 
protect jobs, and expand social and welfare rights. This integrates concepts of 
class and class struggle into an assessment of the contradictions driving and 
shaping the character of party and state power in China, and it informs my 
analysis of Chinese society today.  
 
The reform era witnessed a colossal expansion in the size of the working class.  
This was based on a process of urbanization and the growth of rural industry. It 
simultaneously undermined and transformed the position of urban workers 
	 282	
within the state sector. These workers previously enjoyed a highly privileged 
position in comparison with non-state workers and with the rural population. 
The Maoist concord between the Party and the urban proletariat elevated their 
designated social position to the ‘leading class’ and the ‘masters of the state’. 
However, the balance of forces anchored in the Maoist era was based on the 
near total prohibition against migration from the country to the cities.  
 
I believe that the character of social unrest in China often appears as a 
self-management tendency. And this corresponds to a wide variety of the 
Chinese protest forms that Yu Jianrong investigates. Eric Olin Wright’s 
analysis takes statist, associational, and economic power to be three 
poles corresponding to specific power relations. These are based on 
bureaucratic interests, like classical Stalinism, free associational 
relations, such as Marx envisaged in advanced socialism, and capitalist 
interests, based on exploitation of the working class through the 
ownership and control of capital. From this perspective self-management 
can be interpreted as the expression of associational power through its 
structurally embedded links to statist power, in other words, the ways that 
CCP and the ACFTU cadres respond to demands of the workers, 
particularly those working in the commanding heights of the state 
economy (6.8.2). The socialist objectives of the Party and the trade 
unions are in conflict with capitalist accumulation and the corruption of 
Party and ACFTU cadres. So, despite the CCP dictatorship, and 
draconian forms employment discipline, particularly in private companies, 
militant unrest is a commonplace. Indeed, the influential role of lower 
level Party members and cadres, who often support or organize these 
workers’ and peasants’ struggles, is well documented (6.10). I maintain 
that the CCP’s claim to represent the interests of the workers and 
peasants remains central to its legitimacy.1 
7.3. What relevance does Preobrazhensky’s theory have for studying 
China? 
 
In chapter 5 Preobrazhensky’s theory of the character of socialist 
accumulation in a backward country is explained by reference to the 
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historical circumstances of the NEP (5.3). During this time, the theory 
was developed and efforts were made to test it against reality. Central to 
this theory is the idea that economic policy during the transition to 
socialism is subject to two main laws. The first is the law of primitive 
socialist accumulation, which seeks to optimize accumulation by the state 
sector by pumping over resources from private sectors of the economy. 
The second law is the law of value, which seeks to elevate profit seeking 
private business interests to the dominant economic regulator of the 
economy.  
 
For Preobrazhensky the idea that the socialist objectives of policy could 
be harmoniously and permanently aligned with capitalist objectives was 
utopian. This is rooted in the concept of a fundamental antagonism 
between the interests of the working class and the capitalists that 
constitutes a core axiom of Marxist thought.  
 
However, during the era of primitive socialist accumulation 
Preobrazhensky envisaged that planning would be based on a mixed 
economy dominated by public ownership at the commanding heights of 
the economy. It was not anticipated that the mixed economy would be 
abolished any time soon. Indeed, the NEP had originally been introduced 
in the Soviet Union as an antidote to War Communism, in which 
nationalization and requisition for the war effort, wiped out privately 
owned enterprises altogether. The NEP encouraged the private economy 
and market based activity and communists learnt to trade.  
Preobrazhensky explained through multiple examples how a socialist 
state could exploit its power over the economy and state to extract 
resources from the private sector (5.5-5.7.4).  
 
It was Preobrazhensky’s view that an optimal policy environment in an 
economy guided by primitive socialist accumulation would permit a rate 
of exploitation from the private economy that would constitute a less 
onerous burden on petty producers than either capitalism or feudalism. If 
the process ensures that plans worked out in advance for the overall 
development of the economy are realized; then this shows that planning 
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based on PSA is the dominant economic regulator. If by contrast the 
private sector regulates the economy then the vicissitudes of profit 
seeking enterprises competing for markets will produce a significantly 
different economic structure, organized by the law of value (5.5.-5.5.3.).  
 
Preobrazhensky’s idea of socialism is rooted in Marx’s concept of 
material development, which, on a timeline, locates socialism in the 
future, when the material foundations for universal abundance are 
attained or are within reach.  
7.4 Questions for a future research agenda 
 
Although I examine China using the lens of Preobrazhensky’s conceptual 
framework, I have not undertaken to provide detailed empirical 
verification for China’s macro-level processes using his method. It is my 
hope that further research, to master the data on China’s economy and 
society may assist the elaboration of plans, and the avoidance or 
limitation of crises. This would require more accurate data sets about the 
forms of ownership and control of the economy in each of the key sectors 
on a national scale. In this way the transfer of resources between 
ownership types can more easily be identified and the process of 
discovering the optimal rate of accumulation could be fine-tuned.  
 
I believe that the following questions emerge from Preobrazhensky’s 
theories, and indicate a future empirical research agenda to help study 
China’s system.  
 
1. What transfers occur between different ownership sectors? 
2. How can ownership relations be more precisely defined? 
3. What is the extent of illegal bureaucratic accumulation? 
4. How can we measure the extent of wealth transferred to the state by 
rural land transfers? 
5. How can the quantity of transfers from peasants who become migrant 
workers be measured? 
6. Do rural collective entities act as collective, state or private 
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companies?  
7. Do patterns of centralization and decentralization correspond with 
increasing or decreasing state accumulation?  
8. How is state accumulation divided between different types of public or 
semi-public enterprises? 
9. To what extent are investments by China’s capitalists linked to state 
planning objectives? 
10. To what degree can market impulses be said to shape the economic 
landscape in China? 
11. How effective are state controls over the in and outflow of capital and 
goods? 
12. How influential are party cells inside capitalist enterprises? 
13. How do party cells operate to shape policy in each type of ownership 
sector? To what extent are there differences based on region, sector, 
etc? 
14. To what degree do China’s tech giants share their data with state 
agencies? 
15. Are state agencies able to effectively employ the big data resources 
that they have access to? 
16. What is the extent of China’s growth that stems from emulation and 
duplication of inventions and innovation developed by capitalism? 
17. How systematic and effective is the planning system in exploiting 
such emulation and duplication?   
18. To what extent is the growth of ACFTU membership fictional? And 
does the ACFTU constitute a power within workplaces? 
7.5 How can Preobrazhensky’s ideas be combined with Kornai’s theory of 
socialism?  
 
Preobrazhensky’s theory of primitive socialist accumulation originated in the 
context of the New Economic Policy in the 1920s; this was a system based on 
state ownership and state monopoly over the commanding heights of the 




Preobrazhensky did not engage in a detailed analysis of the rise of 
bureaucratic planning or how it might amend the principles of primitive 
socialist accumulation. Indeed, in the 1920s, he regarded bureaucratic 
degeneration as a phenomenon that could be contained. His principal 
concern was that capitalist forces might threaten the revolutionary state, 
leading to the overthrow of the dominance of public property in the 
commanding heights of the economy, and the dissolution of the state 
economy.  
 
In a backward socialist economy the optimal rate of socialist accumulation 
inevitably and unavoidably entails the continued existence of capitalist and pre-
capitalist economic forms. By optimal, I refer not to the maximum resources 
that can be acquired by the state at a given moment i.e. by immediate and 
universal nationalization but to the medium and long-term process whereby the 
state economy is able to expand and improve its productive potential through 
an on-going process of accumulation from pre-socialist economic formations 
and social relations. This entails a process more akin to harvesting resources 
from the private sector than expropriating all means of production regardless of 
size, or the capacity of the state to produce the same goods.  
 
According to my interpretation of Preobazhensky’s theory, the coexistence of 
socialist and pre-socialist forms is an essential prerequisite for optimal 
accumulation, growth and progress. Indeed, I maintain that the economic 
constellation, which emerged in the reform era, should not be understood 
simply as the advance of capitalism and the decay and degeneration of 
socialist remnants. Instead, during the reform era the continual predominance 
of public ownership in the commanding heights of the economy combined with 
the structure of political power and bureaucratic administration automatically 
generates pressure to contain the advance of capitalism, and to accumulate 
resources from capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors. From this perspective 
reform socialism, as understood by Kornai, is not necessarily an incoherent 
system, destined for revolutionary destruction and internal disintegration, as he 
believes (see 2.5 to 2.8). 
 
Preobrazhensky’s theory understands socialism during the period of PSA as a 
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system moving towards socialism whilst exploiting capitalist and pre-capitalist 
economic forms. However, contradictions in this development pattern generate 
sharp social, economic, and political crises. This results in dramatic changes in 
policy, mediated through the bureaucratic system of command. These assume 
the appearance of zigzags in policy between tightening and loosening control, 
and centralization and decentralization. However, throughout all these phases 
the enduring characteristics rooted in the system’s basic features, maintain 
their efficacy, influence, and dominance. At the heart of this process of 
reproduction is the drive towards state accumulation, state investment, and the 
expansion of the scale, terrain and ambition of party and bureaucratic 
agencies.  
Here a close parallel exists between Preobrazensky’s theory of original 
socialist accumulation and Kornai’s concept of forced growth. Forced 
growth in Kornai’s schema expresses the automatic driving forces of a 
bureaucratically planned and publicly owned economy (2.4.3.1). I believe 
that the specific characteristics of the Soviet and Chinese experience of 
accelerated accumulation closely correspond to Kornai’s description of 
forced growth and investment hunger both under classical and reform 
socialism. This process is seen as the spontaneous product of the 
combination of state ownership of the commanding heights and 
bureaucratic coordination.  
 
The main focus of state investment in China is physical infrastructure and 
the built environment. The tendencies described by Kornai to focus on 
rapid growth, priority targets, physical infrastructure, and mega-projects 
are very pronounced in China today (see parts 2.4.3.1 and 3.8-3.10).  
 
The party’s planning policies as illustrated in the 12th Five Year Plan 
determine the pattern of accumulation and economic dynamics. They 
unify the state monopoly of power with state dominance of the economy 
to shape society (3.8.1). By contrast capitalism is driven by profit-seeking 
investment by private enterprises, state power is subordinate to this 
objective, and the private sector dominates the economy. 
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The CCP and the state bureaucracy automatically organize their actions 
in ways that expand their terrain of influence and power. This produces a 
self-replicating and automatic dynamic – to reproduce the existing 
correlation of power relations and to shape them, whilst containing social 
discontent. This process revolves around the fulfilment of state and local 
planning targets and objectives, which are enforced by the punishment 
and reward systems for cadres (see 3.8). 
 
I believe that the dominance of state ownership of the commanding 
heights of the economy, guided by national plan, acts as a compelling 
force on China’s leaders to act the way they do, or to act within 
circumstances that they do not and cannot simply shape as they wish. 
This generates recurring patterns and contradictions. They take the form 
of conflicts over bureaucratic administration; workers’ and peasants’ 
discontent, planning versus markets, state versus private ownership; 
political reform versus the repression of ‘bourgeois forces’; centralization 
and decentralization etc. These forms of appearance are the product of 
social relations, which emerge within an objective environment that 
fundamentally differs from the socio-economic dynamics of capitalism.  
 
While the clashes between factions and ideologies inside the CCP may 
appear to be ideologically driven conflicts, I believe that the roles that 
these actors play are better understood as ‘character masks’ i.e. as 
forms of behaviour that correspond to specific class and bureaucratic 
interests within the system. Marx employed this concept to argue that the 
actions of people with different class interests tend to adopt an almost 
theatrical form corresponding to these interests.  
 
China’s ideological adjustments throughout the reform era entailed a 
declining emphasis on planning and an apparent ambivalence to its 
relative weight within the economy. This also corresponded to the re-
emergence of highly exploitative private enterprises, therefore the CCP’s 
linguistic twists and turns have generally been interpreted as a ritualistic 
and coded language that barely conceal the open embrace of capitalism. 
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This is commonly lauded by pro-capitalists and condemned by socialists 
around the world.  
 
However, I believe that the ideological stance of the CCP leadership 
should not simply be viewed as an inconsistent, contrived, and theatrical 
ritual, designed to dupe the people. Rather it is an attempt to formulate a 
theoretical understanding of Chinese society from within its historically 
embedded reality.  
When Kornai writes about reform socialism he tends to present it as a 
deviation from the norm of classical socialism. It is an incoherent and 
contradictory system and ideology. Eventually, it anchors private 
ownership and market coordination so deeply in society, that the 
pressures pushing for a transition to a capitalist market economy 
overwhelm the old system. This produces a revolutionary transformation, 
such as we saw between 1989 and 1991 in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union.  
Preobrazhensky’s theory of socialist economic development has two 
distinct advantages compared to Kornai’s, which can be usefully 
employed to examine contemporary China.   
1. He assumes that after the socialist revolution there will be a prolonged 
period during which a socialist state develops its economy whilst the 
external environment is still capitalist. State-owned enterprises dominate 
the commanding heights of the economy, but operate where commodity 
production and capitalist relations are widespread and even growing. 
Indeed, the socialist state may need to actively encourage capitalist 
production and markets in order to develop the forces of production and 
the working class.  
2. Preobrazhensky does not assume that socialist planning must inevitably 
degenerate into a bureaucratic system of power. Whereas Kornai 
equates socialism with innate dysfunctionality attributable to inexorable 
bureaucratic tendencies, which the abolition of the dominance of 
capitalism and free market prices automatically entails. 
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Preobrazhensky explains that the laws of a planned economy should be 
governed by regularity and necessity. For example, if a socialist state 
decides to build a new city of a million inhabitants it has to consciously 
mobilize the required resources and manpower. In an ideal world, one 
planning decision connects to another, and becomes unified into a 
coherent set of actions that create the city, with infrastructure that is fit for 
purpose. To build the city’s roads, houses, shops, etc. requires 
machinery, equipment and manpower, and the workforce needs food, 
clothing and shelter etc. Of course, it is possible to build a city by means 
of planning or markets, and all modern cities are built by some 
combination of the two. However, in a transitional economy that is 
supposed to be moving towards socialism, macro-level planning 
principles – the law of planning based on primitive socialist accumulation 
- acts as the main driving force building the city.  
 
Indeed, I refer to the building of cities because the process of planned 
urbanisation in contemporary China has no parallel in any capitalist 
economy, in terms of its speed and scale, and in the role of planning in 
driving this process. The party seeks to modernize society through an 
urbanization drive that creates a new working class composed of 
hundreds of millions of rural migrants. However, the New Urbanization 
plan is not market driven. And nothing indicates that capitalist investment 
for profit would provide work, livelihood and welfare for 100s of millions of 
new urbanites as envisaged under present policies (see 3.8.2). 
 
The CCP and the bureaucracy continue to exercise a dominant position 
within China’s social structure. Every level of the bureaucracy has 
connections to wider society and comes under pressure from different 
class interests. To remain in power they have to mediate these interests 
and class conflicts whilst administering society. I believe that this 
constellation ensures that China’s ruling party and bureaucracy can force 
the pace of economic development and modernization through vast 
megaprojects, which are increasingly international in scope.
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